The 50th Anniversary of REITts: a Triple Case Study With Financial Analysis by White, Barbara Sumrall
University of Mississippi 
eGrove 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 
2012 
The 50th Anniversary of REITts: a Triple Case Study With Financial 
Analysis 
Barbara Sumrall White 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd 
 Part of the Accounting Commons 
Recommended Citation 
White, Barbara Sumrall, "The 50th Anniversary of REITts: a Triple Case Study With Financial Analysis" 
(2012). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 307. 
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/307 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at eGrove. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more 
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE 50
th
 ANNIVERSARY OF REITS: A TRIPLE CASE STUDY WITH                      
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
presented in partial fulfillment of requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Patterson School of Accountancy 
The University of Mississippi 
 
 
 
by 
BARBARA SUMRALL WHITE 
July 12, 2012
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright Barbara Sumrall White 2012 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
On September 14
th
, 2010, the REIT industry celebrated its 50
th
 Anniversary.  Only 
three REITs that were there in the beginning still exist today: Washington Real Estate 
Investment Trust, Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust, and Winthrop Realty Trust 
(formerly known as First Union Real Estate Equity and Mortgage Investments).  This study 
provides a historical recap of the first fifty years of the REIT industry with a review of its rules 
and underlying tax legislation.  In addition, it provides a historical review of the three 
successful companies that have been in the industry throughout its entire existence.  
Quantitative analysis was performed through the computation of specific ratios relevant to the 
REIT industry from 1961 through 2010, utilizing data from Compustat, SNL Financial, and 
hand-collected data.  In addition, ANOVA testing was performed to identify significant 
differences in the ratios for the three specific companies and all the other companies in the 
industry.  Qualitative analysis was performed through review of historical documents and 
interviews with company management.  Specific qualitative and quantitative factors were 
identified for each company, even though those factors may not have been the same for all 
three companies.  The main finding from this research is that a company that can establish its 
identity, hire strong management, know its market, and concentrate its focus on particular 
financial measures and goals will be the company that will survive while other companies fail.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Since the origin of the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry in 1960, the 
industry has undergone many changes in its first fifty years in existence, arriving at its current 
standing as one of the major capital providers of real estate in the United States. On September 
14
th
, 2010, the REIT industry celebrated its 50
th
 Anniversary. REITs were signed into law by 
President Eisenhower as a means to enable Americans to invest in large-scale and diversified 
real estate portfolios. A day after the industry’s establishment, the National Association of Real 
Estate Investment Funds, the predecessor to the National Association of Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (NAREIT), was formed to represent the interest of the REIT industry (NAREIT, REIT 
50 Years Timeline, 2010).  Nineteen public offerings of REITs occurred in the first two years 
of passage of the REIT law (Killen, 1973), and three of them are still in existence today: 
Washington Real Estate Investment Trust, Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust, and 
Winthrop Realty Trust (formerly known as First Union Real Estate Equity and Mortgage 
Investments).   
Financial data for the three surviving companies, along with financial data on other 
companies that have been part of the industry during its first fifty years, were analyzed in a 
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triple case study to illustrate the progression of the REIT industry.  Additional qualitative 
factors on the three surviving companies were analyzed to further illustrate the individual 
company’s development and how it correlated with changes in the industry.  As the REIT 
industry is known to be distinctly affected by market conditions, the particular companies’ 
financial statements were examined to provide documentation of the relationship between 
market conditions and financial variables relevant to this particular industry. Through this 
research on the past, new insight into the future and direction of this exciting industry was 
obtained.  In particular, the following research question was addressed through review of the 
quantitative data, “Based on specific metrics that form a foundation for valuing REITs, do the 
three surviving companies reveal any quantitative differences from other REITs that have 
entered and left the market?”  Through review of the qualitative data obtained through 
interviews, articles, and press releases, the following research question was addressed, “Based 
on qualitative factors, do the three surviving companies reveal any common characteristics that 
can be indicators of their success and longevity throughout the fifty-year history of the REIT 
industry?”    
 
Background 
 REITs have become an important component of the market since their initial 
introduction in 1960, largely due to their tax-preferential status.  Tax preferential status has 
always been one of the driving forces behind the popularity of REITs.  REITs that pay out at 
least 90% of their income do not have to pay federal income taxes. Most states follow federal 
tax laws and as a result, REITs do not have to pay state income taxes either.  “REITs – What 
are they?  How do they work?” (June 2007) states that just as mutual funds allow for 
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investments in stocks, REITs allow for investments in real estate.  The author states that REITs 
combine the best aspects of stocks and real estate, which gives an investor the ability to include 
professionally-managed real estate in a diversified portfolio.  Some REITs own and often 
manage income-producing properties, such as office buildings, apartments, hotels, warehouses, 
and retail centers.  Other REITs are involved in financing, mainly through mortgages on real 
estate.  However, the fact that REITs do not have to pay income taxes and are allowed to 
deduct dividends paid to shareholders has contributed significantly to their attractiveness as an 
investment vehicle.  To maintain the income tax status as a REIT, the entity must make an 
election and meet certain qualifications.  These qualifications include 1) being structured as a 
corporation, trust, or association; (2) being managed by a board of directors or trustees; (3) 
having transferable shares; (4) not being a financial institution or insurance company; (5) being 
jointly owned by 100 or more shareholders; (6) five or more people owning 50% or greater of 
the shares during the last half of the tax year; (7) earning 90% of its income from property 
income, dividends, and interest; (8) paying out at least 90% of its taxable income in dividends; 
(9) owning investments in real estate that make up at least 75% of its assets; (10) deriving 75% 
of its gross income from property income or mortgage interest; and (11) holding less than 20% 
of its assets in taxable REIT shares.  (Internal Revenue Code Section 856) 
 “REITs – What are they?  How do they work?” (June 2007) provides additional 
information about REITs.  As with other entities, REITs can be privately or publicly held and 
classified as equity, mortgage, or a combination of both.  Equity REITs consist of real estate 
operating companies that own and operate income-producing properties.  The primary 
difference between companies formed as equity REITs and other real estate companies is that 
REITs purchase and develop multiple properties to operate within their portfolios, rather than 
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purchasing real estate properties with the sole intent to sell.  REITs provide a benefit to 
investors in this manner, because they offer diversification in a portfolio of properties.  Many 
other real estate companies invest in a single piece of real estate and may not have professional 
managers. The other main type of REIT is a mortgage REIT, which acts directly as a lender to 
real estate owners or indirectly by offering credit through acquiring loans or mortgage-backed 
securities.  Some REITs function as a hybrid by making loans to real estate owners, while also 
owning and managing properties.  
In evaluating performance, REITs have adopted an industry-wide measure called Funds 
from Operations (FFO).  FFO is defined as net income calculated per Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP), plus depreciation and amortization, eliminating gains (losses) 
on the sales of property, and after adjusting for the effects of unconsolidated partnerships and 
joint ventures (NAREIT, 2002).  Gains and losses are eliminated in computing FFO, since FFO 
is intended to correspond to income effects from a company’s recurring operations.  Removing 
the effect of gains and losses allows one to get a better picture of the future income producing 
potential of the REIT.  The definition of FFO was formally implemented by NAREIT in 1991, 
in an effort to endorse a supplementary industry-wide measure of REIT operating performance 
without the problems related to net income under GAAP (NAREIT, 2002).  In 2003, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) permitted companies to use FFO per share in SEC 
filings (Santucci & Newell, 2003).  One of the most important reasons the industry has adopted 
FFO is due to the deemed irrelevance of GAAP-based depreciation for income-producing real 
properties.  Proponents of FFO believe that the residual value of real estate, in particular 
income-producing properties, is much higher than its depreciated value indicates.  The rules 
used to depreciate equipment, computers, or other fixed assets are not perceived to work for 
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income-producing properties.  Not only do they feel that the properties do not decline in value 
as suggested by GAAP depreciation, but in many cases, they actually appreciate in value 
(Khang & Zao, 2009).  Depreciation is typically the largest expense excluded from FFO in 
measuring operating performance (Tsang 2006) and with its exclusion, an argument can be 
made that by using FFO a better operating measure is provided. 
Parmelee (2005) states that REITs do not draw as much interest from individual 
investors as other investments, partly because individuals are not as familiar with REITs.  
However, he notes that REITs can be very attractive to the investor looking for income, since 
REITs must pay out 90% of their net income in dividends to shareholders.  REITs typically 
experience single-digit growth in income and dividend yield.  He states REITs commonly have 
highly-experienced management teams that are familiar with the industry and possess at least a 
modest stake in the firms they manage.       
 
Tax Preference 
 Tax preferential status has always been one of the driving forces behind the popularity 
of REITs.  Originally organized as business trusts, REITs enjoyed tax preferential status until 
1924.  In 1924 in Hecht v. O’Malley, the Supreme Court determined that trusts that actively 
conducted business should pay federal income tax, as if they were a corporation.  Management 
of some trusts chose to eradicate the trusts, and management of many other new trusts elected 
not to become a trust.  However, for some trusts, its management figured out how to 
manipulate the ruling to avoid taxation.  Over the next eleven years, clever managers of trusts 
that were able to navigate the legal requirements were successful in maintaining the tax-free 
status through the real estate investment trust vehicle.  However, management of the trusts 
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struggled to have the trusts recognized by the real estate and investment community.  In  1935, 
the Supreme Court rendered a decision that sealed the fate of the real estate trust.  In Morrissey 
v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court ruled that corporate characteristics, such as continuity of 
life, limited liability, and transferrable ownership, were sufficient to make trusts subject to 
being taxed like corporations.  Thus, all business trusts, even the passive ones, had to pay 
corporate tax.   This decision ended the last advantage of the trusts and thus they were 
nonexistent for the most part over the years that followed (Killen, 1973).      
In 1936, stock and bond investment companies were able to lobby for legislation to 
exempt regulated investment companies from federal taxes.  However, real estate investment 
trusts were not as organized and could not get similar treatment.  In the late 1950s, interest 
spurred to obtain the same tax treatment for real estate investment trusts that was granted to 
mutual funds under the Revenue Act of 1936.  A bill was passed by Congress in 1956 granting 
similar treatment, but President Eisenhower vetoed it over concerns that it would not operate as 
a passive investment vehicle.  In 1960, a group of trusts led by the Real Estate Investment 
Trust of America, predecessor of NAREIT, were able to convince Congress to amend the law.  
An amendment was attached to the cigar tax bill, and President Eisenhower signed it into law 
effective for years after December 31, 1960.  Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Sections 856-858 
approved conduit or pass-through tax treatment for qualified real estate trusts (Kahn, 1967). 
Since 1961, real estate investment trusts have enjoyed this preferential tax treatment.  
Investors in real estate have found these trusts beneficial, as they can avoid double taxation on 
distributions.  Meanwhile, they are afforded the benefits of either the trust or corporate 
structure with its access to public markets.  As long as they meet the requirements set by law, 
companies can maintain the REIT status indefinitely.  Once the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was 
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enacted, which eliminated the deductibility of passive losses, the limited partnership and other 
real estate tax shelters were no longer attractive organizational structures, which in turn opened 
the door for REITs. 
 
Overview of Three Surviving Companies 
 The focus of this research is on the individual companies that have survived the first 
fifty years of the industry’s development.  Washington Real Estate Investment Trust (WRIT) 
started as a company located in the greater Washington D. C. area in 1960 and has remained 
true to its emphasis on local real estate.  Lerner (2010) states that contrary to traditional REITs, 
WRIT has a diversified property platform.  Management feels their strategy has been 
successful, as the company has had forty-eight consecutive years of equal or increasing 
dividends to its investors.  However, management admits that a large part of their success is 
also due to the stable Washington D. C. market, which makes up their diversified portfolio.  
With government offices and the nation’s capital housed in the area, it is known to be one of 
the most stable markets in the U. S., with the ability to ride out the economic cycles.  
Management also feels diversification is important, since some sectors are more susceptible to 
economic cycles.  In addition, as one sector may be down during a particular time, another 
sector may be thriving, which helps to offset any downturns experienced.  WRIT has also 
focused on the smaller tenant, thus making it less vulnerable to one large tenant pulling out and 
leaving a large vacancy.  The office sector is WRIT’s largest, since the Washington D. C. area 
is more of an office-centered area. The continued focus for WRIT is to increase occupancy 
levels, even though its 90% occupancy rate would be considered high to most other REITs 
(Lerner, 2010). 
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 Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust (PREIT) was initially created to supply 
funding for developers and to provide joint venture equity.  Lerner (2010) notes that because of 
early financial constraints, the company was much smaller in its younger years, with later 
expansion into the multi-family or apartment market.  The shared focus of multi-family and 
older or legacy buildings from its early days remained intact until the late 1990s.  In 1997, 
PREIT merged with The Rubin Organization, expanding into the retail market, while 
continuing with the multi-family focus to build on earlier successes.  In 2003, PREIT merged 
again causing its biggest shift in focus.  This time the merger was with Crown American Realty 
Trust, which caused the company to expand even further into the retail market.  Presently, 
PREIT is focused on the retail sector as not only developers, but also owners/managers.  This 
REIT’s philosophy is the opposite of WRIT’s due to the belief that diversified REITs are less 
favorable than becoming single focused with greater vertical integration (Lerner, 2010).   
Lerner (2010) notes that similar to WRIT, management prefers to stay physically 
located near most of their properties, by remaining within a two-hour flight range from 
Philadelphia.  Management feels that a close relationship with their customer base is necessary 
in order to understand their needs and desires.  The resilience of its base geographical area and 
the various types of tenants housed in their properties has allowed it to survive through 
recessions and downturns.  Its base area is the Mid-Atlantic region, which is known for its 
higher income and stable growth. PREIT has also worked with historical preservation and 
environmental projects, in an effort to unite with its communities. Expansion into other sectors 
seems probable for PREIT in the future, as mixed-use developments become more popular. In 
addition, its experience in redevelopment and converting industrial property into more 
environmental-friendly property provides the REIT with an advantage, since it has worked 
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throughout its existence with distressed assets. The current economic downturn has continued 
to provide more of these distressed assets, which PREIT hopes to capitalize on as it builds for 
the future (Lerner, 2010). 
          Winthrop Realty Trust (formerly known as First Union Real Estate and Equity Mortgage 
Investments), starting off with only two properties at its inception, has expanded its portfolio to 
include the retail, service, and office sectors.  Winthrop executives feel the company has grown 
in coordination with the industry.  Winthrop has thrived through the years by seeking out 
underperforming assets and bringing management and capital to the projects to earn an above-
average market return (Investor Relations, Winthrop, 2010).  Unlike WRIT or PREIT, which 
have focused on geographical areas or properties sectors, Winthrop has done neither, rather 
letting the assets’ potential dictate its interest.  It also focuses on joint ventures, where it can 
combine local area expertise with its infusion of capital to grow investments. In addition, 
Winthrop looks for entities to acquire that own real estate, invest in real estate projects solely 
or in a joint venture, obtain preferred equity, or invest in first mortgage debt of real estate. 
Winthrop prides itself on patiently waiting for the right opportunities and avoiding the market 
mania that often drives investor activity (Investor Relations, Winthrop, 2010).   
Michael Ashner, current Chairman/CEO of Winthrop, and a member of the REIT 
industry since the 1980s, believes market conditions have promoted the success of the REIT 
industry.  He believes the real estate crisis of the early 1990s forced many REITs to reduce 
debt and morph out of private equity funding situations, which could be deemed the most 
dramatic event for the REIT industry in his opinion. He sees Equity REITs as a dominant form 
of real estate investing, with dedicated REITS playing a huge role and non-dedicated REITs 
offering varied asset groups (Flynn, 2010).    
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Overview of REIT Industry 
Reviewing the companies’ individual histories and financial statements in consideration 
of industry happenings over the fifty years provided some interesting historical accounting 
research into the interplay between industry and firm dynamics.  Patterns of success within 
individual companies or in conjunction with the industry can provide guidelines for company 
management in navigating their financial futures.  At NAREIT’s website, a timeline for the 
fifty years of the REIT industry is provided (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).  Not 
only does it note who the Presidents of the United States were during the fifty-year period of 
the REIT industry, but also other historical events that have shaped its development.  The 
Presidents are important, since different political parties are seen by the investment community 
as bringing diverse views to the economic environment and can shape an industry influenced 
by economic cycles.  
One of the most significant happenings once the industry itself was created, was the 
formation of NAREIT on September 15, 1960, the day after the REIT industry was established.  
Every industry that is successful seems to need a formal organization to help guide it through 
its transitional states, and NAREIT has provided that for the REIT industry.  Other important 
events in the 1960s include the first REIT being listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 
1965 and the recognition in a Wall Street research write-up about REITs in 1969.  From the 
period of 1969 to 1974, REITs expanded from $1 billion to approximately $21 billion mostly 
due to mortgage REITs financing development and construction financing.  Meanwhile, in 
1970 the first Healthcare REIT was formed, and in 1972 a REIT index was established to allow 
investors to benchmark REITs.  Tax legislation, such as the foreclosure property rules in 1974 
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and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, started changing the organizational dynamics of REITs by 
liberalizing previous restrictions included with the initial REIT rules.  Such restrictions 
included the business structure that permitted REITs to be formed as corporations, instead of 
just as business trusts (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010). 
In the 1970s and1980s, many real estate tax-sheltered partnerships were created that 
raised billions through private placements. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 dealt with this issue 
by enacting passive activity loss rules preventing taxpayers from using partnerships to shelter 
earnings from other sources, which impacted the REIT industry.  The 1986 act liberalized 
REIT powers creating a new class of REITs (Kaplow, 1998).  The real estate market downturn 
that started in 1989 and extended through 1991 was viewed by most as the worst real estate 
downturn market since the Great Depression.  REIT prices dropped in anticipation of a decline 
in private real estate prices (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).    
The decade of the 1990s proved to be a significant time for REITs with many important 
events occurring that propelled the industry forward.  In 1991, NAREIT formally adopted 
Funds from Operations (FFO) as an earnings measure to be used by the REIT industry.  Since 
2003 the SEC allows companies to use FFO per share in SEC filings.  In 1991, the first 
publicly-traded REIT reached $1 billion equity market capitalization, only to be acquired by an 
Australian company.  In 1992, the first public umbrella partnership REIT (UPREIT)
1
 was 
formed.   In 1993, the five or fewer investors rule was lifted, thus pensions become more 
                                                          
1
 An UPREIT is a type of REIT that holds properties through an umbrella-limited partnership controlled by the 
REIT.  The umbrella-limited partnership supplies cash to existing partnerships, which own the real estate 
conveyed.  The existing partners convey their interests in the partnership to the umbrella partnership in exchange 
for limited partnership interests in the umbrella partnership, in which the interests can later be converted into 
REIT stock.  UPREITs offer commercial property owners the ability to defer tax on the sale or transfer of their 
real estate.  Taubman Centers was the first UPREIT to go public in 1992.   
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involved in the REIT market.   The five or fewer investor restriction was initially intended to 
ensure that a few people did not have majority ownership of the REIT.  The problem arose 
when a pension plan was counted as a single investor, even though there were hundreds or 
thousands of members in the pension plan.  Thus, a pension plan was limited in how many 
shares of a REIT it could own.  With the lifting of this rule, pensions could become active 
participants in REITs and it opened up the institutional market for REITs.  This event is 
significant because it opened up REITs to investments by institutional investors (NAREIT, 
REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).   
In 1993, the biggest REIT initial public offering (IPO) to date was initiated, opening up 
the market to large REIT investments.  In 1996, REIT services were expanded by the IRS, 
which allowed REITs to manage and operate the real estate they owned.  In 1997 the REIT 
Simplification Act (REITSA) was signed as part of the budget package in the Taxpayer Relief 
Act of 1997 to reduce the complexity and uncertainty associated with compliance with REIT 
tax law provisions.  In the same year, the Treasury Department modified the U. S. tax treaty 
model to allow non-U.S. stockholders to pay 15% in taxes on ordinary dividends for REITs.   
In addition, during 1997 the private fund model was introduced to the industry, as AMB
2
 
completed a roll-up of separately-managed private portfolios into one public REIT.   In 1999, 
NAREIT added real-time pricing to the index and the REIT Modernization Act was signed into 
law (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).    
                                                          
2
 AMB Property Corporation became one of the largest public REITs in 1997.  The name AMB comes from the 
first initials of the founders’ last names.  AMB was a client advisory real estate company prior to becoming a 
REIT, but was successful converting to a REIT because its clients were satisfied with its above-average 
performance. 
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 In the decade of the 2000s, REITs have moved forward in the investment arena with 
increased global interest.  REIT exchange traded funds (ETFs) hit the market as the iShares 
Dow Jones U. S. Real Estate Index Fund was created.  In 2001, REITs were added to the 
Standard & Poors’ Indexes, such as the S & P 500 Index.  As part of the global economy, the 
U. S. and U. K. signed a reciprocal tax treaty in 2003 that allowed U. K. pension funds to 
invest in U. S. REITs without requiring taxes to be withheld on the dividend distributions.  In 
2004, IBM added a REIT investment index as an option to its pension portfolio mix, while the 
REIT Improvement Act was signed into law the same year.  In 2006, The Real Estate Equity 
Security Alliance (REESA) held its first meeting with members from NAREIT and similar 
associations in Japan, Australia, Great Britain, Canada and Asia in a worldwide effort to unite 
this industry (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).   
In 2008, the REIT Investment and Diversification Act was signed into law giving 
REITs more privileges, such as the ability to buy and sell assets efficiently and increase the 
size of REIT subsidiaries. In addition, NAREIT led an effort to achieve uniform tax treatment 
for REIT investments all over the world.  In 2009, with the global credit crisis, REITs 
demonstrated toughness by reducing their debt and strengthening their balance sheets.  In 
addition, NAREIT launched the website, www.reit.com in June 2009, where this timeline may 
be found.  In 2010, Congress recognized the REIT industry’s 50th Anniversary with a 
congressional resolution.  This resolution shows the significance of the REIT industry to the 
overall investment market in the U. S. (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).   
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Need for Historical Accounting Research 
 Historical accounting research is as important today as it has ever been. As Aristotle 
noted, “if you would understand anything observe its beginnings and its developments” (as 
cited in Grant, 1995).  In the case of the REIT industry, studying its history through the lens of 
financial accounting assists in understanding the components that have allowed the REIT 
industry to thrive over the last fifty years, while providing insights into the components that 
will propel it successfully forward.  As Winston Churchill stated, “The longer you look back, 
the farther you can look forward.” 
        Historical accounting research also provides an industry with information that may be key 
to its success. As George Santayana stated, “Those who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it” (Santayana, 1905). Through studying the history of the industry and 
individual companies, mistakes and pitfalls that have occurred hopefully can be minimized as 
the industry moves forward into its next fifty years. With this concern for successfully moving 
forward, Moseley and Usry describe historical research: 
History involves the selection of facts about the past. The selection process is 
tempered by the judgment of the researcher as to what he thinks is fact and 
significant. Facts are often seen as causes and the researcher again exercises his 
judgment in interpreting the causes and determining how the causes relate to the 
present (Moseley and Usry, 1981).  
 
 Historical accounting research also assists one in understanding experiences and 
tensions present in the current environment. As Carr noted, “to enable man to understand the 
society of the past and to increase his mastery over the society of the present is the dual 
function of history” (Carr, 1967).  By analyzing various articles written about the REIT 
industry, one can see that the industry has been questioned at times about its prevalent use of 
non-GAAP accounting disclosures, such as funds from operations (FFO).  Providing value-
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relevant disclosures to investors that will sustain investment and interest in the REIT industry 
is important to society, as real estate is a significant component of economic well-being. 
Littleton’s perspective on accounting research states; 
But history is useful as well as inspiring. In meeting conditions as they arise it is 
distinctly helpful to start with a consciousness of the fact that change is a 
permanent element. There is always need for constant, even if cautious, revision 
of ideas and patient adaptation or renovation of methods. Whence better than 
from history could that consciousness come? (Littleton, 1966) 
 
  Using historical accounting research, disclosures, and accounting methods that have 
predominated the reporting and recording of financial information for the REIT industry is 
viewed under a new lens to provide guidance moving forward.  Researching the development 
of the industry over the last fifty years and the companies that have survived offers new 
insights and possible paths that increase the success and usefulness of this industry and its 
contribution to the overall economy.   As Oscar Wilde stated, “The one duty we owe to history 
is to rewrite it” (Foreman, 1966). 
 Historical accounting research can be a tool for bringing awareness to society of the 
interplay between accounting, economic, and legal factors.  History should not be viewed as a 
closed book, but as something always in the making (Schlesinger, Jr., 2007, 1).   Thus, the 
interaction of accounting, economic, and legal factors results in ongoing impact on societal 
functions and decision making.  Homburger notes that accounting history: 
…can help to improve judgment and competence by bringing present-day 
theories, conventions, and practices into perspective, by awakening the 
student’s consciousness of their relationship to our economic and legal 
environment (Homburger, 1958).  
 
The American Accounting Association (AAA) has long supported accounting history 
research as an area of research that is necessary to the development of the accounting 
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profession.  The Committee on Accounting History of the American Accounting Association 
issued a report in 1970 which describes accounting history as: 
…the study of the evolution in accounting thought, practices, and institutions in 
response to changes in the environment and societal needs. It also considers the 
effect that this evolution has worked on the environment (Committee on 
Accounting History Report, 1970). 
 
 
 
Case Study Research as an Accounting History Methodology 
 
 Case study research is an effective means of analyzing issues in a natural, real-life 
setting.  In accounting history research, case studies can provide detailed insight into historical 
events and trends from the perspective of the companies and individuals involved by 
conducting meetings and gathering data in their respective familiar locations.  The qualitative 
information that is obtained provides meaning to quantitative data gathered there and 
elsewhere.  Qualitative data is usually collected through surveys, interviews, observation, 
collection of physical artifacts, and documentation review (Yin, 1984).  
For many years, case study researchers have attempted to clarify the methodological 
basis upon which to conduct case studies (Benbasat, et al. 1987, Datta 1982, Herriot 1982).   
Among management researchers, the natural science model is a well-known and widely 
accepted model for conducting studies in social science.
3
  Lee (1989) notes that it is the critics 
of case study research that require convincing of its legitimacy.  He mentions that the case 
researcher must manage with qualitative data and verbally stated propositions, which can be 
more problematic than working with quantitative data.  In addition, he cautions that case 
                                                          
3
 In his article, “The case for the natural science model for research in organizational behavior and organizational 
theory,” Behling (1980) promotes the natural science model and refers to it as a good research methodology that 
has gained wide acceptance in organizational theory.   
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researchers have to deal with the non-replicability of observations when attempting to verify 
the findings of a particular case study.  Lastly, Lee (1989) notes that case studies are known by 
a unique set of circumstances that make them vulnerable to changes that make them not-
extendable to other settings, thereby limiting their generalizability. 
  Case study research works in tangent with the scientific method by showing that 
acquiring knowledge through physical evidence is an ongoing process with the development of 
better models that can deal with the limits inherent with true verifiability.  Copi (1986) states, 
“Few propositions of science are directly verifiable as true.  In fact, none of the important ones 
are.”  Thus, indirect testing of theoretical perceptions serves to address the problems with 
direct verification.  In addition, natural controls can be used to meet the need for controlled 
observations.  By focusing on a single person, behavior can be identified with the specific 
treatment.  In addition, natural controls and treatments can be incorporated into the formulation 
of a prediction, which is in keeping with the natural science model.  Case study research works 
by applying the same theories as tested in the original case study to a different set of initial 
conditions.  Thus, even though observations may not be replicated, case study findings can be.  
Additional case studies can confirm the empirical circumstances of particular settings.  Lee 
(1989) states, “In other words, generalizability is a quality describing a theory that has been 
tested and confirmed in a variety of situations, whether such testing is conducted through case 
research, laboratory experiments, statistical experiments, or natural experiments.”    
 The advantages of the case study method are its applicability to real life, contemporary 
nature, suitability for human situations, and relevance to everyday experiences that facilitate an 
understanding of complex real life situations.  In addition, the public has accessibility to some 
of the information in case studies through written reports.  Yin (1984) defines the case study 
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research method as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within a 
real life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.  With case study research, an 
object is selected that is internally connected to the political, social, historical, and personal 
issues.  Case study research generally answers one or more questions beginning with “how” or 
“why” targeted to a select number of conditions and their inter-relationships (Yin, 1984).    
 Analytical rigor in case study research is important and can be assessed in two ways.  
First, one can ask if the case study considers any predictions through which the theory of 
interest could be proven wrong or if the study rules out rival theories?  In addition, one can 
check to see if the predictions are consistent with one another and if the case study confirms 
the theory through empirical testing.  Secondly, the case study can reveal analytical rigor by 
considering the degree to which it addresses the above issues.  As the number of explicitly 
derived predictions or the number of organizational settings is increased, the more rigorous the 
theory will be considered.  In addition, the more rival theories that are considered enhances the 
theory’s degree of relative prediction power.  Lee (1989) concludes that neither quantitative 
nor qualitative research is inherently more rigorous, and it does not matter if theories are stated 
in the form of mathematical propositions or verbal propositions.  Thus, case study research can 
be beneficial to address issues where true experimentation would not work (Lee, 1989).  For 
history research working with specific firms and industries, case studies can provide relevant 
information on the impact of past decisions on a firm’s or industry’s viability.  In this manner, 
case study research will be used to analyze fifty years of the REIT industry with particular 
emphasis on the three firms that have survived since the industry’s initiation.        
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Purpose of Study 
 As this study addresses the 50
th
 Anniversary of the REIT industry through the lens of 
financial analysis of individual companies and the overall REIT industry, it provides 
information relevant to the financial markets of the United States.  Through the fifty years, the 
REIT industry has grown in its sophistication and prominence, with three companies surviving 
throughout the years. The purpose of this research was performing a triple case study of the 
three companies by analyzing their financial statements, reading press releases, and 
interviewing management, to identify events and trends that were attributable to the 
companies’ successes over the fifty years. Analyzing these companies’ histories in an 
accounting context enables important attributes, such as earnings and dividend potential, to be 
identified.  With knowledge of these attributes, benchmarks were established for evaluating 
future companies’ successes. In addition, a story was told about each of the companies and the 
role each played in the development of the industry. The primary purpose of this study was to 
increase the body of accounting history in the relevance of financial statements’ items and 
trends, while considering the market’s willingness to accept new industries when demanded by 
investors.   
 
Methodology 
  The focus of the methodology was to answer the research question, “Based on specific 
metrics that form a foundation for valuing REITs, do the three surviving companies reveal any 
quantitative differences from other REITs that have entered and left the market?”  First, to 
understand the three surviving companies, financial statements were obtained and analyzed for 
as many of the fifty years as possible. With these financial statements, typical financial 
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analysis, such as trend analysis and ratio analysis, was performed on both an individual basis 
and in comparison with the other two surviving companies and overall industry results. The 
financial analysis was the primary source for an examination of the activities of the companies 
that have led to their ability to survive throughout the fifty years of the industry.  Additional 
primary source material came from interviews with present and former management and 
personnel that will provide insight into the strategies and policies related to the companies’ 
successes. 
 Additionally, press releases and other write-ups concerning each of the companies were 
examined. These sources of secondary information were used to identify important aspects and 
other items of interest related to the companies. Lastly, interviews were conducted with 
industry personnel concerning noteworthy facts related to these companies and other 
companies that have been part of the REIT industry. 
 To obtain a better understanding of the industry, NAREIT’s website and publications 
were thoroughly examined for documentation of important industry events and factors.  Other 
publications from NAREIT, such as their White Papers and the REIT magazine, were analyzed 
for information relating to the fifty-year history of the industry.  Tax legislation was also 
examined, as tax laws have had a distinct effect on the industry’s growth and development.  
Lastly, interviews were conducted with officials at NAREIT concerning the history of the 
industry and the role of past events in setting the future of the industry.  Chapter III provides 
more detailed information regarding the methodology. 
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Contributions of the Study 
 A major contribution of this study was to analyze and document the Real Estate 
Investment Trust industry’s success over its fifty years of existence in a financial context.  An 
additional contribution was to analyze and document three successful companies: Washington 
Real Estate Investment Trust, Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust, and Winthrop Realty 
Trust.  These entities have survived from the beginning of the industry to the present.   These 
companies are used as a backdrop to telling the story of the industry, but in a way unique to 
accounting history research. Rather than just review and discuss the companies’ histories, 
financial analysis was used as a tool to offer an accounting perspective on the happenings of an 
industry. The role the accounting numbers and financial statements play in telling the story of 
these successful companies offers insight into an industry’s anniversary celebration that has 
mainly been discussed in a more narrative sense prior to this study (NAREIT, 2010).  The role 
of tax changes on the industry’s development was also highlighted.  Historical accounting 
research offers a new lens to an event that is just being brought to the forefront, with the 
recognition of the 50
th
 Anniversary of the REIT industry, whose celebration began on 
September 14, 2010.      
 
Limitations of the Study 
 When evaluating the history of the REIT industry in recognition of its 50
th
 Anniversary, 
certain aspects of the history may not be discussed as thoroughly in this study as they have 
been elsewhere. Since the financial aspects of the history are of utmost priority in this study, 
certain narrative aspects of the industry’s history may be minimized that others would deem 
important. 
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 In addition, interviews were conducted as part of this research, and with interviews, the 
author brings in her own biases and experiences. As a historian, one should relay events 
accurately as they occur, trying to leave out personal judgments that could influence how 
events are told. However, the author realizes this can be difficult when beliefs and interests 
lead an interview in a certain direction. The author was careful to have interview questions 
structured, such that a plan could be followed that allow insights into the company and 
industry, while also permitting systematic comparability. 
 
Organization and Plan of the Study 
 Chapter I is the introduction to the dissertation and provides an overview of the Real 
Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry and the three companies that were studied as part of 
the research.  The need for accounting historical research is also presented, along with the use 
of case study research in this regard.  After those discussions, the purpose of the study and the 
methodology employed are presented.  Lastly, both the contributions and limitations of the 
study are presented, along with the overall plan for the research. 
 Next, Chapter II provides detailed information about the REIT industry.  Emphasis 
includes analysis of changes in tax laws and criticisms of non-GAAP accounting over the past 
fifty years, along with a detailed discussion of the REIT rules.  Chapter III addresses the 
specific methodology utilized and analysis performed.  Chapter IV is devoted to NAREIT, 
where information about this association and its services is presented.  Chapter V is devoted to 
Washington Real Estate Investment Trust (WRIT), where financial analysis, narratives, and 
interviews are presented for that company.  A similar analysis of Pennsylvania Real Estate 
Investment Trust (PREIT) is presented in Chapter VI.  Chapter VII is devoted to Winthrop 
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Realty Trust (known previously as First Union Real Estate and Equity Mortgage Investments).  
Chapter VIII offers a data analysis and comparison among the three companies and extends 
that comparison to include the relevance to the industry.  Chapter IX, the final chapter in the 
dissertation, offers some conclusions and highlights the trends and significance of the 
companies and industry.  In this chapter, additional insight is offered into what can be learned 
from this analysis and how the accounting profession and investment community can use this 
information to make financial information more valuable as an indicator of future prospects.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE REIT INDUSTRY 
 
 The official REIT industry was launched in 1960 with President Eisenhower’s signature 
on the REIT Act.  As with a lot of legislation, this particular act was included in other 
unrelated legislation known as the Cigar Excise Tax Extension of 1960.  One day after the law 
was passed on September 15
th
, the National Association of Real Estate Investment Funds was 
formed, which later became known as NAREIT (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).  
However, both the creation of the industry and the establishment of the professional advocacy 
group, NAREIT, were already years in the making.  Tax professionals had begun years earlier 
to look at the unfairness in tax laws that permitted pass-through treatment to regulated 
investment companies, while real estate investment trusts did not enjoy the same tax preference 
status.  The choice of investing in stocks or investing in real estate was an investor decision 
driven by multiple factors and not just tax concerns.  In 1956, a bill resembling the REIT Act 
of 1960 was approved by the Senate and House of Representatives.  However, the Treasury 
Department was not convinced that real estate investment trusts would remain passive 
according to the 1956 bill and encouraged a Presidential veto.  However, the REIT Act of 1960 
did specify that the trust must be completely passive, which caused the Treasury Department 
25 
 
and President Eisenhower to support and ultimately sign the bill (Blake, 1988).    With the 
signing of the REIT Act, the stage was set for the industry to grow.   During the years 1960 and 
1961, six REITs known as First Union Real Estate (name changed to Winthrop Realty Trust), 
Pennsylvania REIT, Washington REIT, Bradley Real Estate Investors, Continental Mortgage 
Investors, and First Mortgage Investors were all initiated.  Of those initial six companies, only 
three are still in existence today; Winthrop Realty Trust, Pennsylvania REIT, and Washington 
REIT (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010). 
Besides the 50th anniversary of the REIT industry and NAREIT that occurred in 2010, 
the year 2011 marks other milestones important to the industry.  As Blair noted, “At 
NAREIT’s 2010 Annual Convention we celebrated the 50th Anniversary of the REIT industry.  
This year, we will celebrate another milestone in our industry:  the 20
th
 Anniversary of the 
Modern REIT era.  Most REIT professionals and investors date the beginning of the Modern 
REIT Era to November 22, 1991, when Kimco launched its IPO” (Blair, 2011).  Kimco is a 
large, publicly-traded, equity REIT that went public in 1991 to obtain financing.  This move 
started a wave of REIT IPOs, as other companies also went public.  In 1991, eight firms 
followed Kimco’s example by going public, and in 1993, 75 REITs went public (Johnson, 
2010).    Blair noted, “The wave of REIT IPOs that characterized the beginning of the Modern 
REIT era transformed the REIT marketplace from an industry made up of mainly mortgage 
REITs to one composed of primarily larger, publicly traded equity REITs” (Blair, 2011).  What 
makes this Modern REIT era significant is the rapid growth of the industry, from an equity 
market capitalization of $13 billion at the end of 1991, to $155 billion at the end of 2001, to 
$389 billion as of December 2010 (NAREIT, 2011). 
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Besides the beginning of the Modern REIT, 2011 marked another important 
anniversary for REITs.  In October 2001, Standard & Poors (S & P) added REITs to its 
indexes, most importantly the S & P 500 Index.  This move was an important signal to analysts 
and investors that the industry was gaining in importance, since S & P included REITs in its 
flagship index, the S & P 500.  As Equity International Chairman Zell noted on the move by S 
& P to reclassify REITs for inclusion in its indices, it was a “coming of age” for the REIT 
industry (Kenney, 2011).    Prior to this, the REIT industry had acknowledged that being left 
outside the indexes was slowing down the growth of the industry.  Some investors did not want 
to purchase stocks that were not part of the coveted S & P 500 Index.  In addition, as long as 
they were excluded from the index, some investors did not perceive REITs as real stock 
investments (Kenney, 2011).  Martin Cohen of Cohen & Steers, the largest REIT investment 
firm, states that “We wanted recognition that REITs had become mainstream investments” 
(Kenney, 2011).  Jim Sullivan of Green Street Advisors stated “The inclusion of REITs in the 
S & P 500 provided a clear endorsement of the idea that real estate should no longer be this 
island way off on its own.”  He felt REITs should be viewed as an investment option, just as 
stocks in other public companies and industries were considered.  It is speculated that the 
reason for their exclusion was due to the small capitalization, low trading volume, and lack of 
internal management (Kenney, 2011). 
With the beginning of the Modern REIT era in 1991, REITs began to appear more like 
other stock investments.  Equity Office Properties Trust was the first REIT to become part of 
the S & P 500, bumping Texaco Inc. from inclusion.  By November 1, 2001, Equity 
Residential was in the S & P 500, while Hospitality Properties Trust became part of the S & P 
400 and Colonial Properties Trust became part of the S & P 600.  REITs could now be viewed 
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as best in class companies.  However, Sullivan notes there are some downsides to inclusion by 
stating, “One consequence of the S & P inclusion is that REIT share price movements can get a 
bit ‘noisy’ when the S & P is moving up and down for reasons that are largely unrelated to the 
economic drivers that should cause REIT share prices to move up or down.”  (Kenney, 2011)  
Even though their correlation with other equity markets may have increased, so has the 
volatility of REIT stocks.  In the ten-year period since October 2001, the market capitalization 
of REITs has nearly tripled partly due to inclusion in these market indices, from $155.6 billion 
to $433.3 billion, thus lowering their capital costs.  Schalop sums it up by saying, “I think that 
when I began this effort in early 2001, I really believed that this would be a transformational 
event for the industry.  It really has been.”  In 2001, when S & P first started including REITs, 
one in twenty defined contribution plans included a REIT fund.  In 2011, one in three defined 
contribution plans include a REIT fund.  Fifteen REITs now have a spot in the S & P 500, with 
the sixteenth in the process of conversion to a REIT.  They make up 2% of the index’s total 
market value (Kenney, 2011). 
 
REIT Industry during its First 50 Years 
Throughout the 1960s, the REIT industry worked to establish itself as a legitimate 
vehicle for investment.  In 1965, the first REIT to become part of the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), Continental Mortgage Investors, appeared in its listings.  In the 1960s and 
into the next decade, mortgage REITs fueled the expansion of the industry.  The period from 
1969 – 1974 marked the first major expansion, as mortgage REITs engaged in land 
development and construction financing.  With this expansion, total industry assets increased 
from $1 billion to $21 billion.  Also in 1969, the global REIT model expanded to Europe with 
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the Netherlands enacting the first European REIT legislation.  The first piece of REIT research 
conducted by a Wall Street analyst was published in 1969, showing that the REIT industry had 
become a plausible investment vehicle (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).   
The REIT industry was not recognized by the investment community until the surge 
during 1968 - 1969.  The problem was due to the fact that most people did not understand the 
unique aspects of real estate.  Real-estate investing was seen as something for the more 
speculative, risk-taking type of elitist individual.  However, once a few analysts caught on to 
the income yields and strong price appreciation of some of the largest REITs, REITs began to 
be seen as a valid investment vehicle.  Timing was good for the REITs, as the general stock 
market was becoming stagnant in early 1969 and by the latter part of 1969 was experiencing a 
decline.  Seen as the wave of the future, the new REIT listings beginning in 1969 were 
received favorably at a time when other stocks did not appear so good (Killen, 1973). 
 With the growth in the industry that occurred during the 1960s, the first REIT-focused 
periodical, Realty Trust Review, was started by Kenneth Campbell in 1970.  Also in 1970, the 
first healthcare REIT, Health Care Fund, was started, which is the predecessor to Health Care 
REIT, Inc. that is still in operation in 2011.  Two years later in January 1972, NAREIT 
established the REIT index which enabled interested parties to evaluate REIT price and return 
performance.  The index allowed the industry to provide much needed information to potential 
investors who might be interested in providing capital to further grow this developing industry.  
With the enactment of foreclosure property rules, REITs experienced their first major change 
in tax laws in 1974 (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).  In 1974, Congress passed a 
special rule for foreclosure property that allowed the REIT to possess property obtained 
through foreclosure for two years, with possible extension for another two, provided the REIT 
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remitted the normal corporate income tax on income earned from the foreclosure.  This 
provision for foreclosure property permitted the REIT an equitable time to systematically 
liquidate the foreclosure property without losing conduit tax treatment due to its holding 
property for sale (95
th
 Congress, 1979).  
 The Tax Reform Act of 1976 continued the changes to REIT provisions by allowing 
REITs to be created as corporations, along with business trusts.  It was signed into law by  
President Ford as the first real effort to simplify REIT provisions (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years 
Timeline).  In simplifying REIT provisions, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 raised the total 
income resulting from certain sources from 90% to 95%, offered a “reasonable cause” out from 
disqualification for failure to meet the 95% and 75% income tests, revoked the prohibition on 
gain resulting from property held primarily for sale to customers and instead taxed 100% of the 
gain on sale from the sale of such property, provided a deduction for dividend deficiencies 
instead of  disqualification, and made certain other technical adjustments (Kelley, 1998). 
Utilizing the changes in tax laws that impacted REITs, the 1970s and1980s produced 
many real estate tax-sheltered partnerships that raised billions through private placements. 
These partnerships were enticing to investors, as they could shelter more income through 
losses and large depreciation deductions (Kaplow, 1998).  As the demand for REITs was 
squeezed by these private placements, the National Real Estate Stock Fund was initiated as the 
first mutual fund to be open-ended and dedicated to REITs and real estate investments.  
However, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 enacted passive activity loss rules that prevented 
taxpayers from using partnerships to shelter earnings from other sources.  The passive activity 
loss rules spurred the growth of the REIT industry, as REITs now became the prime vehicle for 
investment in commercial real estate assets (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).  With 
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the passive activity rules making tax shelters obsolete, investors sought a means to continue 
investment in real estate. Passive activity losses could only be deducted to the extent of passive 
activity gains, thus a tax shelter no longer provided its past tax benefit.  With the help of 
lobbying by NAREIT, REITs were able to add legislation that enabled them to be self-
managed, which furthered the appeal of REITs.  With the previous loophole closed in regards 
to tax shelters and the addition of new powers, REITs offered a viable solution for future 
commercial investment in real estate (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).   
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 liberalized REIT powers creating a new class of REITs 
that have become the modern REIT.  REITs could now own and manage their real properties, 
permitting a vertical integration of the company that was not possible prior to the Act (Kaplow, 
1998).  With the real estate market downturn that started in 1989 and continued through 1991, 
investors experienced what some consider the worst real estate downturn since the Great 
Depression.  Seeing private real estate prices declining on the horizon, REIT prices dropped 
first (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).    
The REIT industry was thrust forward during the 1990s and many consider this time to 
be the start of the modern REIT era.  Up to this point the industry was much smaller and 
evenly split between mortgage and equity REITs (Wood, 2011).   In 1991, NAREIT formally 
adopted the earnings measure of Funds from Operations (FFO) for the REIT industry.  This 
earnings measure has become such a significant component of REIT evaluations that in 2003 
the SEC started allowing companies to use FFO per share in SEC filings.  In 1991, publicly-
traded New Plan was the first of its kind to grow in equity market capitalization to the $1 
billion mark.  In addition during that same year, Kimco prospered by launching the first IPO in 
several years by an equity REIT.  In 1992, the first public UPREIT was formed, with Taubman 
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completing the first UPREIT IPO (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).  Taubman 
Centers, Inc., a publicly traded REIT, has always been known as one of the pioneers of the 
American mall business.  Taubman had been a managing partner of a limited partnership, but 
continued its reputation as a pioneer in the REIT business by forming an UPREIT in 1992.  By 
using the UPREIT formation, it allowed the company to go public without exposing existing 
partners to large capital gain taxes (Robaton, 2011).  
In 1993, Congress lifted the five or fewer investors rule, allowing pensions more access 
to the REIT market, which increased institutional investment in REITs. With the Revenue 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, REIT shares possessed by trusts of qualified pension plans became 
regarded as owned by the plan beneficiaries for purposes of the rule prohibiting 5 or fewer 
individuals from owning 50% or more of the REIT’s shares (Kelley, 1998).   In 1993, the 
biggest REIT initial public offering (IPO) initiated to date of approximately $840 million by 
Simon Property Group, reflected larger investment opportunities in the REIT marketplace 
(NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).  
 REIT services were expanded by the IRS in its first private letter ruling on qualifying 
services for REITs in 1996.  The ruling was pursued by NAREIT over a three-year period 
related to a REIT providing cable services to residential tenants.  The REIT Simplification Act 
(REITSA) was enacted as part of the budget package in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.  Also 
in 1997, the Treasury Department modified its model for tax treaty compliance by permitting 
non-U.S. stockholders to pay 15% in taxes on ordinary dividends for REITs and saw the 
private fund model
4
 introduced to the REIT industry.  Another milestone in 1997 was the 
                                                          
4
 The Private Fund model consists of a group of independently managed private portfolios combined into one, 
publicly traded REIT. 
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launching of the largest equity REIT IPO to date of approximately $903 million by Boston 
Properties, Inc., as the market sought larger investments in REITs.  In 1999, NAREIT added 
concurrent valuation with its Real-Time REIT Index and the REIT Modernization Act became 
law.  Also in 1999, timber REITs became part of the landscape as Plum Creek Timber 
Company was introduced as the first of its kind.   A major development in the international 
REIT arena was the establishment of the European Public Real Estate Association (EPRA) in 
1999 (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).    
  In the 2000s, REITs moved even further towards being viewed as a valued investment 
with heightened global awareness.  The year 2000 saw REIT exchange-traded funds (ETFs) 
promoted through a new U. S. Real Estate Index Fund, the iShares Dow Jones fund.  In 2001, 
REITs were added to the Standard & Poor’s Indices,5 with Equity Office Properties Trust being 
the first REIT included as part of the S & P 500 Index.  In addition, in October 2001, the 
EPRA/NAREIT Global Real Estate Index was launched, furthering REITs as international 
investment vehicles.  Also during 2001, Ibbotson Associates published breakthrough research 
on the benefits of owning REITs as part of a diversified investment portfolio (NAREIT, REIT 
50 Years Timeline, 2010).  
 REITs become part of the global economy in 2003, as the U. S. and U. K. signed a 
reciprocal tax treaty to permit pension plans in the U. K. to allocate investment dollars to 
REITs in the U. S. with no taxes withheld on subsequent dividend distributions.  Similar zero-
withholding treatment occurred that same year for other countries, such as Japan.   Also in 
2003, Ibbotson Associates published additional research to highlight the benefit of including 
                                                          
5
 As of 6/30/2010, 15 REITs were part of the S & P 500, 25 REITs were part of the S & P 400 Mid Cap Index, 
and 27 REITs were part of the S & P 600 Small Cap Index.  
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both private and public real estate in portfolios held long-term.  Their research showed 
performance data of direct investment in real estate and investment in REITs in institutional 
portfolios    The following year, 2004, IBM added a REIT investment index as an option to its 
pension portfolio mix in an effort to give its participants an alternative investment vehicle 
uncorrelated with traditional asset classes (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).   
In 2004, the largest public-to-public acquisition occurred as General Growth Properties 
purchased The Rouse Company.  Additionally important, the REIT Improvement Act was 
signed into law.  Significant legislation included in the REIT Improvement Act permitted a 
REIT to either correct a mistake or incur monetary penalties for most violations of REIT tax 
rules, rather than the previously legislated and imposed loss of REIT status. This act removed 
some of the discriminatory barriers to foreign investment in publicly-listed REIT stock.  The 
REIT Improvement Act was actually passed as part of the American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004.  Also in 2004, the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 was passed, which 
contained technical corrections related to the 15% maximum tax rate for certain REIT 
dividends (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).    
Entering into the second half of the decade of the 2000s, more recognition, exposure, 
and international emphasis surrounded the REIT industry.  Real Estate Equity Security 
Alliance (REESA) held its first meeting with members from NAREIT during its annual 
convention, with attending members from Japan, Australia, Great Britain, Canada and Asia.  
REESA is an ongoing effort to unite the REIT industry and provide worldwide awareness of 
income-producing real estate.  To further the global awareness of U. S. and foreign REITs, 
Ibbotson Associates published more research on REITs.  This research highlighted the benefits 
of global REITs and the inclusion of publicly-listed real property investments in portfolios to 
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provide diversification.  In 2008, the REIT Investment and Diversification Act (RIDEA) was 
enacted expanding REIT privileges.  With its passage, the use of taxable REIT subsidiaries 
grew.  As with other REITs, health care REITs could now implement taxable REIT 
subsidiaries (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).   
Continuing its ongoing research on REITs, Ibbotson Associates published results in 
2008 concerning the utilization of liability-relative optimization.
6
  Also that year, NAREIT led 
an effort to attain consistent international tax policies related to investments in REITs through 
coordination with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  The 
FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global REIT index was modified in 2009 to add REITs from rising 
markets.  In that same year with the occurrence of the global credit crisis, REITs demonstrated 
toughness by reducing their debt and strengthening their balance sheets and the investment 
community responded favorably.  In addition, NAREIT launched the website, www.reit.com in 
June 2009.  To further identify the industry, NAREIT renamed its flagship magazine, REIT:  
Real Estate Investment Today
7
.  In September 2010, Congress recognized the REIT industry’s 
50
th
 Anniversary with a congressional resolution (NAREIT, REIT 50 Years Timeline, 2010).  
Upon reading U. S. Senator Johnny Isakson’s floor statement regarding the Congressional 
Resolution provided in Appendix J, one can see how this congressional resolution shows the 
significance of the REIT industry to the overall investment market in the U. S. 
                                                          
6
 Liability-relative optimization focuses on the challenges of pension funds in trying to manage assets to sustain 
their long-term pension liabilities.  The concern is over managing the future variability of a funding surplus, while 
accomplishing the best performance for the portfolio. 
7
 NAREIT continues to produce its magazine, REIT:  Real Estate Investment Today, six times a year in both an 
online and written format.  This magazine is available to not only members, but other interested parties also. 
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As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the decade of the 2000s and beyond have 
shown international interest in U. S. REITs grow exponentially.  Even though 2011 levels on 
non-U. S. investment have not reached the levels they were in 2007 of $40 billion, 
international investment is once again increasing in 2011, especially with the weak dollar.  
With its close physical proximity, Canada has been one of the biggest international investors in 
the U. S.  Canada has experienced a strong economy with stable currency values in the recent 
period leading up to 2011.  Real estate is also in high demand in Canada, with not enough 
supply available to meet demand, thus the U. S. is viewed as a natural fit.  Canadian companies 
have also snapped up parts of U. S. companies, like General Growth Properties, which had 
been in bankruptcy in 2010, but is now 40% owned by Brookfield Canada Office Properties.  
Washington D. C. and New York are seen as two strong areas of demand, with potential 
Canadian investors flocking to those regions that offer sustainable high rents.  International 
pension funds are also responsible for the interest, since REITs offer the ability to invest in real 
estate without being locked into a particular property.  Thus, when amounts are needed to meet 
funding requirements, REITs in recent years have offered liquidity through high dividends and 
the ability to divest easily in the equity markets (Keenan, pp. 20-22).       
According to Merrie S. Frankel, Vice-President and Senior Credit Officer with 
Moody’s Investor Service, economic uncertainty is a reminder that meticulous analysis of 
firms is essential and that the property markets and economy are connected.  She states that 
long-term leases of REITs are an advantage, in that they allow them to withstand periodic 
rough times with tiered refinancing dates.  Since they do not have to refinance too much in any 
one year, REITs can better steer through rough waters in a turbulent economy.  She continues 
to state that in the past, REITs have been proactive in preparing for unknowns, like rising 
36 
 
interest rates, by negotiating credit lines early and refinancing mortgages.  In her opinion, in 
order to move ahead in a difficult environment, such as 2012, REITs will have to carefully 
pursue acquisitions, while emphasizing liquidity.  Since REITs are not able to retain earnings, 
most of their debt payoffs happen by using additional equity or debt financing. In addition, as 
times get tough, positive spreads from rents will become harder to achieve, according to 
Frankel (Kenney, 4 Quick Questions, 2011).  Thus, as new leases are signed during a 
recessionary environment, lower rent and other rent concessions can cause the spreads from 
rents to decline.  
 
History of REIT Tax Legislation 
 Since a REIT’s tax-preferred status is important to its value as an investment, one must 
understand the history of its underlying tax legislation.  Even though some of these tax 
provisions have been mentioned in previous paragraphs, tax legislation provided in its own 
timeline highlights the complexities companies face in navigating REIT requirements within 
the tax provisions.  As mentioned above, the REIT industry began with the REIT provisions 
enacted in 1960 (Kelly, 1998).  The bill served to amend the IRC of 1954, by defining a real 
estate investment trust as an entity having the same pass-through treatment for tax purposes as 
regulated investment companies, as long as specific requirements were met.  This treatment 
indicated that income earned by REITs would not be taxed at the firm level, but would be 
passed to the owners to be taxed.  Prior to the amendment in 1960, income was taxed at the 
REIT level, and was also taxed as personal income to the trust-holders (Sanger, 1990).  The 
issue of conduit treatment for a REIT is important for its marketability and requires specific 
provisions to be met.  These provisions are detailed in the next section under REIT rules.      
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Four years after the 1960 Act, the Revenue Act of 1964 was passed, primarily focusing 
on cuts in income tax rates imposed on individuals and corporations.  However, this Act did 
affect REITs by clarifying the tax treatment for dividends received from a REIT.  Later in 
1969, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was signed into law addressing unrelated business taxable 
income as it relates to REITs as tax-exempt organizations. IRC 512(a)(1) states that the term 
"unrelated business taxable income" (“UBTI”) means gross income obtained by any 
organization from any unrelated trade or business regularly performed by the business, minus 
allowable deductions directly related to the performance of such business. Section 511(a) 
makes an organization exempt from federal income tax to be taxed on its "UBTI" (Popplewell, 
1999). The 1969 Act asserted that services, such as marketing, promotion, and advertising to 
tenants in a shopping center were not allowed and could cause the related rents to be unrelated 
business taxable income.  However, if the services were not substantial, the rents from the 
shopping center were not treated as unrelated business income subject to tax (Kelley, 1998).  
Unrelated business income resulted in taxable income, which most REIT managers tried to 
avoid.  
 In 1975, amendments were made to special foreclosure property rules to reduce the 
risk of disqualification for receipt of income from the sale of foreclosure property held for sale 
to customers in the normal course of business (Kelley, 1998).  Congress stipulated the rule for 
foreclosure property that permitted a REIT to retain property acquired in a foreclosure for a 
period of two years, as long as the REIT paid the customary corporate income tax on income 
earned on the foreclosure property.  In addition, the REIT could obtain an extension of time 
from the IRS to hold the property for another two years.  This new rule for foreclosure property 
gave the REIT a reasonable period to orderly liquidate its foreclosed property (95
th
 Congress, 
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1979).   The issue of foreclosed property is important to REITs since real estate transactions 
can be driven by foreclosures.  Other than these changes to the foreclosure property rules, no 
major tax reform proposals affecting REITs were enacted subsequent to the amendments to the 
tax code in 1960, until the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (TRA 76).  One of the purposes in drafting 
TRA 76 was to limit tax shelters that were considered abusive (Sanger, 1990).  
 TRA76 was noteworthy to REITs for many reasons.  Its complex provisions updated 
some of the REIT requirements created when the industry was established in 1960.  Even 
though TRA 76 did not alter the basic tax rules related to a REIT, it did include some 
modifications that made the rules easier to implement (Sanger, 1990). The specific REIT 
requirements are covered in the next section on REIT rules.  However, some discussion will be 
provided here, as the provisions of TRA 76 relate to specific REIT requirements.  The 
percentage of income that must be obtained from specific sources was increased from 90% to 
95%.  These specific sources consist of rents, interest, dividends, gains from the sale of real 
estate and foreclosure property, and other income items considered passive in nature and 
normally earned by REITs.  In addition, commitment fee income became part of qualified 
income for a REIT to pass the 75% of gross income from primarily-passive-sources test.  TRA 
76 also offered an alternative to disqualification for failure to meet the 95% and 75% income 
tests due to reasonable causes by allowing REITs to pay a 100% tax instead.  Similarly, for 
REITs that did not meet the dividend distribution requirements, TRA 76 offered a deduction 
for insufficient dividends instead of disqualification for distribution deficiencies.  Prior to TRA 
76, such deficiencies could cause an entity to lose its tax-favored REIT status (Kelley, 1998). 
Also importantly, TRA 76 revoked the exclusion on gain from property held primarily 
for sale to others, to align it more closely with the treatment for foreclosed property.  For these 
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sales, it imposed a tax on 100% of the gain on sale from the disposal of held-for-sale property.  
TRA 76 allowed qualification of REITs that choose to use the corporate form, which allowed 
REITs an organizational structure other than trusts.  TRA 76 also mandated that new trusts 
report on the calendar year and clarified other issues by making technical adjustments (Kelley, 
1998).  Sanger (1990) states that the major goal of lawmakers in drafting TRA 76 was reducing 
tax shelters deemed to be abusive in several major industries.  Debate centered around which 
investment activities should be targeted, with real estate investments escaping the “at risk”8 
restrictions put on investments in drilling, farming, television and movie production, and 
equipment leasing.  These latter activities Congress determined had the greatest opportunity for 
tax avoidance. The “at risk” rules tend to decrease asset values for those industries that must 
adhere to these requirements and the real estate industry benefitted from exclusion from these 
rules.  Thus, real estate could continue to produce incremental losses that were deductible for 
tax purposes and REITs provided a vehicle for those deductions (Sanger, 1990).  
  In addition, TRA 76 imposed other major changes to the real estate industry.  For all 
real estate companies, whether organized as a REIT or not, construction-period interest and 
taxes were to be capitalized rather than expensed. This accounting change was important 
because interest and taxes incurred during construction can be large expenses for real estate 
developers, with those costs now represented on the Balance Sheet.  Subsequently, net income 
becomes higher, as those expenses are moved off the Income Statement.  This change in 
accounting for interest and taxes could cause wide swings in the financial statements as 
compared to prior periods.  Regarding residential income properties, depreciation had to be 
                                                          
8
 “At risk” restrictions preclude the taxpayer from utilizing tax losses greater than the investment actually at risk, 
which would allow the losses to reduce other taxable income.   
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recaptured, as had been the case with nonresidential real estate. Thus, excess depreciation over 
the straight-line basis had to be recaptured and taxed as ordinary income (94
th
 Congress, 1976).  
This recapture closed a loophole where depreciation deductions were allowed against ordinary 
income, while gains from the sale of the assets were taxed as capital gains.  For all capital 
assets, the holding period for capital gains treatment was extended from six months to nine 
months.  Lastly, the investment interest limitation was again tightened, this time limiting the 
deductibility of investment interest to $10,000 per year (Sanger, 1990). 
 The Revenue Act of 1978 made further technical amendments with respect to 
prohibited transactions and foreclosure property.  The 100% tax that was imposed on 
prohibited transactions, such as the sale of property in the normal course of business, provided 
an exception to REITs for sales of real estate under certain conditions.  Gains from sale of real 
property that was held for four years were excluded, as long as no more than five sales were 
made in a year and the sales amounted to less than 10% of the assets’ aggregate value 
(Humphreys, 2008).  If the sale was from foreclosed property, then the four-year period 
included the time the REIT held the mortgage.  Congress believed that imposing certain 
restrictions would keep REITs from using the safe harbor rule to participate in an active trade, 
such as the development of land.  In addition, Congress wanted to allow REITs to change the 
portfolio of their assets without the concern that a tax would be imposed equal to the full 
amount of the appreciation in those assets (95
th
 Congress, 1979).   
  The Technical Corrections Act of 1979 and the Tax Reform Act of 1984 each made 
further technical corrections to the REIT provisions of the Code, especially in regards to 
shortening the holding period for long-term capital gains (Kelley, 1998).  The Tax Reform Act 
of 1984 specifically shortened the holding period for long-term capital gains treatment from 
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one year to six months (allBusiness, 2011).  For REITs, shortening the holding period enabled 
preferential capital gains treatment to be realized on more transactions passed through to the 
shareholders. In general, real estate companies benefit when holding periods are reduced and 
assets can be turned over quicker to receive preferential capital gains treatment. 
Referring to income taxes in general, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) was the 
most widespread modification to the tax code since it was adopted in 1954 (Sanger, 1990).  
Numerous revisions were made to the tax code and many of them affected real estate.  For the 
real estate industry, the modifications represented major changes to the existing rules 
impacting areas such as depreciation, loss offset limitations, and capital gains.  Along with the 
changes affecting real estate in general, specific changes were made to the tax rules impacting 
REITs.  The main purposes of the REIT provisions were to make it simpler for an entity to 
qualify for REIT status and to provide structural changes to allow for more flexibility in the 
operations of a REIT.  In meeting qualification requirements, a REIT in its first year was no 
longer required to meet the minimum 100-shareholder test, if the personal stock holding 
requirement was met.  The personal stock holding requirement provided that more  than 50% 
of the value of an entity's outstanding stock had to be owned, directly or indirectly, by five or 
fewer individuals.  In addition, the definition of rent income became more widespread and 
easier to apply in meeting the gross income tests required to maintain REIT status (Sanger, 
1990). 
As far as the changes enacted in TRA 86 related to the real estate industry in general, 
several of the provisions impacted the real estate industry in a significant manner.  For one, the 
depreciation deduction was limited by extending the useful lives of assets and by disallowing 
the accelerated depreciation deduction.  In addition, due to the loss offset limitations and “at 
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risk” restrictions on real estate, losses that could flow through were limited. Due to the 
limitation on losses that could flow through, real estate values were reduced related to other 
non-real estate assets.  In addition, opportunities to use real estate tax shelters were minimized, 
which made real estate not as attractive as an investment. Also, capital gains became taxed at 
ordinary income rates and marginal tax rates were reduced. With capital gains no longer having 
preferential tax treatment, the value of the underlying real estate diminished relative to other 
assets. Between the tax loss offset and “at-risk” limitations, the value of real estate as a tax 
shelter was diminished.  The slowdown of depreciation deductions for real estate likewise hurt 
the value of real estate relative to other investments.  With accelerated depreciation no longer 
applicable and longer depreciable lives, real estate did not provide the same tax advantage that 
it had in the past relative to other investments (Sanger, 1990).          
In Appendix D-3, information provided by the FDIC Division of Research & Statistics, 
entitled Major Tax Law Provisions Affecting Returns on Commercial Real Estate, shows the 
impact on property from provisions related to the Pre-Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Post-
Economic Recovery Act of 1981, and Post 1986 Tax Reform Act. The maximum depreciable 
life was 40 years prior to the 1981 Act and 31.5 years after the 1986 Act.  The 1981Act had 
reduced the maximum depreciable life to 15 years, while establishing the depreciation method 
as 175% declining balance.  Prior to the 1981 Act and after the 1986 Act, the depreciation 
method was straight-line.  Passive losses were fully deductible until the 1986 Act, which as 
mentioned earlier changed to deductibility only to the extent of passive income after the 1986 
Act.  The top income tax rate was 70% prior to the 1981 Act, falling to 38.5% after the 1986 
Act.  Capital gains rates were changed from 28% to 20% with the 1981 Act and then back to 
28% after the 1986 Act (FDIC Division of Research & Statistics). 
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 Arising out of TRA 86, the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 
(TAMRA) was passed to clarify the earlier act and provide further modifications impacting 
REIT investments. The 1988 act modified the attribution rules in regards to share ownership to 
eliminate attribution amid the partners in a partnership. This reduction in attribution among 
partners helped REITs work within the rule concerning the ownership of shares not allowed to 
reside in five or fewer owners possessing more than fifty percent of the shares.  Next, this act 
required that earnings and profits from corporate years when the entity was not a REIT be 
distributed. Thus, REITs would not be allowed to take advantage of electing REIT status, while 
also holding on to past accumulated earnings and profits.  Third, it allowed new entities that 
had not conducted business activities to select the calendar year when electing REIT status, 
without IRS approval (Kelley, 1998).  
To continue with modifications to ease the requirements in establishing REITs, 
TAMRA loosened up the ownership rules for the first year of a REIT election.  In addition, 
TAMRA allowed specific wholly-owned subsidiaries to be owned by a trust, thus enabling 
more entities to become REITs.  Furthermore, it adjusted the asset and income tests during the 
first year after the receipt of funds due to a new offering to give new REITs time to structure 
their organization in alignment to meet REIT requirements.  The 1988 Act further relaxed the 
rules related to independent contractor activity related to REITs.  Since REITs utilize many 
independent contractors in the conduct of their business, this act eased its tax compliance 
burden.  Rents or interest based on the net income of the tenant or debtor in some situations 
was restricted.  Restrictions affected the REIT’s ability to meet its income requirements.  Also, 
specific dollars of accrued rents and income from particular ineligible tax-free exchanges were 
excluded from net income distribution requirements, with taxes applied on the amount not 
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disbursed.  Thus, a REIT was allowed to keep this income, rather than distributing it, provided 
it paid a hefty tax on the transaction.  In addition, capital gain dividends unreduced by 
operating losses were allowed and capital gain dividend notices could be delayed until 
distribution of the annual report.  TAMRA changed the prohibited transactions rules in regards 
to safe harbor and losses, while income from certain shared appreciation mortgages became 
limited.  Due to the strict distribution requirements of REITs, the lifting of the penalty tax on 
deficiency dividends rescinded by the Act was important to REIT management.  Equally 
important to REITs, the four percent excise tax was established on specific types of post year-
end distributions.  Lastly, TAMRA provided for some specific dividends paid in January to be 
taken into account as if paid in December.  This provision enabled REITs to ensure that 
distribution requirements were met (Kelley, p. 5).  
        The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 was important in the growth of the 
REIT industry as it changed the shareholder ownership rules in regards to REITs and pension 
funds.  As high-dividend-yield investments, REIT stocks are a good fit for pension funds 
(Chan, et al, 2003).  However, prior to 1993, REIT requirements specified that no fewer than 
five people could own jointly more than fifty percent (5/50 rule) of all outstanding shares.  The 
1993 Act modified the interpretation of the rule by allowing each investor in a pension fund to 
count as an individual investor for the 5/50 rule, as long as the REIT has a minimum of 100 
shareholders.  Prior to this change in interpretation, the pension fund as a whole counted as an 
individual investor, with large-scale investment by pension funds exposing the REITs to loss of 
status.  Banking firms and investment bankers responded by bringing liquidity and increased 
investment to the market, which resulted in the growth and capitalization of REITs.  This 
change in rule interpretation, along with the establishment of the UPREIT structure and the 
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specialization of the REITs entering the market, drove the growth of the REIT industry during 
the early 1990s (Chan, et al, 2003).             
With the growth of the REIT industry during the 1990s, some revision to existing tax 
legislation was to be expected, and by the end of the decade it was forthcoming. The Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 1997 (TRA 97) made the most substantial changes to the rules governing REITs 
since the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  First, TRA 97 allowed REITs to retain capital gains at the 
entity level and pay applicable taxes.  These capital gains were deemed passed through to the 
shareholders, who received a credit for the capital gains taxes paid by the REITs.  Second, if a 
REIT failed to keep proper shareholder records, monetary penalties rather than disqualification 
resulted, which allowed a REIT to retain its tax preferential status even if its recordkeeping 
was lacking.  Third, as long as adequate shareholder records were kept by the REIT and the 
REIT had no information to the contrary, the rule requiring a REIT not be closely held was 
considered met (Kelley, 1998). 
With TRA 97, REITS were permitted to provide a de minimus amount of tenant 
services, while still treating income from the property as rent, thus using it to meet the income 
tests.  Being able to perform these additional tenant services allowed REITs to become a little 
more involved in managing their properties without the risk of failing the income tests because 
of disqualifying rental income. When considering the independent contractor or related party 
test as related to REIT rental income, the attribution rules were considered relevant only to 
partnerships in cases where one partner owns 25% or greater interest in the partnership.  Thus, 
rental income from these sources could be used to meet the REIT income tests.  TRA 97 
modified the definition of the independent contractor related to foreclosure property to align 
with its definition related to rents from real property, so that similar methodology could be 
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used in managing REIT income.  In addition, the 30% gross income test that had been required 
to qualify for REIT status was revoked. Previously, this rule required that no more than 30% of 
gross income could come from certain sources, such as the gain on sale of stock held for less 
than one year, specific real property owned less than four years, and property disposed of due 
to a prohibited transaction.  This gross income test was just another hurdle that companies had 
been required to meet to become a REIT, which with its revocation allowed more companies to 
become REITs (Kelley, 1998).      
TRA 97 also addressed other income sources, especially related to interest and debt.  
Noncash income was redefined in regards to items not subject to distribution requirements, to 
include income from debt cancellation and to extend the treatment of coupon interest and OID 
as excess noncash items to REITs that use an accrual method of taxation.  In addition, income 
derived from interest rate swaps and caps and hedging agreements permissible under the 95% 
gross income test became expanded (Kelley, 1998).  By excluding more income items from 
distribution requirements and allowing other items to be included in income for the 95% gross 
income tests, REITs were able to comply with the tax provisions in an easier manner.   
To continue with the provisions set forth in TRA 97, REIT property that was 
involuntarily converted received a safe harbor by becoming excluded from the prohibited 
transaction rule subject to a 100% tax.  Alleviating this 100% tax burden was important to 
REITs, as real estate properties were sometimes targeted by governmental entities.  Another 
modification of TRA 97 affected shared appreciation mortgages disposed of under bankruptcy 
court jurisdiction.  For these mortgages, REITs were provided a safe harbor from the 
prohibited transaction rule subject to a 100% tax (Kelley, 1998).  The tax revisions were an 
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effort to help REITs deal with difficult situations concerning real estate properties that often 
happened in downturn economies.   
A few final provisions of TRA 97 dealt with REIT structure issues.  Qualified 
subsidiaries of REITs could now include an established corporation in which a REIT obtained 
a 100% ownership interest. Previously, corporations were not considered qualified subsidiaries, 
which reduced the vertical integration available to REITs.   Finally, distributions by newly-
electing REITs to remove pre-REIT year earnings and profits were deemed to reduce the 
earliest acquired earnings and profits before reducing current earnings and profits (Kelley, 
1998).  Thus a REIT could eliminate its pre-election earnings and profits first through its 
distributions. 
The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (IRS Act) was particularly important 
for paired-share or stapled REITs
9
.  This Act provided that real property interests obtained by 
any member of a stapled REIT company are deemed obtained by the full group, especially as it 
relates to the rules for REIT status and the prohibited transactions rule (NAREIT, IRS, 1998).  
Prior to 1998, REITs and non-REIT corporations were treated as a single or paired-share entity 
in regards to the REIT tax rules when at least half of the stock of both firms was conveyed as a 
package.  This provision allowed six stapled REITs to operate as individual companies.  When 
considering REIT income tests under the IRS Act, these grandfathered stapled REITs were 
viewed as one entity in regards to property acquisitions or to major improvements in presently-
owned assets by the REIT, its stapled corporation, or a subsidiary or partnership where the 
REIT or stapled entity owns 10% of the value of the stock.   Properties acquired prior to March 
                                                          
9
 Paired-share REITs consisted of a REIT and non-REIT corporation, viewed as a single entity for purposes of the 
REIT tax rules, as long as more than 50% of the stock of both entities had to be transferred as a package.  Stapled 
REITs was another name for a paired-share REIT. 
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26, 1998 were grandfathered and permitted an exception to the IRS Act.  Grandfathered 
properties lose this status if the property is extended outside its original borders or if any 
improvement after the 1999 IRS Act alters the use of the property while costing more than 
200% of its cost. While the IRS Act contained many clarifications requested by paired-share 
firms, it did not include other far-reaching changes intended to permit the firm's operations to 
inflate without losing their grandfathered status (NAREIT, IRS, 1998).   Thus, paired-share or 
stapled REITs lost the big advantage possessed over other REITs through passage of this Act. 
In addition with the IRS Act, rules were revised that relate to REITs that are involved in 
tax-free mergers with non-REIT corporations and the handling of long-term capital gains.  The 
IRS Act made a technical correction related to tax-free mergers in the ordering of Earnings & 
Profits (E & P) distributions.  For a REIT that had a non-REIT corporate entity merged into it, 
only non-REIT E & P accumulated from the corporation would have to be distributed. Thus, 
the REIT would not be penalized for failure to meet its distribution requirements due to 
existing E & P brought over from a newly-merged corporation.  In addition, the previous 18-
month holding period put into place as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 was extinguished 
for asset sales occurring after December 31, 1997.  Sales of capital property held for a year or 
more received the same preferential lower capital gains rates that individuals could utilize 
(NAREIT, IRS, 1998).  Thus, REITs that chose not to distribute capital gain income and pay 
tax at the preferential income rate were required to retain the property for a year, rather than 
the eighteen months previously required.  
 The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 
affected REITs mainly in regards to liquidating REIT dividends.  Any owner of a REIT that 
was in process of liquidating was required to report as income the liquidating REIT dividends 
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received for dividends distributed after May 22, 1998.  The liquidating REIT was allowed to 
deduct the dividends paid and if the recipient of the REIT dividends was another REIT, then 
those dividends could be distributed to shareholders to reduce any corporate tax impact 
(NAREIT, Limitations, 1998).  
One of the most important tax law changes that has positively impacted the REIT 
industry occurred with the passage of the Ticket to Work Incentives Improvement Act signed 
on December 17, 1999, which contained provisions known as the REIT Modernization Act 
(RMA) (Edwards, 1999).  These federal tax law provisions enabled REITs to operate 
companies that offer tenant services using an entity referred to as a taxable REIT subsidiary 
(TRS) that can be 100% owned by the REIT.  A TRS can perform most types of business 
activities for REIT tenants that were previously prohibited.  Ownership of TRS entities is 
limited to the 20% provision of gross real estate assets test and can include any corporation in 
which the REIT owns stock directly or indirectly, as long as both agree to treat the corporation 
as a TRS (Edwards, 1999).   
Once the TRS election is made, only the REIT or the TRS can revoke it and the 
election will apply to any other entity in which the TRS owns more than 35% of the securities 
by vote or value.  Exceptions include corporations that operate healthcare or lodging facilities, 
as they are heavily involved in offering tenant services.  These entities are viewed as operating 
real property, rather than property held for investment, which is the original intent of REITs.  
Income tests were also adjusted to allow a TRS to perform usual and additional services to 
tenants of REIT property without causing non-qualifying income.  Regarding the rule that 
restricts including in rental income for REIT qualification purposes any related-party rent, an 
exception to the exclusion for lodging facilities exists.  REITs can lease a lodging facility to a 
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TRS, as long as an independent contractor manages the facility.  Additionally, property can be 
leased to a TRS as long as 90% of the leased property is rented to entities other than the 
REITs’ TRSs or related parties, and rent payments are significantly comparable to payments 
that other tenants made for similar space (Friedman & Hoppe, 2000).   
RMA of 1999, however, did enact a 100% excise tax on any transactions between a 
REIT and its TRS that are not handled as arms-lengths transactions.  RMA wanted to ensure 
that even with these extensions of privileges for TRSs that REITs stay true to their core 
purpose of real estate ownership and operations.  After 2001, REITs were not able to own more 
than 10% of the stock value of a non-REIT corporation, other than a TRS or other 
grandfathered entities (Edwards, 1999).   
Besides addressing taxable REIT subsidiaries, RMA of 1999 has allowed REITs to be 
more competitive and carry out their business activities in a more efficient manner.  A key 
provision of RMA was returning the required distribution level to 90% of taxable income, 
which it had been from 1960 – 1980.  Since mutual funds had a 90% requirement, REITs were 
allowed to drop down from 95% that was imposed in 1980 back to 90%.  The requirement that 
only 15% of total rents can come from personal property rents was changed from basing the 
15% off of the adjusted value of the lease payments to basing it off the fair market value of the 
lease payments (Edwards, 1999).  Thus, those leases that may have been negotiated and in 
place for some time that had an element of personal property rent included with the real 
property rent were allowed to use the fair market value of the total rent payments in applying 
the 15% test.  Fair market value typically resulted in a higher ceiling for this test, making it 
easier for the REIT to satisfy this restriction on personal property rents. 
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In regards to the tests for an independent contractor for publicly-traded corporations 
addressed in TRA 97, only shareholders with an interest greater than 5% were evaluated in 
relation to services performed.  With the Tax Reform Act of 1986, REITs could directly hire 
and manage independent contractors to perform normal services related to rental properties, 
rather than hire an independent contractor to engage other independent contractors.  Lastly, 
Health Care REITs were permitted to hire an independent contractor to manage nursing homes 
that do not have a lease for up to six years when the REIT is not able to lease it subsequent to a 
foreclosure.  This modification extended the rules to foreclosure property to require a REIT to 
pay taxes at the corporate level on the operating income from the property until it obtains a 
new lease.  Lastly, RMA further clarified the rules for pre-REIT Earnings & Profits related to 
how they should be calculated for distributions to shareholders for newly-elected REITs after a 
merger with a corporation (Edwards, 1999).    
 The REIT Improvement Act of 2003 (RIA 2003) further clarified the application of 
specific rules related to the administration of REITs.  In addition, the Act provided for further 
foreign investment by ending some of the discrimination previously shown towards these 
investors.  RIA 2003 also was important because it eliminated the severity of the penalties for 
failure to follow REIT rules by imposing monetary penalties in lieu of disqualifying the REIT.  
REITs that became disqualified would have to wait until after the fifth taxable year after the 
taxable year that revocation of REIT status occurred to be reinstated, which was particularly 
punitive for the firm.  One of the REITs that almost lost its REIT status due to an insignificant 
accounting error prior to the implementation of this Act was Pennsylvania Real Estate 
Investment Trust (PREIT).  Many of the provisions of RIA 2003 were built upon previous 
amendments made in the REIT Simplification Act of 1997.  As with other previous tax 
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legislation, NAREIT supported the passage of this act to further the growth of the industry and 
make REITs more attractive to the investment community.  When President Bush signed the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA 2004) into law, it contained the provisions of the 
REIT Improvement Act that had previously been addressed in 2003 with separate Senate and 
House versions of the bill (Edwards & Bernstein, 2005).   As has been the case with most 
REIT legislation, the provisions related to REITs were incorporated into unrelated tax 
legislation and passed in that manner. 
 The provisions of RIA 2003 were important to REITs.  First, enabling a REIT to cure 
asset ownership problems without automatic disqualification of REIT status was huge for the 
industry (Edwards & Bernstein, 2005).  Then, as it relates to the definition of securities for the 
10% limitation rule, RIA 2003 provided a safe harbor for REITs similar to that provided to 
Subchapter S corporations.  If securities belonging to a REIT did not qualify as straight debt
10
 
and did not satisfy the 10% limitation rule, the REIT could lose its REIT status prior to this 
Act.  This Act extended the definition of straight debt for ordinary qualifying loans when 
payments are contingent under certain allowable conditions to keep legitimate extensions of 
credit by REITs safe from causing problems.  This provision was retroactively applied to the 
enactment of the RMA of 1999 so that REITs that made loans in good faith in ordinary 
business situations would not be at risk by the expansion in the definition of straight debt 
(Edwards & Bernstein, 2005).   
                                                          
10
 Straight debt is defined as any written absolute promise to pay on demand or on a certain date a specific amount 
if the dates and rates of interest due are not dependent on profits or the borrower’s judgment and no conversion 
into stock, direct or indirect, can occur, per § 856(c)(7), § 1361(c)(5).   Additional clarification from Treasury 
Regulation § 1.1361-1(l)(5)(A) specifies straight debt does not include debt where interest is dependent on 
dividend payment on common stock.   
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 RIA also offered updated rules for calculating a REIT partner’s share of securities of a 
partnership by using a look-through to treat non-mortgage debt to the REIT as included in its 
partnership interest.  In addition, it eliminated the requirement that a REIT or its TRS could not 
own securities of an issuer, except for straight debt, by permitting a REIT or its 50% or greater 
owned TRS to possess safe harbor securities valued at no greater than 1% of the issuer’s 
outstanding stocks.  Also, any loan to a partnership by a REIT in which the REIT is not a 
partner was not deemed a security to the degree of the REIT’s interest as a partner in the 
partnership.  In particular, the Act gives the IRS authority to omit additional types of loans 
from treatment as securities for purposes of the 10% of value rule (Edwards & Bernstein, 
2005). 
 REITs were held to a 90% rental threshold rule, which stated that as long as 90% of the 
rental property was rented to unrelated individuals and the rent paid by the TRS was similar to 
the rent paid by other non-related parties, then the rent paid by the TRS was considered rental 
income under the REIT tax rules.  RIA clarified this provision by looking at rents at the 
beginning of the lease, at the extension of the lease, and at the renegotiated lease when the rent 
between a REIT and its subsidiary was raised.  As long as the rental tests were met at the three 
intervals, the tests were considered to be met when the actual space rented to a TRS was not 
increased.  However, if the REIT possessed greater than 50% of the value or vote of the TRS 
and the rent was increased under a renegotiated lease, then the rental increase would not be 
treated as qualifying rent (Edwards & Bernstein, 2005).  All of these changes were important in 
clarifying the rules to ensure the rental threshold test was met.   
 Previous REIT tax legislation was concerned with preventing REITs from shifting 
income between itself and its TRS.  Any income or deductions shifted between a REIT and its 
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TRS were subject to a 100% excise tax.  RIA allows these payments to be excused from the 
excise tax if the REIT paid 150% of the cost to the TRS in offering the service (Edwards & 
Bernstein, 2005).  
 Congress was concerned in the past about how REITs derived their source income, thus 
there were specific requirements that had to be met.  The rules stated that 75% of a REIT’s 
gross income had to be from real estate sources, but 95% of the gross income could be from a 
combination of real estate sources and passive activities.  With legislation in 1999, REITs were 
forgiven if more than 90% of gross income was from the combination.  RIA corrected this 
issue by applying a fraction based upon the 95% of gross income requirement rather than 90% 
for years after October 22, 2004 (Edwards & Bernstein, 2005).  
 The Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 contained a rule relating to timber 
REITs that only applied to taxable years between May 22, 2008 and May 22, 2009.  In 
accordance with this rule, timber REITs were permitted to possess securities in a TRS equal to 
25% of the REIT’s assets.  In addition, the holding period, which had been at four years, 
became reduced to two years for sales to a qualified entity for conservation reasons.  Any gain 
was also not considered gain from the sale of dealer property, and thus could be eligible for 
capital gains treatment.  Prior to this act, the REIT Investment Diversification and 
Empowerment Act of 2007, discussed below, modified this provision by eradicating the 
requirement that property had to be sold to qualified entities to receive the two-year holding 
period (Edwards & Bernstein, pp. 4-5).  These provisions were especially important during the 
time period it was enacted, as asset values declined and sales were often needed to meet 
distribution requirements.   
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 In 2008, Bush signed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 containing the 
provisions of the REIT Investment Diversification and Empowerment Act of 2007 (RIDEA).  
RIDEA permits REITs to buy and sell assets more efficiently, permits REITs to be involved in 
higher level entrepreneurial behavior with their TRSs, permits health care REITs to organize 
investments similar to hotel REITs, and supplies assurance in regards to the treatment for REIT 
qualification reasons of activities denominated in foreign currencies from international 
investments and the receipt of other gross income items (Edwards & Bernstein, 2008).   
 Even though the REIT ownership in a TRS limit was originally set at 25% in RMA, 
when the Ticket to Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 was passed, the limit was 
reduced to 20%.  The mutual fund test used the 25% rule, so it seemed to make sense for 
REITs to use the same percentage.  By adjusting the limit to 25%, REITs were better able to 
compete with the mutual funds.  Related to the provisions specific to health care REITs, a TRS 
would still be required to use an approved independent contractor to oversee healthcare 
facilities, but fair market rents from a qualified health-care property would now be considered 
qualified rents for the rental income tests.  Allowing these rents to be included made it easier to 
meet the gross income tests for REIT status (Edwards & Bernstein, 2008).  
In regards to foreign transactions, RIDEA sets out that passive foreign exchange gains 
will not be regarded as gross income for the 95% and 75% tests.  Excluding gains from both 
the numerator and denominator in calculating gross income was considered to be the best way 
to protect REITs from the loss of REIT status.  Regarding foreign currency, changes to the 
asset tests were also made.  Fluctuation in asset investment values, primarily from changes in 
foreign currency rates that are not related to changes due to acquisitions of new assets, would 
no longer cause an entity to fail the asset tests.  Lastly, the IRS was granted authority to 
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provide assistance in matters relating to income items considered for the 75% and 95% income 
tests.  The IRS could decide what items were or were not considered in calculating income 
qualified under these testing rules, giving some flexibility to requirements that might otherwise 
disqualify a REIT (Edwards & Bernstein, 2008).   
On February 3, 2011, NAREIT wrote the IRS requesting guidance for REITs on 
distressed debt acquisitions and work-out arrangements often necessary to avoid foreclosures.  
With the economic climate of 2008 through 2011, many REITs have dealt with troubled loans 
and NAREIT was seeking guidance for its members.  NAREIT wrote the IRS requesting 
clarification on a number of issues that it felt excluded REITs from obtaining mortgages at 
values lower than face value.  The ability of REITs to buy up distressed mortgages, as 
NAREIT stated, is important to toiling through the dregs of the latest financial crisis. With the 
way the Revenue Procedure 2011-16 is written, NAREIT stated there is a problem when the 
value of the distressed asset increases.  In addition, NAREIT stated there is a problem with the 
manner in which interest is computed and assessed for the gross income tests, with much of it 
considered non-qualifying income.  NAREIT, in its letter, was requesting the IRS adopt a safe 
harbor through which a REIT would not have to bifurcate a mortgage to meet the gross income 
test and the asset test.  NAREIT was concerned that without capital provided from REITs and 
their investors, less liquidity in the market for distressed mortgage loans and mortgage-backed 
securities would result.  Through issuing additional clarification on several important issues 
concerning distressed loans, NAREIT stated the IRS could avoid problems due to lack of REIT 
participation (NAREIT, 02/03/2011).  
As shown in this section, tax legislation is an important component to the functioning 
of REITs and NAREIT has lobbied on the industry’s behalf.  With conduit treatment affording 
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REITs the opportunity to avoid taxation at the entity level,  REITs offer the public an 
investment that avoids double taxation.  Combining its tax preference with substantial 
distribution requirements, REITs are in a unique position to attract both individual and 
institutional investors.  
 
Areas other than Tax Legislation 
NAREIT is active in its lobbying efforts to ensure that tax legislation and accounting 
pronouncements that are introduced or passed consider the needs of the REIT industry.  
Ongoing proposals exist to support continued international and intrastate investment in REITs 
and other investment vehicles.  Since 2008, no major tax legislation affecting REITs has 
passed.  However, NAREIT continues to send comment letters and other correspondence 
regarding tax and accounting matters to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Internal Revenue 
Service, the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC), and U. S. congressmen (NAREIT, 2012).   
On October 31, 2011, NAREIT issued an SFO Alert on the definition of FFO in 
accordance with NAREIT guidance.  With recent word from the SEC that it would not express 
an opinion on whether impairment losses should be excluded or included in the calculation of 
FFO, NAREIT issued guidance to state that FFO should exclude impairment write-downs on 
depreciable real estate.  NAREIT stated that this treatment of impairment write-downs was 
consistent with its white paper on FFO issued in 2002, even though the SEC chose not to issue 
an opinion.  The only stipulation the SEC provided was that the calculation and disclosures 
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must meet the requirements of Regulation G.
11  
The SEC additionally stated that companies 
should avoid any possible confusion with using measures that omit a GAAP income statement 
item, including impairment write-downs (NAREIT, 10/31/2011).  NAREIT, on November 4, 
2011, issued another alert providing further guidance on FFO.  This guidance stated that for the 
years 2011 and afterwards, FFO should exclude impairment write-downs.  However for years 
prior to 2011, NAREIT stated that a company may indicate it is calculating FFO in accordance 
with NAREIT guidelines whether or not it included impairment write-downs in FFO.  
However, for comparative statements, it was suggested that FFO be recalculated to exclude 
impairment write-downs if it had previously been included. NAREIT additionally stated that its 
members should be careful to clearly disclose its position on impairment write-downs for its 
investors.  Companies should document their calculation of FFO, so there is no confusion by 
the investor in what is included or excluded (NAREIT, 11/04/2011).   
In addition, NAREIT has been working for over ten years with the FASB to get 
clarification on SFAS 144
12
 related to discontinued operations and its impact on the REIT 
industry.  On November 1, 2011, NAREIT issued a letter to the FASB as a follow-up to letters 
written in 2001 and 2006 concerning ongoing issues with the interpretation and application of 
that standard as it applies to REITs.  As a REIT regularly disposes of properties in its normal 
business activities, SFAS 144 causes a noteworthy amount of earnings to be classified as 
                                                          
11
 Regulation G addresses the use of non-GAAP financial measures in Conditions for the Use of Non-GAAP 
Financial Measures (Regulation G), and, in filings made with the SEC, Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K, Use of Non-
GAAP Financial Measures in Commission Filings (Regulation S-K) (NAREIT, 10/31/2011). 
12
 SFAS No. 144 titled, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets, requires that both 
current and  historical revenues and expenses, along with any gain or loss on the sale of an identifiable component 
of an entity that has been disposed of or held for sale, be shown separately as discontinued operations.   
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discontinued operations, with annual restatements to prior years for comparability. The 
NAREIT letter quoted Moody’s Rating Methodology for REITs:   
Moody’s believes the “discontinued” classification of these activities makes it 
difficult to determine a REIT’s real estate property business performance and 
therefore we combine discontinued operations related to these core activities 
with the operating income from real estate properties that continue to be owned 
but are not classified as held for sale (Moody’s, 2006). 
 
This quote shows how analysts, investors, and others have tried to work around the 
cumbersome requirements surrounding SFAS 144.  NAREIT notes that even though they are 
appreciative that the FASB has added it to its agenda as it addresses SFAS 144 in convergence 
with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), they are restating the urgency that 
action be taken on this issue.  In addition, NAREIT states that the confusion surrounding the 
application of SFAS 144 and its inconsistency with the position taken by IFRS continues to 
provide problems for both the accounting and investment community (NAREIT, 11/01/2011). 
 Pending congressional bills have also drawn the attention of NAREIT.  In 2011, 
NAREIT has either supported or provided comments on several bills.  The Marketplace 
Fairness Act permits states to collect sales tax from the sellers, whether or not the sales occur 
at a physical store or online. As many REITs specialize in retail properties, this act is supported 
to level the playing field for retailers with physical locations that are already required to collect 
sales tax.  Another bill, the Real Estate Jobs and Investment Act, is supported by NAREIT to 
encourage non-U. S. investment in commercial real property.  This proposed bill would 
increase the number of shares held by minority shareholders in publicly-traded companies, 
such as REITs, from five to ten percent.  NAREIT has also provided comments to the SEC and 
banking regulators on a proposed rule concerning credit risk retention.  Under this rule, similar 
high quality loans used to finance commercial or multifamily property receive different 
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treatment, depending on whether the borrower is a REIT.  NAREIT opposes the exclusion of a 
loan to a REIT as a qualifying commercial real estate loan, stating this rule discriminates 
against REIT borrowers and is counterproductive in dealing with the weakness in the 
commercial real estate markets stemming from the current recession (NAREIT, 2012).    
  
REIT Rules 
 The central feature of the tax laws that govern REITs is that a violation of any of the 
laws can cause a firm to lose its REIT status, with some legislative changes in 2004 easing 
those stringent penalties.  Thus, many aspects of a REIT’s organization are exposed to 
extensive, complex, and sometimes trivial rules that must be followed to ensure the tax-free 
benefits.  These rules are meant to enforce Congress’ intent that only businesses primarily 
involved passively in real estate activities should be exempt from corporate income tax.  Since 
the original enactment of the REIT law, however, Congress has extended the range of REIT 
activities.  Even with the expansion of permissible activities, the basic set of detailed 
qualification tests and prohibitions has remained.  In some cases, these intricate rules make 
practical application difficult and sometimes tenable at best (Temkin, 2005). 
 Most states have income tax laws that follow federal tax guidelines and keep REITs as 
nontaxable entities.  States do have the option, and often times do, to impose other taxes on 
corporate entities, (NAREIT, 2012) such as the Gross Receipts Tax in Florida.
13
    
 REITs must be organized as a corporation, trust, or association that is taxable as a 
domestic corporation, not including a bank or life insurance company.  Most REITs are 
                                                          
13
 Florida is just one state that imposes a gross receipts tax on total receipts from certain services, such as utilities, 
communications, electrical, dry cleaning, etc.  These taxes are assessed on top of other taxes required to be paid. 
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corporations or business trusts.  A REIT that is formed as a partnership must elect to be taxed 
as a corporation under Section 7701 of the IRS Code of 1986.  Public REITs have chosen most 
often to be organized under the jurisdiction of Maryland, as this state’s corporate rules are 
perceived to be affable to management (Temkin, 2005). 
 A second requirement for REITs is that they must have transferable shares, with at least 
100 shareholders.  A public REIT would have no problem with this rule, but privately-held 
REITs have become creative to satisfy this requirement.  One mechanism used by closely-held 
REITs is to issue 100 or more shares of preferred stock that are owned by 100 or more 
different friends, family members, employees, or charities.  Preferred shares are usually priced 
at either $1,000 or $100 per share (Temkin, 2005), which is usually much higher than the price 
charged for common shares and is meant to keep the stock amongst select individuals.  The 
rule requiring more than 100 shareholders is meant to ensure that REITs are a vehicle for 
public investment of commercial real estate, and not a tax shelter for wealthy private investors.  
By issuing preferred shares to multiple shareholders, closely-held REITs can expand their 
shareholder base to include over 100 investors without deleting their voting power. 
 A third requirement for REITs is that five or fewer individuals cannot own more than 
50% of the REIT’s outstanding stock.  The original purpose of this rule was to avoid ownership 
by a single family or individual.  However, it does not prevent a majority ownership by an 
entity that is not closely held.  For tax purposes, ownership considers economic benefits, but 
for SEC purposes, ownership considers control.  Companies may prevent violations of the 50% 
requirement by stating in their charter that no person can own more than 9.5% of the equity of 
the entity (Temkin, 2005).   
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 A fourth requirement for REITs is that they have to elect REIT status and that status 
cannot have been terminated or revoked.  If it does become revoked, a new election cannot 
occur for five years unless the IRS consents to a shorter period.  These strict penalties enhance 
the need for compliance with REIT requirements (Temkin, 2005). 
 A fifth requirement for REITs states that at least 75% of the REIT’s gross income must 
consist of rents from real property, mortgage interest, gain from the sale of real property, 
dividends or gain from the sale of shares in other REITs, refunds of real property tax, income 
and gain from foreclosure property, payments to agree to make mortgage loans or purchase real 
property, or income from stock or debt instruments occurring from the proceeds of new capital.  
The rents from real property include additional restrictions:  personal property rents cannot 
make up more than 15% of the total rents; rents based on profits are excluded; related party 
(persons who own more than 10% of the common stock unless a taxable REIT subsidiary) 
rents are excluded; and rents where income from providing prohibited services directly to 
tenants exceeds 1% of all amounts received by the REIT from the property are excluded.  In 
addition, mortgage interest included as part of the 75% of gross income rule cannot be 
contingent on profits.  Also gains on dealer property cannot be included as gross income for 
this requirement (Temkin, 2005). 
 A sixth requirement of REITs relates to specific items that must make up at least 95% 
of a REIT’s gross income.  The specific items included in the 95% rule include the income 
items mentioned above relating to the 75% of gross income test along with some additional 
items.  These additional items include non-REIT dividends, non-mortgage interest, gain from 
the sale of non-REIT securities, and income from hedging transactions related to debt incurred 
for real estate purchases or holdings.  The gross income tests are meant to encourage REITs to 
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primarily be involved in the rental real estate business, which is usually equity REITs, or to be 
involved in holding mortgages, which is usually mortgage REITs.  REITS can be active in real 
estate by developing their own properties, but a REIT cannot earn fees from developing real 
estate for third parties and use this income to meet the requirement.  Congress has since 
allowed a REIT to own all or part of a taxable REIT subsidiary (TRS), which can participate in 
all but a few certain activities.  A TRS is subject to corporate income tax, thus Congress felt it 
should not be subject to the REIT restrictions.  However, for a corporation to be viewed as a 
TRS, the REIT and corporation must elect jointly.  The election is automatic where 35% or 
more ownership of subsidiaries of a TRS make the election.  Congress did not want 
transactions that were not arms length to be utilized to divert income from the TRS to the REIT 
in order to avoid corporate taxation (Temkin, 2005). 
 A seventh requirement relates to the need for at least 75% of a REIT’s gross assets to 
be made up of real estate, cash items, and government securities. This rule works in 
conjunction with the earlier specified gross income tests to ensure real estate activities drive 
the business of REITs.  In addition, no more than 20% of a REIT’s gross assets can be 
represented by securities in one or more taxable REIT subsidiaries. This rule is intended to 
limit the use of taxable REIT subsidiaries (TRS) to conduct non-REIT activities.  Omitting the 
assets that meet the 75% of gross assets test and taxable REIT subsidiary shares, no more than 
5% of a REIT’s gross assets may come from the securities of any single issuer nor can the 
REIT hold securities that possess 10% or more of the issuer’s voting shares or 10% or more of 
the issuer’s value.  REITs have to be particularly careful with this rule, as the debt of a smaller 
issuer may make up a large portion of the issuer’s securities.  In such cases, REITs have 
needed to correspond with the IRS to avoid being de-REITed (Temkin, 2005). 
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 An eighth requirement of REITs is that they must distribute 90% of REIT taxable 
income each year, with dividends following the respective rights of all classes of stocks.  The 
REIT may choose to retain any capital gains received, but must remit the tax due, with the 
shareholders receiving a credit for the tax paid with dividends deemed distributed.  Most 
REITs distribute 100% or more of their taxable income, sometimes resulting in a return of 
capital to the shareholders.  This high level of distribution has been a strong motivator of 
investor interest in REITs, but has also limited REITs’ use of internal financing (Temkin, 
2005). 
 When REITs fail to meet all the provisions mentioned above, various negative results 
can occur, with the worst for an organization to be de-REITed.  By being de-REITed, an entity 
loses its REIT status, which means it must pay corporate income tax on its earnings.  In 
addition, once the REIT status is revoked, it cannot be reestablished for five years, unless the 
IRS consents to special permission.  Some of the provisions mentioned above do not 
automatically result in de-REITing, with lesser penalties being invoked.  For instance, if a 
REIT fails to meet one or more of the gross income tests because of reasonable cause and not 
willful non-compliance, the REIT will be taxed on the deficiency and not de-REITed.  To show 
reasonable cause, the REIT must be exercising due professional care in its business operations 
when it recognizes gross income or relying on the advice of a tax or other accounting 
professional.  In addition, if a REIT fails to meet one or more of the gross assets tests and the 
offending asset is less than 1% of the REIT’s assets or $10 million, the REIT has to dispose of 
that asset.  If the offending asset is not de minimis, then not only does the REIT have to 
dispose of the asset, but also pay tax for the greater of $50,000 or the corporate tax on the 
income from the offending asset.  Other noncompliance issues, that are not willful neglect, can 
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also be handled through a fine of $50,000 per offense, thus avoiding de-REITing (Temkin, 
2005). 
 Since it has been shown that one of the primary advantages to the REIT form of 
organization resides in the tax exemption for income at the corporate level, one must look to 
the effect on the shareholder to understand its value as an investment vehicle.  Shareholders are 
taxed on the distributions they receive from the REIT.  Individual shareholders are not eligible 
for capital gains treatment, since no corporate tax has been paid and corporations may not 
claim the dividends-received deduction. If the distributions are related to capital gains realized 
by the REIT, and the REIT specifies them as capital gains, then shareholders can take 
preferential capital gains treatment on the distributions.  Tax-exempt shareholders are not taxed 
on REIT dividends.  REITs have an advantage over partnerships, since tax-exempt partners 
would be accessed tax on income from leveraged real estate assets, but would not be taxed on 
REIT dividends produced by leveraged real estate assets.  In terms of non-U. S. shareholders, 
they will incur a withholding tax on regular REIT dividends with some exceptions.  If a treaty 
is in place, the withholding can be reduced to less than the customary 30%.  In addition, if the 
non-U. S. shareholder owns less than 5% of a class of publicly traded REIT stock, he will not 
be taxed on the gain on the sale of the stock or on capital gain distributions.  A non-U. S. 
shareholder of a REIT (that is owned by a majority of U. S. shareholders) is not taxed on the 
gain on sale of REIT stock (Temkin, 2005).  Understanding the tax rules is important to 
appreciating the attraction of REITs to certain investors.  Thus, even though REITs are charged 
with complying with strict rules and regulations, the benefits seem to outweigh the costs. 
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Macroeconomic Factors & Real Estate Cycles  
Interest rates have always been presumed to have a large impact on the profitability of 
real estate, along with certain other macroeconomic factors.  McCue & Kling (1994) examined 
the influence of macroeconomic variables on real estate returns, focusing in particular on the 
extent to which macroeconomic shocks affect returns.  The variables examined were nominal 
interest rates, prices, output, and investment.  These variables combined explained 60% of the 
variability in real estate returns, with interest rates explaining the largest part or 36% of the 
effect.  Nominal interest rates were tested using the 3-month Treasury Bill rate, prices using the 
Consumer Price Index, output using the Federal Reserve Industrial Production Index, and 
investment using the McGraw-Hill Construction Contract Index (McCue & Kling, 1994).   
The early 1990s signaled the beginning of what is referred to as the Modern REIT era.  
This era was triggered by the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and its subsequent 
effects on the real estate community.  In consideration of this new era, Jirasakuldech (2009) 
examined equity REITs looking at volatility for two distinct time periods, pre- and post-1993.  
The first time period analyzed monthly returns for the period 1972 – 1992 and the second time 
period covered the years 1993 – 2006.  Results showed that volatility was persistent, 
predictable, and time-varying.  Changes in classic macroeconomic variables were found to 
explain future changes in the volatility of equity REITs.  In addition, they found a positive 
correlation between expected return and expected risk for equity REITs prior to 1993, but no 
correlation after that point (Jirasakuldech, 2009).  This research indicated that macroeconomic 
variables impact REITs, but the effect may be different for the earlier REITs than the post-
modern period REITs.     
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Blake (1988) examined the performance of REITs over business cycles.  He was 
interested not only in cyclical effects, but also how REITs reacted in comparison to the S & P 
500.  He found the REITs overall outperformed the S & P 500 over the fifteen-year period 
from 1971 to 1986.  However, he found greater volatility in REITs during the downswing of 
the economic cycles.  Overall, his research suggests that REITs may have been less risky for 
the entire period, while delivering a greater average return, even with the higher volatility in 
the downswing periods.  The time periods in which Blake (1988) found that REITs did not 
outperform the S & P 500 was the recession of January 1974 to January 1975, and the 
downswing period preceding that recession.  The other exception was the upswing period 
beginning in April 1982.  Because of these exceptions, he could not draw a definitive 
conclusion on REIT performance over the business cycle.  Prior research from Smith & 
Shulman (1976) looked at 16 REITs from January 1964 to December 1974, finding the highest 
risk-adjusted return of the REITs during the upswing portion of the 1960s’ cycle from January 
1964 to April 1968.  Blake (1988) confirmed Smith’s finding that REITs were more volatile 
during the downswing period, with both studies finding higher betas during the downswing 
periods (Blake, 1988).  These studies highlight the impact of cyclical effects that will impact 
analysis of REITs over the fifty-year period under examination in this research.      
 
 
Conclusion 
With an understanding of the details of the history of the REIT industry, the specific 
rules required to maintain REIT status, and the tax legislation related to REITs, one can 
understand how an industry that was created in 1960 to allow individuals to invest in 
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commercial real estate has become an important part of the American real estate landscape.  
Owning real estate has always been part of the American dream and with the current economic 
crisis, investors are looking to any kind of safe haven for their money that will allow them to 
earn a decent return.  NAREIT is trying to promote REITs as such an investment, so that the 
recent scare with real estate values does not turn people away from what has always been an 
essential part of an individual’s portfolio.  To fully comprehend the financial factors, specific 
methodologies will be employed as laid out in the next chapter.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 The focus of the methodology section is to provide documentation to answer the two 
research questions posed by this study.  The first question will be answered through review of 
the quantitative data and asks, “Based on specific metrics that form a foundation for valuing 
REITs, do the three surviving companies reveal any quantitative differences from other REITs 
that have entered and left the market?”  The second question will be answered through review 
of the qualitative data and asks, “Based on qualitative factors, do the three surviving companies 
reveal any common characteristics that can be indicators of their success and longevity 
throughout the fifty-year history of the REIT industry?”  To qualitatively assess the company’s 
performance and longevity, information obtained through interviews, articles, and press 
releases will be used.  To quantitatively assess the operating performance of REITs, several 
unique metrics have been created to assist analysts and others.   These unique metrics are a 
supplement to some of the customary metrics for financial analysis used by non-REIT 
companies, such as debt ratios, profitability ratios, asset growth, and revenue growth. 
Additional metrics have been created for REITs to assess the ability of the firm to 
conduct and sustain quality dividend distributions, since dividends are such an important 
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component of the market valuation of REITs.  Such metrics include Funds from Operations 
(FFO), Modified Funds from Operations (MFFO), and Adjusted Funds from Operations 
(AFFO).  Further utilizing FFO, the FFO Multiple, similar to the Price-Earnings Ratio used for 
non-REIT companies, will also be examined.  In addition, cash flows from operations, which is 
also commonly used for non-REIT companies, assists interested parties of REITs to determine 
the part of a given REIT’s’ distributions covered by operating cash flows.  While financial 
statements are prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP), additional income statements are prepared to assist with calculation of the tax 
liability.  Some adjustments made to the financials for these purposes often do not assist in 
determining the firms’ ability to continue dividend distributions.  The additional metrics for 
REITs are meant to assist investors and analysts in making better determinations of a firm’s 
dividend-paying ability and future profitability (Shields, 2010).    
 Since initially defining FFO in 1991, the National Association of Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (NAREIT) has issued several White Papers to help define, refine, and clear 
up confusion with this key metric of operating performance.  FFO was established to provide 
an extra industry-wide standard measure of operating performance for REITs that would 
supplement the analysis of GAAP financial statements.  Originally, FFO was intended to be 
viewed as a supplemental capitalization multiple akin to a price-earnings ratio.  However, 
NAREIT did not want FFO to be confused with a measure of cash generated by a REIT nor the 
REIT’s ability to continue to pay dividends.  Industry observers, however, have played with the 
concept of FFO as a more useable measure of cash flow, with the hope of evaluating a firm’s 
future dividend prospects (Shields, 2010).   
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 GAAP net income is commonly defined as total revenues less total expenses.  For 
REITs, total revenues include lease rental income, expense recoveries from tenants, and 
interest income.  Total expenses normally include property operating and maintenance 
expenses, property taxes, property and asset management fees, acquisition expenses, 
depreciation and amortization expenses, and general and administration expenses.  As of 
January 1, 2009, NAREIT redefined net income to require subtracting acquisition-related costs 
as defined in SFAS 141(R).
14
  Thus, costs of the acquirer of real estate, including accounting, 
legal, valuation, and consulting, are now charged to expense in the period incurred per GAAP.  
For tax purposes, these same costs are capitalized in the purchase price and depreciated 
(Shields, 2010). 
 When evaluating FFO, the FFO multiple will also be computed and analyzed.  The FFO 
Multiple is similar to the Price-Earnings ratio, which is used to evaluate the intrinsic value of a 
corporation.  The FFO Multiple approach is the most common method used by NAREIT and 
industry analysts to evaluate the value of a REIT.  FFO Multiples are computed using a REIT’s 
closing stock price divided by FFO per share outstanding, similar to price-earnings ratios 
computed as stock price divided by earnings per share.  A high FFO Multiple indicates a high 
expected rate of growth for FFO.  In determining what makes a successful REIT, Vakalopoulos 
(1993) found that the Dividend Payout ratio and the Dividend Yield accounted for the most 
variability in the FFO Multiple when performing her quantitative analysis.  However, the 
qualitative portion of her study indicated high inside ownership and experienced management 
were the key to REITs trading at higher multiples (Vakalopoulos, 1993).   
                                                          
14
 SFAS 141(R) is a Statement of Financial Accounting Standard on Business Combinations that requires 
acquisition costs be expensed as occurred, rather than capitalized into the purchase price under the old standard.   
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   An additional metric worth consideration in evaluating REIT performance is Modified 
Funds from Operations (MFFO).  MFFO takes FFO one step further by adding back to FFO the 
SFAS 141(R) deductions to net income, while also considering the position on asset 
impairment write-downs suggested by NAREIT.  One would take FFO and add back 
acquisition-related expenses from property deals and impairment charges during the period.  
As such, MFFO is a fairly new metric arising from the passage of SFAS 141(R), and is not 
widely used by all REITs.  Neither NAREIT nor the SEC have officially adopted MFFO 
(Shields, 2010). 
   To further evaluate REITs, Adjusted Funds from Operations (AFFO) has been utilized. 
AFFO is also known as Cash Available for Distribution (CAD) or Funds Available for 
Distribution (FAD).  AFFO further adjusts FFO in an effort to provide a measure of a real 
property’s cash flows from operations by addressing the issue of whether dividends can be 
covered by cash flows.  To calculate AFFO, additional subtractions are made from FFO, 
including normal recurring expenses that have been capitalized by the REIT and amortized and 
are necessary for the maintenance of the REIT properties and its corresponding revenue 
streams.  In addition, straight-line rents are also deducted from FFO.  Straight-line rents result 
from the GAAP requirement that real estate firms report in revenue the average rent, while 
booking the difference between the rent actually received and the straight-line rent recognized 
for GAAP accounting as an asset.  Typically, these types of assets are shown as deferred rent 
receivables.   To explain this concept further, one could assume a single tenant rents a property 
under a five-year lease, with no rent increases for the first two years, and then a 5% increase 
for years three to five.  Assume initial rent was $2,000 and for years three to five the rent 
would increase to $2,100.  Thus the average rent for all five years would be $2,060.  The real 
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estate firm would only receive cash rent of $2,000 in year one.  However, an additional $60 of 
straight-line rent would be included in the GAAP income statement.  This additional $60 
would have to be deducted from GAAP net income to arrive at AFFO.  The situation will 
reverse itself in year 3, when the real estate firm receives cash of $2,100, but only $2,060 of 
rent income would be shown in the GAAP income statement.  In this year, an individual 
calculating AFFO would add back $40 in excess of the straight-line rent shown in GAAP net 
income (Shields, 2010). 
 To further explain AFFO and the subtraction of the normal recurring expenses that are 
capitalized by the REIT and subsequently amortized, the type of expenses must be understood 
to see their effect on AFFO.  Certain expenses from a tax accounting perspective must be 
capitalized and amortized over a stated useful life.  However, these same normal expenditures 
are so ordinary and recurring in maintaining the economic performance of the properties that it 
makes sense that they be deducted from FFO.  One example of this type of expense is the 
carpet in an apartment complex that must be regularly replaced.  In this case, the more 
apartment complexes a REIT has in its portfolio, the more impact it will have on the REIT’s 
ability to pay dividends from its cash flows.  Longer-term capitalized expenditures, such as 
roofs and renovations, are not in this category of recurring expenditures, and thus not 
subtracted from FFO (Shields, 2010).  If AFFO is not routinely computed by the particular 
REIT under examination, then it may be hard to calculate, as the level of detail needed may not 
be readily available from the published financial statements. 
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Lastly, as an additional metric exclusive to the SNL database, SNL Calculated FFO
15
 
will be analyzed, and subsequently compared to each company’s Reported FFO.  The 
definition of FFO utilized in the calculation of SNL FFO is net income calculated per GAAP, 
plus depreciation and amortization, eliminating gains (losses) on the sales of property, and after 
adjusting for the effects of unconsolidated partnerships and joint ventures.
16
  The first part of 
this analysis will be similar to the analysis provided for FFO, MFFO, and AFFO in identifying 
variances among the averages of the three surviving companies and the average of the industry.  
The latter part of this analysis is to determine if FFO calculated by SNL is similar to company-
reported FFO, and whether it is useful to investors. 
 For all of the metrics just explained in the preceding paragraphs, understanding their 
definitions is important in developing a methodology to evaluate REIT performance and its 
future dividend distributions.  For a REIT that pays out dividends in excess of its AFFO, it is 
giving out more cash than it is generating, which will cause it to borrow cash or raise 
additional equity in the future.  By borrowing cash, the REIT has weakened its Balance Sheet 
and by raising new capital to fund dividends, the REIT has diluted all its equity investors since 
the capital was not utilized in the operating business.  However, it should be noted that there 
are times that REITs will pay dividends in excess of cash flow, especially when they are 
building up their portfolios.  For the public, non-traded REIT, it is subject to specific fixed 
costs for operating the REIT, such as legal, accounting, filing fees, etc.  In addition, a public, 
                                                          
15
 SNL Calculated FFO is a field in the database maintained by SNL Financial that purports to calculate FFO in a 
systematic manner across all companies.  Its calculation is deemed to be in strict accordance with the NAREIT’s 
National Policy Bulletin of April 26, 2001, guidelines for FFO. 
16
 Definition as stated in the NAREIT’s 2002 White Paper on Funds from Operations, with the definition first 
adopted in 1991, and then clarified in 1995, 1998, and 2002. 
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non-traded REIT raises funds and grows in stages, such that the early stages require equity 
funding to meet its expenses and dividend requirements.  Over time, however, a REIT should 
be able to fund its dividends from its generated cash flow, which is why AFFO is so important.  
Investors and analysts may still look favorably on a REIT if its investment focus and 
management team appear sound, even if its cash flow is not sufficient to fund distributions.  
For older, public, non-traded REITs, it is important that management be able to execute its exit 
strategy when the time comes and return to its shareholders the initial equity with a return, 
which may be viewed as more important than its cash flow to make distributions.  If an 
investor does not see cash flow consistently covering dividend distributions, he should look for 
another investment vehicle (Shields, 2010).       
 To find ways to further evaluate REITs, previous studies have sought to compare equity 
investments in real estate with common stocks.  Wendt and Wong (1965) implied that returns 
from investments in apartments were higher than returns from investments in common stocks.  
Robichek, Cohn and Pringle (1972) showed the average yearly return from investments in farm 
real estate from the period 1949 to 1969 was 9.5% compared to an average return of 11.6% for 
common stocks, per Standard & Poor’s Industrial Stock Price Index.  This study also revealed 
that returns from farm real estate were inversely correlated with returns from common stock.  
Further trying to evaluate REIT performance, studies have considered comparing REITs to 
mutual funds, but these funds are open-ended investment companies that constantly sell or 
redeem shares at the per share net asset value.  So, the constantly changing capitalization is 
different than the fixed capitalization of a REIT investment.  Closed-end funds, similar to 
REITs, sell typically at discounts or premiums of their net asset value.  Real estate projects 
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lack the continual market valuations that yield relevant net asset values, thus discounts or 
premiums are likely (Smith and Shulman, 1976). 
 Smith and Shulman (1976) used four different metrics to evaluate REITs beginning 
first with the mean of the quarterly rates of return, including both appreciation and dividend 
yield for each portfolio of a sample period.  A second measure that was utilized involved the 
development of a best-fitting line with excess market returns for each quarter plotted on the 
horizontal axis and excess portfolio returns plotted on the vertical axis.  This secondary 
measure consists of the intercept of this straight line that shows the excess return earned by the 
portfolio when the excess market is zero.  A positive intercept indicates the portfolio’s 
performance is greater than the market, while a negative intercept indicates the portfolio’s 
performance is less than the market according to a risk-adjusted basis.  A third measure focuses 
on the slope of the straight line representing how the portfolio signifies the market indicating 
portfolio risk that cannot be reduced by increased diversification.  A fourth measure is the 
goodness of fit of the straight line revealing the percentage of variation in the portfolio return 
accounted for by the market return.  This measure helps to show how diversified the portfolio 
is during the period observed.  Less diversification is represented by a poor fit.  All of the 
above mentioned metrics were based on quarterly returns as calculated from monthly prices 
and dividends of the respective portfolios (Smith & Shulman, 1976).  
 Looking at the results of these measures in Smith & Shulman (1976), equity REITs 
were found to perform better than closed-end funds consisting of non-REIT companies, and 
were not as risky or as diversified.  The study went further to analyze performance over a 
rising market, a declining market, a peak-to-peak market, and a trough-to-trough market.  The 
closed-end funds performed better during the rising market and trough-to-trough markets.  The 
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equity REITs performed better in the declining and peak-to-peak markets.  Overall, the REITs 
did show lower market risk for the sample and also less diversification, which works against 
one of the noted advantages of REITs of being able to diversify without risking illiquidity and 
uncertainty associated with other real estate investment vehicles.  The concern expressed from 
this study was that the results suggested that portfolio managers would not have achieved 
better performance by investing in equity REITs.  In some periods, REITs would have 
increased the losses realized by investors in common stocks.  It is important to note that these 
findings occurred for periods earlier than 1976 and may not relate to periods subsequent to that 
time.   Interestingly, Smith & Shulman (1976) state, “Real estate investments have not been, 
and are unlikely to become, a panacea for large institutional portfolios” (Smith & Shulman, 
1976).  
 Other studies that have attempted to evaluate REIT performance have tried to compare 
net income to FFO.  Gore and Stott (1998) looked at both net income and FFO to determine 
which measure was better at evaluating the operating performance of REITs.  They found FFO 
was better correlated with stock returns, but only marginally so.  They also studied GAAP 
depreciation, finding that it was not value relevant to investors.  In addition, realized gains and 
losses were studied, and they were found to be value relevant to investors in evaluating REIT 
performance.  From the content and results of the study, net income, depreciation, and realized 
gains and losses were deemed as useful measures in evaluating REIT performance..  These 
measures were used alongside the FFO measures previously discussed.  Gore and Stott studied 
the time period from 1991 – 1996, whereas this historical research will evaluate financial 
variables for the first fifty years of the REIT industry. 
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 Fields, et al (1998) studied the variation in stock price due to FFO and net income in 
trying to determine which measure provided more information to investors to value their stock 
investments.  In addition, book value and dividends were evaluated to determine their effect on 
stock price, finding both impacting the stock price.  Thus Fields, et al (1998) showed that stock 
price and dividends are additional measures that should be considered in analyzing REITs and 
will be used over this fifty-year history research.  Fields, et al (1998) studied the time period 
from 1991 – 1995, while this study will consider information that is available for the years of 
1960 – 2010.   
 Dividends are an important metric to look at when evaluating REITs, since REITs pay 
out most of their taxable income.  In addition, dividends are a significant portion of the total 
return of REITs (NAREIT, 1998, p.3).  Because of the significance of dividends to total return 
for REITs, this metric was evaluated over the fifty-year period by looking at the dividend yield 
and the dividend payout ratio. Vakalopoulos (1993) found that the dividend payout ratio and 
dividend yield accounted for much of the variability in the FFO Multiple, another important 
metric in evaluating REIT performance.  Because of the interplay between these metrics, the 
dividend ratios were examined individually and in accordance with the FFO Multiple. 
 NAREIT analyzes the growth and development of the REIT industry by tracking 
market equity capitalization and the number of REITs.  At the end of 1997, there were 210 
REITs with a total market equity capitalization of $141 billion (Grupe, 1998).  At the end of 
2010, 153 REITs with a total market equity capitalization of $389 billion existed (NAREIT, 
2011).  To show how the industry has changed and grown over the last fifty years, equity 
capitalization and the number of REITs have been displayed in Table B-1. 
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 The Debt ratio, which compares total debt to total assets, is a common ratio in most 
financial analysis and is particularly relevant for REITs.  Since REITs are heavy purchasers of 
real estate, large amounts of funding are required.  REITs fund most of their acquisitions 
through raising capital or external borrowing.  Sometimes a REIT will dispose of real estate 
assets to fund the purchase of new assets, but a significant portion of the funding is achieved 
externally through the issuance of stock or long-term borrowing.  Analysts, investors, company 
personnel and NAREIT personnel track the debt ratio to determine the strength of a REIT’s 
balance sheet.  In 1973, NAREIT published a table of the debt ratios of the 40 largest REITs.
17
   
 The Leverage ratio, which compares total debt to total equity, is also a common ratio in 
most financial analysis and has been cited in previous research on REITs.  Valachi (1976) 
performed financial ratio analysis on a matched sample of failed and active REITs to identify if 
differences in certain ratios could predict REIT failures.  Valachi (1976) noted that the 
relationship of debt to equity was one of the indicators of REIT failures, as firms that are 
unable to pay their debts are not able to survive in the long-term.  Because of the importance of 
debt, the Leverage ratio was analyzed along with the Debt ratio for both the three surviving 
companies and other firms in the REIT industry. 
 Total revenue growth and total asset growth are two metrics that are commonly used to 
track a company or industry’s growth and maturation.  Significant growth is expected for both 
metrics during the fifty-year history, as REITs experienced their biggest growth after the early 
1990s.  With changes in tax laws and the shutting down of many tax shelters and partnership 
arrangements, REITs found increased investor interest after that time.  REITs previously could 
not compete for capital with the tax shelters, as the REIT was set up to produce taxable income 
                                                          
17
 Table IV, Debt Ratios of the 40 Largest REITs, based on data as of July 29, 1973, published by NAREIT.    
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and could not pass through paper or other losses to shareholders (NAREIT, 1998).  Thus the 
growth in assets and revenues was included in the financial measures to evaluate the 
development of this now flourishing industry.   
 To analyze liquidity and the cash component of a REIT specifically, the ratio of cash 
and cash equivalents to total assets was analyzed.  Valachi (1976) analyzed this ratio in his 
study on failed REITs as a metric for liquidity. By analyzing the cash component, one can 
determine if the three surviving companies show a pattern of liquidity different from the other 
companies that have either entered the market later or left the market during the fifty-year 
history of the REIT industry. 
 Once the metrics discussed above were computed, ANOVA testing and additional Post-
hoc testing was performed to determine if significant differences exist between the three 
companies and other companies that have participated in the REIT industry over the fifty years.  
For each of the three surviving companies (Washington REIT, Pennsylvania REIT, and 
Winthrop Realty) the metrics were computed and compared individually and as an average of 
the three companies to the average of the REIT industry, excluding these three surviving 
companies.  ANOVA testing was performed to determine if significant differences exist among 
the metrics under review and the company compositions noted above.  Additional Post-hoc 
testing was performed to determine where the specific significant differences exist among each 
of the companies, the three companies’ average, and the averages for the industry excluding 
the three companies.   
 To finally examine the interplay of macroeconomic factors over the fifty-year period of 
REITs, certain factors were analyzed. As mentioned earlier, McCue & Kling (1994) examined 
the influence of macroeconomic variables on real estate returns.  The variables examined 
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explained 60% of the variability in real estate returns, with interest rates explaining 36%.  
Nominal interest rates were tested using the 3-month Treasury Bill rate (McCue & Kling, 
1994).  Since the 3-month Treasury Bill rate was utilized in prior studies to evaluate 
macroeconomic variables on REITs, that rate was analyzed over the fifty-year period in 
comparison with the other metrics described earlier.  Lastly, Blake (1988) and Smith & 
Shulman (1976) examined REIT performance over the business cycles.  Business cycles over 
the fifty-year period of this research are noted and comments made, as applicable, related to the 
relevance of these metrics to the business cycles. 
 In addition to the quantitative analysis performed through the use of the above 
mentioned metrics, qualitative analysis was performed through the use of interviews, press 
releases, and other articles on the companies and its officers.  A copy of the question document 
that was used to conduct the interviews is provided in the Appendix.  Interviews were 
conducted with officers at each of the three REITs; Washington REIT, Pennsylvania REIT, and 
Winthrop.  These interviews were used to assess each of the companies’ strengths, their 
management’s goals and strategies and activities conducted to reach them, their organizations’ 
unique characteristics, factors that contributed to the companies’ successes, and any other 
additional information helpful in explaining each individual company’s ability to survive 
throughout the last fifty years.  In addition, interviews were conducted with individuals at 
NAREIT.  Similar questions to those asked of the REIT officers were asked to the individuals 
at NAREIT, but the intent was to determine unique characteristics of the industry’s national 
association, and how it has promoted and protected the industry over the last fifty years.   
 Besides interviews, written documents (press releases, annual reports, and other types 
of articles) were reviewed on each of the three companies, along with NAREIT.  These various 
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documents were used to supplement the interviews and help tell the story of the companies’ 
and NAREIT’s activities and any actions taken to enable their companies and the industry to 
thrive and survive.  It is through these documents that insight into the companies’ goals and 
strategies was obtained or strengthened. In addition, these documents provided written 
evidence of the companies’ strengths, actions, and successes, as recorded from the interviews. 
Through the use of qualitative analysis, factors other than financial matters can be considered 
as contributors to a company’s success in this particular industry. 
 In summary, qualitative and quantitative analysis was used to provide information on 
the three surviving companies, NAREIT, and the overall REIT industry.  Key metrics were 
computed and are displayed for the REIT industry and these three particular companies, to 
document the REIT industry’s fifty-year historical development.  All of the quantitative 
metrics utilized have been documented in prior research as being particularly relevant to the 
REIT industry.  By looking at these metrics and the additional qualitative information obtained, 
one will see and understand how an industry created by Congress in 1960 has morphed into a 
major player in the investment arena.  Since three specific entities are known as survivors 
throughout the entire period that REITs have existed, these entities are examined in greater 
detail utilizing the methodologies just discussed.  Washington Real Estate Investment Trust 
(WRE) will be discussed in Chapter V.  Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust (PEI) will 
be discussed in Chapter VI.  Winthrop Realty Trust (FUR) will be discussed in Chapter VII.  
Chapter VIII will compare the three companies and offer some detailed analysis.  Summary 
comments will be provided in Chapter IX, on what conclusions can be drawn from reviewing 
both the qualitative and quantitative data on these three companies as they relate to company 
survival and the growth of the industry. 
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CHAPTER IV 
NAREIT 
 NAREIT, which was established the day after the industry was signed into law in 1960, 
has been in existence for fifty years protecting the interests of its members. NAREIT considers 
itself “the worldwide representative voice for REITs and publicly traded real estate companies 
with an interest in U.S. real estate and capital markets” (REIT.com/AboutNAREIT).  The 
membership of NAREIT consists of REITs and other companies throughout the world that 
hold, manage or finance income-producing real properties, plus parties who inform and 
examine those companies. 
 Steven A. Wechsler, the current President and CEO of NAREIT, has been with 
NAREIT since May 1, 1997.  Prior to joining NAREIT, Wechsler was the President of the 
National Realty Committee.  When asked about his mandate as President, he responded: 
NAREIT has two fundamental missions. The first is to communicate effectively 
inside Washington and in the states with policymakers to ensure that the REIT 
industry and the REIT vehicle is understood, appreciated and continue its 
mandate. The second mission for NAREIT is to communicate beyond the 
policymakers to the investment marketplace to the investing public, to the 
investing analysts, to the financial media and press, about the REIT industry, 
about REITs and real estate investment, and to ensure that people understand 
what's involved and how it works (Johnson, 1997).      
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Wechsler felt this core mission of NAREIT was tied to the national policies and structures of 
the REIT vehicle itself.  He said it was important that the public gets educated about REITs 
and what the companies have to offer (Johnson, 1997).   
 NAREIT’s website, REIT.com, provides information and data on the real estate 
investment industry and REITs.  In Appendix B, several tables and a chart are presented with 
information obtained from REIT.com.  Table B-1 provides information on the Historical REIT 
Industry Market Capitalization from 1971 – present, emphasizing the growth in capitalization 
from $1,494.3 million in 1971 to $389,295.4 million in 2010.  Table B-2 provides the FTSE U. 
S. Real Estate Index Historical Price and Return rates from 1971 - present.  In 1971, the Index 
was set at 100 and by 2010 it had risen to 3,458.89, with annualized returns varying from a low 
of -42.23% in 1974 to a high of 48.97% in 1976.  Table B-3 provides the FTSE U. S. Real 
Estate Index Series Historical Price and Return from 1971 - present with compound returns 
from time periods of 1 year to 40 years.  Other than the 5-year compound rate, all other 
compounded time periods showed positive annual rates of return between a low of 7.28% for 
the 1-year to a high of 20.38% for the 3-year rate.  The 40-year compound rate was 9.46%.  
Table B-4 provides a listing as of 2011 of REITs in the S & P 400, S & P 500, and S & P 600, 
along with their entrance dates into the S & P indexes.  This table shows how REITs have 
achieved prominence in the marketplace over the industry’s life.  Lastly, Exhibit B-1 shows a 
pie chart detailing the Breakout of REITs by Property Type as of 2010.  Retail properties make 
up the biggest group at 26%, with Industrial at 5%.   
 In summary, when comparing the NAREIT indexes to other pertinent indexes, 
interesting results are provided on how REITs perform relevant to other investments.  In 
comparison with other indexes, the FTSE NAREIT U. S. Real Estate Index showed a total 
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return for all REITs of 7.28% for the year-ended 2011, with 20.38% for the 3-year compound 
total, and -2.13% for the 5-year compound total return.  The S&P 500 Index showed a return of 
2.11% for the year-ended 2011, with 19.11% for the 3-year compound total, and -0.25% for the 
5-year compound total return.  The Russell 2000 Index showed a return of -4.18% for the year-
ended 2011, with 15.63% for the 3-year compound total, and 0.15% for the 5-year compound 
total return (REIT.com).     
  
Interview with Brad Case 
As part of the process in understanding the mission and activities of NAREIT, Brad 
Case, Senior Vice President of Research and Industry Information was interviewed.  Case 
stated he had been with the organization five years, with his primary duty being the 
development of content for outreach meetings to pension funds, investors, etc.  The content he 
produces should answer questions on why one should invest in real estate and how REIT funds 
perform better than real estate (Case, 2011). 
Case was asked to identify the strengths of NAREIT.   He responded by stating that 
member companies would probably view the lobbying efforts as the strength of the 
organization, but he personally felt the outreach they provided to be of primary importance.  
Case expressed his view as: 
Getting the word out on REIT investments to pension funds, institution 
investors, and other potential investors is important for the continued growth of 
the industry.  NAREIT, not only provides lobbying efforts for member 
companies, but also promotes REITs as investment vehicles.  In addition, we 
monitor and report on items of interest to REITs (Case, 2011). 
      
When Case was asked about his organization’s goals and strategies, he stated that the main 
goal was to get more money invested in REITs through outreach programs and meetings.  The 
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other goal is to continue the lobbying efforts for the industry.  To meet those goals, Case stated 
NAREIT has a full-time lobbyist on staff, along with knowledgeable people who promote and 
provide research related to items of interest to REITs (Case, 2011).       
As a narrative on the history of investing in REITs, Case mentioned that for the first 
thirty years, no one really cared much about REITs as a vehicle for investment.  For the next 
fifteen years, institutional investors become more involved, but not much information was 
available to them to spur real interest.  In the last five years, more empirical information is 
available, with most of the responsibility for producing it falling on Case.  He further stated 
that private equity funds of today are similar to the limited partnerships of the 1990.  These 
funds do not have the transparency and accessibility associated with REITs.   Per Brad Case, 
these funds are not a good idea. The National Council of Real Estate Investment Funds 
(NCREIF) is the association that works to protect these funds, similar to how NAREIT works 
to protect REITs (Case, 2011). 
As he continued to describe the history of investing in REITs, Case mentioned that in 
the late 2000s when the economy started faltering with reduced access to credit markets, the 
government did not force fire sales like they did in the prior recession.
18
  He said the position 
the government took in the late 2000s may have been better for the economy, but not 
necessarily better for REITs.  Per Case, the Savings & Loans problems in the 1980s and early 
1990s led to the recession, which helped spur on the real estate crisis in 1990 – 1991 (Case, 
2011).   
                                                          
18
 Fire sales refer to the sales of distressed assets, in this case real estate, at depressed prices.  With the Resolution 
Trust Corporation closing many Savings & Loans Institutions starting in 1989, access to new credit dried up as 
real estate hit a downturn, causing many properties to be foreclosed and subsequently sold at depressed prices 
(FDIC, 2000).   
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The RTC was formed in 1989 as a federal government agency to deal with insolvent 
Savings & Loans institutions during the period from 1989 to 1992.  In the early 1990s, it was 
viewed as a contributor to the real estate crisis during that time.  The RTC was subsequently 
dissolved in 1996 (FDIC, 2000).  REI Ts took off as a result of the activities of the RTC, and in 
some ways attribute increased investor interest in REITs during that time to the RTC. 
 As part of his responsibilities, Case noted he provides information to analysts and 
investors about REITs.  Many of the reports provided by Case show REITs’ performance 
relative to other indexes in order to promote the benefits of REIT investment.  In Appendix C, 
charts are provided that provide some interesting information on REITs in comparison with 
other investment vehicles.  Appendix C-1 and C-2 provide a chart concerning Domestic REIT 
Stock Cycles and Market Dynamics related to REIT Market Downturns and REIT Market 
Expansions, respectively. The chart on downturns (C-1) reveals that the downturn experienced 
beginning in 2008 has been worse than others in the past.  On a positive note, the expansion 
from the 2008 downturn is occurring more rapidly, but is not as long-lived as expansions in the 
past.  Appendix C-3 displays that REITs were net sellers during peak valuations, which shows 
wise investment activity.  Appendix C-4 displays the net returns to listed Equity REITs and 
Private Real Estate Investments over the market cycle.  This chart shows that Equity REITs 
had higher returns than Private Equity Funds, whether the full real estate cycle was evaluated 
or just the upside of the cycle.  Appendix C-5 displays the comparison of the Equity REIT 
index during downturns.  This chart provides a historical perspective on the activity of Equity 
REITs from 1972 through 2011, displaying the months and returns that REITs were either in 
the peak-to-trough periods or the expansion-from-trough periods.  This chart provides 
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numerical support to the graphs in C-1 and C-2, with the current downturn showing a larger 
negative return of -68.3%, with a shorter expansion period from the trough of only 31 months.  
 To continue with the charts, Appendix C-6 displays the historical compound Annual 
Total Returns of REITs and Benchmarks.  This chart is important because it shows the FTSE 
NAREIT Equity REITs index compared to indexes for the S & P 500, Russell 2000, and 
Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index.  The most important result is that the REIT index 
displays higher returns for the long-term of 10 years to 35 years than the other indexes.  
Appendix C-7 shows the long-term performance distribution of the S & P 500 and the FTSE 
NAREIT Equity REIT Index.
19
  For returns in the range of 20 – 25%, more companies that 
make up the REIT index (87) fall in that range, than companies in the S & P 500 (33).  Even 
though the S & P 500 has more companies with returns greater than 25%, the difference in 
number of firms is not much, only consisting of 9 companies.  Appendix C-8 displays that 
REITs offer strong long-term net returns, with returns much greater over time than the other 
indexes.  Appendix C-9 shows that REIT returns have little in common with any non-REIT 
stocks by providing correlation coefficients with other stock groups.  This information is 
important to show that REITs offer diversification to an investor’s portfolio, in particular the 
larger, institutional investor.  NAREIT realizes that for the REIT industry to continue to grow 
and flourish, larger investment pools will need to include REITs in their portfolio. 
To continue with the analysis of REITs, Appendix C -10 shows REIT Dividend Growth 
versus the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  Except for 2 years during the period 1992 – 2010, the 
growth in REIT dividends far outpaced the CPI.  Appendix C-11 charts that strong continuing 
dividends over time have accounted for more than 60% of REIT total returns.  This chart 
                                                          
19
 FTSE provides the equity REIT index and other indexes that are then used by NAREIT to evaluate REITs. 
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compares the FTSE NAREIT index to the S & P 500 to reveal that not only is the total return 
higher for REITs, but the dividend component is a larger component of the total return for 
REITs than for other stock investments.  Appendix C-12 reveals that REITs provide greater 
capital appreciation than most other real estate investments.  This chart displays capital 
appreciation throughout the real estate market cycle 1998/1999 to 2007/2008 for REITs versus 
other real estate funds to support the REIT industry’s role in the investment arena.    
Two additional charts provide more information relevant to REITs.  These two charts 
are not prepared by Case or NAREIT, but were located within some research conducted by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  In Appendix D-1, information provided by the 
FDIC Division of Research & Statistics, entitled Industrial Market Conditions 1977 – 1994, 
shows the net new supply of leased space, along with the increase in occupied space.  The net 
new supply of leased space peaked in 1979 and dipped from 1988 – 1994.  The increase in 
occupied space exceeded the net new supply for the years of 1992 – 1994.  In Appendix D-2, 
additional information provided by the FDIC, entitled Total Nonresidential Construction Put in 
Place 1970 – 1994, shows nonresidential construction at its highest in 1985, with a big dip in 
the late 1970s and dipped again in 1992 – 1994.  These charts point to the cyclical nature of 
real estate, which impacts not only the industry as a whole, but the histories of the three 
specific companies that are featured in this case study research. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
WASHINGTON REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST 
 
 Washington Real Estate Investment Trust (WRIT) began and has remained a company 
invested in and operating in the greater Washington D. C. area.  Started in 1960, the company 
is focused on local real estate with diversification in its property type.  The company celebrated 
its 200
th
 consecutive quarterly dividend with its declaration on October 27, 2011 (Camp, 
October 27, 2011).  The stable Washington market, with government offices and the nation’s 
capital, has enabled it to better ride out business cycles.  With being a mid-sized REIT, WRIT 
focuses on smaller tenants, thus making it less vulnerable to one large tenant leaving. The 
largest property sector in WRIT’s portfolio is office, due to government and company 
headquarters located in Washington, which yields an occupancy level of 90% (Lerner, 2010). 
 Qualitative evaluation was performed through review of historical documents and 
discussions with management.  A joint interview was conducted with William (Bill) Camp, 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and Kelly Shiflett, Director of Finance.  The interview 
provided information on WRIT’s history, strategies, management, and future direction. After 
discussion of some historical information, the details related to the interview will follow. 
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Review of Historical Information 
 WRIT issued a Prospectus on June 6, 1961, offering 600,000 shares of $1.00 par value 
beneficial interest.  In the Prospectus, it states WRIT is a common law trust organized on 
November 18, 1960, under the laws of the District of Columbia.  It states that WRIT intends to 
utilize the opportunity presented with Public Law 86-779 (REIT law) enacted on September 
14, 1960, and effective January 1, 1961.  Two of the sponsors of the trust were Franklin Kahn 
and Art Birney (WRIT Prospectus, June 6, 1961), who would go on to serve at WRIT for a 
long time.  WRIT notes on its website that it was the first of the new Congress-approved 
investment trusts.   
 The 1961 Prospectus states that WRIT will purchase commercial income-producing 
property, mostly in the Washington D. C. area and that it had entered into a contract to buy an 
apartment complex known as 4901 – 4915 Battery Lane in Bethesda, Maryland (WRIT 
Prospectus, June 6, 1961).  On August 6, 1964, WRIT issued a Prospectus for a $2,000,000 6 
¾ convertible subordinated debentures due September 1, 1984.   As of that date, the Prospectus 
stated WRIT had 2,800 shareholders.  The Prospectus states that the decision to concentrate 
WRIT’s investments in the Washington area is due to the belief that: 
(1) The residence in the area of a large percentage of government-employed 
personnel, Federal, state, District, and foreign, affords the area a high 
degree of income stability, 
(2) The nation’s capital is growing in employment and population, 
(3) The fact that the Trustees and the members of the Advisory Board are 
engaged in business in the area and also reside there enables them to 
exercise close supervision over the Trust’s real estate investments. 
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 These beliefs are important since they indicate that the same strategy WRIT was implementing 
in 1964 is the same strategy they state in 2011.  The Prospectus states that as of 1964 WRIT 
had not sold any properties it had acquired (WRIT Prospectus, August 6, 1964). 
 On January 22, 1969, WRIT issued another Prospectus, with this particular one for 
400,000 shares of beneficial interest at $2 par value.  The Prospectus reveals that rental income 
from properties climbed from $1,386,002 in 1963 to $2,772,999 in 1967, showing the growth 
of WRIT’s business through the mid 1960s.  Net income per share rose from $.29 in 1963 to 
$.33 in 1967, showing growth, but not the triple digit percentage growth reflected in rental 
income.  The Prospectus provides a summary of real estate investments, showing six dedicated 
apartment buildings, one distribution center, two office building combinations, and two 
shopping centers (WRIT Prospectus, January 22, 1969).  In 1961, WRIT started with the 
purchase of one apartment building, so its growth to eleven buildings in eight years was 
significant for this smaller REIT. 
 On June 3, 1971, WRIT issued a Prospectus for 500,000 shares of beneficial interest at 
$2 par value.  Since the January 1969 Prospectus, three new apartment buildings were added to 
the portfolio, while one apartment building was sold.  Plans were to use these proceeds for 
future equity purchases (WRIT Prospectus, June 3, 1971). 
 The 1971 Washington Real Estate Investment Trust Annual Report reflects the growth 
in WRIT during its first ten years.  By 1971, rental income was up to $5,766,393, which as 
noted previously, was $2,772,999 in 1967.  As rental income had doubled from the years 1963 
to 1967, it doubled again from 1967 to 1971.  The increase in net income per share from 
1967’s $.33 to 1971’s $.87 was much greater than the earlier increase noted from the years 
1963 to 1967.  WRIT seemed to be getting more efficient in turning rental income increases 
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into net profit in 1971.  The 1971 Annual Report stated that 1971 was WRIT’s best 
performance year for its real estate activities.  The report stated that net income increased 80% 
from 1970 to 1971.  In addition, WRIT owned 13 properties at the end of 1971, which it 
consistently held those same properties throughout the years in 1970 and 1971.  Cash flow 
increased 32% from 1970 to 1971 from these same properties, showing better utilization of the 
assets to generate income and cash flow.  The annual report stated that the quarterly dividend 
was increased to $.24, which resulted in dividends per share for 1971 of $.96 compared to $.82 
in 1970.  In addition, on May 7, WRIT was listed on the American Stock Exchange under 
symbol WRE (WRIT, 1971 Annual Report). 
 Per the Annual Report of 1971, WRIT mentioned its concern for the environment, even 
as early as 1971, by providing trash compactors in its buildings to cut down on pollution.  
WRIT also stated in its annual report that it considered a building’s potential when it evaluates 
a purchase, rather than just looking at its current operations, which seems to be the standard it 
has followed throughout its history (WRIT, 1971 Annual Report). 
 On May 7, 1981, WRIT’s Prospectus included the offering of 275,000 shares of 
beneficial interest.  The Prospectus mentions that WRIT has six apartment buildings, four 
office buildings, seven shopping centers, and four distribution centers.  WRIT has utilized tax-
free exchanges for its sales and purchases to avoid taxes on the significant gains realized on its 
sales.  In addition, the Prospectus states that the dividend per share increased according to a 
compound annual growth rate of 11.9% from 1971 to 1980.  In addition, WRIT boasted that 
since 1962, it had paid 77 consecutive quarterly dividends, with each dividend at least equal or 
larger than the previous one.  On March 16, 1981, WRIT had a three-for-one stock split and 
paid $.25 as its March 31
st
 quarterly dividend (WRIT Prospectus, May 7, 1981). 
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 Per the 1981 Prospectus, rental income showed gains with $5,766,000 in 1971 and 
$12,297,000 for 1980.  Likewise, net income per share increased from $.29 per share in 1971 
to $.76 per share in 1980.  Dividends also increased from $.32 per share in 1971 to $.84 per 
share in 1980.  The Prospectus noted that no distributions of long-term gains had occurred 
since 1972 (WRIT Prospectus, May 7, 1981).        
 On October 24, 1985, WRIT’s Prospectus included an offering of 1,000,000 shares of 
beneficial interest.  In the Prospectus, it updates WRIT’s portfolio as five apartment buildings, 
nine shopping centers, four office buildings, and five business centers.  In addition, it states 
that WRIT’s earnings and cash flows had increased for 20 consecutive years.  Along with these 
increases, dividends had increased since 1969 with an annual growth rate of 12%, with 
consecutive quarterly dividends paid since 1962.  Stock splits equal to 4 ½ to 1 had occurred 
since 1980.  Rental income, as reported in the 1981 Prospectus, showed $12,297,000 for 1980, 
which by 1984 had increased to $17,247,000.  Net income per share of $.51 in 1980 had 
increased to $1.04 in 1984, with dividends per share increasing from $.56 in 1980 to $1.00 in 
1984.  Overall, dividends per share increased from $.18 per share in 1965 to $1.00 per share in 
1984.  Cash flow had also increased from $.59 per share in 1980 to $1.11 per share in 1984.  In 
1965, cash flow per share was only approximately $.05 per share and showed continual 
increases to 1984.  In Exhibit H-1, one can see a graphical display of the growth of net income, 
dividends and cash flow.  Debt-to-equity had decreased from .8 to 1 in 1980 to .3 to 1 in 1984 
(WRIT Prospectus, October 24, 1985). 
 On April 21, 1989, WRIT’s Prospectus offered 1,500,000 shares of beneficial interest.  
At that date, WRIT owned five apartment buildings, four office buildings, nine shopping 
centers, and nine business centers as displayed in Exhibit H-2.  Once again, WRIT stated that 
95 
 
net income increased for 24 consecutive years, with consecutive quarterly dividends for 27 
years and increasing annual dividends since 1970 with a 12% annual growth rate.  In addition, 
it stated that since 1980, combined stock splits were 6 ¾ to 1.  The proceeds from this offering 
were noted to be used for future acquisitions and to improve already owned properties.  Real 
estate revenue had increased from $17,247,000 in 1984 to $25,713,000 in 1988.  Dividends per 
share had increased from $.67 in 1984 to $.95 in 1988.  The debt-to-equity ratio was .3 to 1 in 
1984 and .2 to 1 in 1988 (WRIT Prospectus, April 21, 1989).   
 On March 19, 1997, WRIT’s Prospectus offered 3,750,000 shares of beneficial interest.  
The Prospectus showed WRIT owned seven apartment buildings, twelve shopping centers, 
sixteen office buildings, and fourteen industrial distribution centers.  Rental revenue increased 
from $34,132,000 in 1992 to $65,541,000 in 1996, while net income increased from 
$20,429,000 in 1992 to $27,964,000 in 1996.  Dividends per share increased from $.84 in 1992 
to $1.03 in 1996.  In addition, FFO increased from $23,817,000 in 1992 to $35,748,000 in 
1996.  WRIT also noted that it maintained a diversified tenant base, with approximately 1,000 
tenants.  The proceeds from this offering were to be used to pay off $23,000,000 in credit lines, 
with the remaining proceeds used to fund acquisitions and major capital improvements.  In 
addition, WRIT stated it would keep its debt coverage ratio at 5 to 1, which was above the 3 to 
1 debt coverage ratio generally considered conservative (WRIT Prospectus, March 19, 1997). 
 In the Washington Post on November 5, 2003, WRIT’s profit was reported down for 
the third quarter 2003 due to expenses rising quicker than revenues.  WRIT reported earnings 
of $.28 per share for the quarter ending September 2003, compared to reported earnings of $.30 
per share for the same quarter in 2002.  Revenues increased 7%, whereas expenses increased 
12%, which was led by a 24% increase in depreciation and amortization expense.  FFO, which 
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adds back depreciation, increased from $18.90 for third quarter 2002 to $20.10 for third quarter 
2003 (Washington REIT, 2003). 
 As of March 12, 2004, WRIT owned 67 properties, which included 11 retail centers, 29 
offices buildings, 18 industrial properties, and 9 multifamily properties.  Net operating income 
increased 10.4%, mostly due to WRIT’s acquisition of six office buildings.  Net income 
increased from $44,887,000 in 2003 to $45,564,000 in 2004 or 1.5%.  Dividends per share 
increased from $1.47 in 2003 to $1.55 in 2004.  During 2004, WRIT was noted as reducing its 
exposure to the office sector by disposing of some office assets and acquiring medical office 
buildings, along with some purchases of retail, multifamily, and industrial/flex buildings.  A 
portfolio of five buildings in Dulles Business Park was acquired in late 2004, which were 
98.9% leased.  In February 2005, three office buildings were sold for a gain of $33.0 million 
(Mergent’s, 2005). 
 The Wall Street Journal conducted an interview with Edmund B. Cronin during March 
2006.  At the time, Cronin had been Chairman, President and CEO, of WRIT since 2000.  Prior 
to 2000, he was President and CEO of WRIT since 1994.  He was also a Director of NAREIT.  
Cronin was asked to provide a brief history of WRIT and its present activities.  At that time, he 
noted that WRIT was one of the few REITs with an S & P rating of A- or better (TWST, 
Cronin, 2006). 
 Asked if WRIT would consider properties that were run down but with potential, 
Cronin commented yes.  He said they look at the NOI growth potential, in particular, over the 
next three years.  He said they project a 10-year cash flow run, focusing on return on invested 
capital after the first year with a minimum expectation of 4 to 6%.  After that, they consider if 
the property should be sold.  He stated concerns over the economy, but noted that their market 
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does not feel the downturns as hard as in other areas.  However, in the late 1990s and early 
2000s and the crash of the technology sector, he said they felt a significant downturn.  He also 
said they had to consider the base realignments that may be planned (TWST, Cronin, 2006).   
 Asked why invest with WRIT, Cronin said it would depend on the goals of the investor.  
For an investor who wanted a good dividend, he said investors would like their long-term 
growth in dividends and FFO.  If an investor is looking for growth, he would see a long track 
record of growth, exceeding the average annual rate.  The total return of WRIT is also higher 
than other growth companies.  Overall, he said it is a good investment in a diversified portfolio.  
He stated he thought they would continue with their current investment strategy, but possibly 
add a little more speculative development.  He said the medical office portfolio is an area they 
would like to increase.  He also stated that even though some express concern with 
telecommuting and the future of office space, he felt that personal interaction in the work place 
will always be needed.  He said he sees more satellite offices and office building relocations 
closer to residential areas to reduce employees travel times (TWST, Cronin, 2006).          
 WRIT announced Friday, June 1, 2007, that it initiated a public offering of 1.6 million 
common shares at a price of $37 per share.  The offering was planned to close no later than 
June 6, with the proceeds used to pay down debt.  In January 2008, WRIT announced it 
planned to sell $125 million in bonds for additional funding to refinance debt (Washington 
REIT Prices Offering, 06/04/2007).     
 BellwetherReport.com announced on June 4, 2007 that it had added Washington REIT 
to its watch list.  Besides being diverse in its portfolio, the article noted that WRIT was also 
diversified in its tenant base with no more than 5% of its rental revenue coming from one 
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tenant.  It also noted that WRIT had such good tenants as NASA, George Washington 
University, and the World Bank (Washington REIT is Added to Watch List, 06/04/2007). 
 Baschuk (2007) wrote in The Washington Times that WRIT was claiming a small 
victory even though the national REIT sector was struggling.  The REIT sector had fallen .5% 
during 2007 and many of the top REITs were being hurt by increasing interest rates, negative 
flows out of mutual funds, small dividend yields, and competition with the international 
markets.  WRIT’s stock had fallen to a six-month low on July 23, 2007, falling to $32.64.  
WRIT, feeling hopeful, had increased its quarterly dividend for 37 consecutive years.  Baschuk 
noted, “With 88 properties in the Washington region, WRIT distinguished itself from the pack 
by encouraging diversity in its portfolio” (Baschuk, 2007).  Charlie Place, with Ferris, Baker 
Watts Inc., an investment banking firm, emphasized that many of the other REITs settle on one 
specific asset type, but WRIT invests in all property types.  As stated by Place, “Since they are 
not focused solely on one property type, they are constantly in the market.  So I see WRIT 
finding opportunities to add to their portfolio.” (Baschuk, 2007)  WRIT was also in the 
construction phase of three developments in the Washington region that were slated to be 
completed by the end of year 2007.  Of course, Baschuk noted that not all analysts were as 
upbeat about WRIT’s activities.  John Guinee, analyst at Stifel Nicolaus & Co., Inc., was not as 
enthusiastic about WRIT, stating management bought a few assets, but did not do that much.  
Guinee wanted to see WRIT selling off some of its old assets and paying a higher dividend 
(Baschuk, 2007).     
 On May 8, 2009, Titanstocks.com issued a hot alert on WRIT.  It noted that WRIT 
announced that it entered into an agreement the previous day to change its $100 million 
unsecured loan with Wells Fargo Bank.  The revised agreement extended that maturity date 
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from February 19, 2010 to November 1, 2011 to allow WRIT an additional year and a half to 
pay off or refinance the existing indebtedness (Today’s, 05/08/2009). 
 On May 12, 2011, Jim Cramer of Jim Cramer Mad Money show, featured Washington 
REIT.  The show felt that REITs were a good read on commercial real estate and that REITs 
gauge all property types including retail, office, and industrial.  The show stated that WRIT 
owned a diversified portfolio of 85 properties throughout Washington D. C. and the 
surrounding areas.  Cramer interviewed McKenzie on “Mad Money” to learn about the varying 
segments and what he felt each one said about the overall economic recovery (Sandholm, 
2011). 
An article in The Washington Post on September 12, 2011, discussed how apartment 
developers were pouring funds into Washington real estate.  The area has been noted as being 
one of the top performing apartment sectors in the U. S.  O’Connell (2011) stated that the 
available jobs, 3.1% vacancy rate, and lull in building due to the financial crisis was slowing 
down access to available funds.  Both Urban Investment Partners, based in Washington D. C., 
and Equity Residential, based in Chicago, are apartment developers and managers who were 
actively purchasing building and development sites in the area.  Company personnel noted that 
the feeling is people come and stay in D. C. now, whereas in the past people left the city at the 
end of the day to go live in the suburbs.  Potential cuts to the federal budget have not 
dampened the enthusiasm in the area, according to a vice president at Equity Residential, who 
saw the area as continuing to produce jobs.   In addition, today’s renters who are in their 20s 
and 30s emphasize location, whether they rent or own.  Thus, the multifamily business looks 
bright for those companies that choose to invest in that area (O’Connell, 2011).  The 
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attractiveness of multifamily, along with industrial’s smaller returns, are some of the 
contributing factors for WRIT’s decision to sell off its industrial portfolio in 2011.      
During the second quarter 2011 earnings call, management at WRIT noted that the 
multifamily portfolio outperformed the other sectors.  They also noted that the selling of the 
Industrial portfolio was under a Letter of Intent.  In addition, management stated there was a 
full deal pipeline with several projects possible, but no firm deals yet.  In addition, they stated 
no more sales were projected before the end of 2011, other than the industrial portfolio.  Most 
developments in the near future would be multifamily, with a focus on properties in sub-
optimal markets.  Furthermore, management stated cash flow was improving and WRIT would 
be paying its 199
th
 consecutive dividend.  Leasing volume was the highest it had been in five 
years, with not as much lease exposure as there was in prior years.  Lastly, they noted a line of 
credit of $475 million was extended for three years (WRIT second quarter conference call 
2011, 7/29/11). 
During the third quarter 2011 earnings call, management noted WRIT would be paying 
its 200
th
 consecutive quarterly dividend.  McKenzie noted that in the last conference call, 
WRIT mentioned three projects ready to close.  He stated there was a little less opportunity 
than a quarter earlier, but it was still an acquisition market. The multifamily sector was 
operating at a 96% occupancy level, which they were comfortable with and perceived it to be a 
normal good market.  Occupancy could experience a slight uptick, but the overall market for 
leases should remain about the same, until better news is heard on macro events.  Utilities were 
higher in the last quarter and real estate taxes increased, which made NOI growth look flat.  
Metro Washington D. C. area was flat due to elections, but management was optimistic leasing 
would improve over the long term (WRIT third quarter conference call, October 28, 2011).    
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On November 1, 2011, WRIT announced that it had sold the remaining properties from 
its industrial portfolio for $70.6 million.  The first three industrial portfolio sales occurred in 
September 2011 and the fourth was in October 2011.  With the sale in November, the entire 
portfolio was sold for an aggregate amount of $350 million.  According to McKenzie: 
We are pleased to announce the completion of the final piece of our industrial 
portfolio disposition.  Following our strategic decision earlier this year to trade 
out of this portfolio, we worked tirelessly to execute these five sale transactions.  
We recognized a GAAP gain of approximately $97 million, which we have 
already reinvested into better located and faster growing office and retail assets, 
leaving us with a well-positioned portfolio as we look ahead to 2012. (Camp, 
11/1/2011) 
 
With the sale of the industrial portfolio, WRIT had 71 properties made up of 26 office 
buildings, 18 medical office buildings, 16 retail centers, and 11 multifamily properties (Camp, 
11/1/2011). 
 After reviewing the historical documents related to WRIT, a joint interview was 
conducted with two officers at WRIT to extend the qualitative review of the company and to 
obtain a feel for the culture and strategy of the company.  Through discussions with company 
personnel, insights into company activities and strategies were obtained and evaluated.  Both 
Bill Camp, Executive Vice President and CEO, and Kelly Shifflett, Director of Finance, were 
very familiar with the company and were willing to share their insights. 
  .   
Interview with Bill Camp and Kelly Shiflett 
To obtain a feel for the longevity and knowledge base of the officers interviewed in 
relation to WRIT, the question was asked, “How long have you been with the organization?”   
Kelly Shiflett stated she had been there five years, while Bill Camp indicated he had been there 
three years.  Camp stated he had covered the REIT industry since 1999 and been in the stock 
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industry since 1992.  However, Camp noted that his perspective is different now, since he is on 
the other side of the table.  Shiflett stated this was her first experience at a REIT, but that prior 
to her service at WRIT, she was a stock analyst and in banking (Camp and Shiflett, 2011). 
In conjunction with the interviews, the officers were asked about their primary duties 
and responsibilities. Shiflett mentioned she was in charge of investor relations, coordinating 
the financial and nonfinancial information, preparing information for presentations, and acting 
as the corporate historian.  Camp stated he was in charge of the financial statements and 
presentation of financial information to investors, bankers and others (Camp and Shiflett, 
2011). 
With an understanding of their relative positions in WRIT and their knowledge base, 
the question was asked concerning the strengths of their organization.  Shiflett mentioned 
diversification was important and it allowed WRIT to stay in balance, since when one sector is 
not doing well, another is performing, which has served the company well in delivering returns 
to stock investors.  In addition, she stated location is important, with Washington D.C. serving 
as its target market.  With the federal government located in Washington D. C., even in bad 
times, money is being spent, so there is always need for space.  Camp stated one of the 
strengths of WRIT was the population growth in D.C., with its focus solely on the D. C. market 
(Camp and Shiflett, 2011). 
Camp discussed how all the employees eat, drink, and sleep the Washington D. C. 
market.  He said the officers at WRIT know all the brokers and everybody in the area, which 
allows them to get leases and deals done.  He stated that those connected with WRIT know 
more about the markets than the average real estate investor.  He said they know traffic 
patterns, where people get off the Metro, where they walk and what they do throughout the 
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day.  So, management at WRIT knows whether they want a building on the corner, and which 
one is the better building, even though they may look the same.  Camp feels that so many 
REITs are spread out all over the country or in different countries, which makes it impossible 
to know what is going on in each of those markets.  WRIT’s senior management team is only 
focused in this one market.  As Camp stated, “If we know the returns are better in the 
neighborhoods where the rich people live, we can go in there.  Being flexible in one market 
and a general real estate operator has advantages.” (Camp and Shiflett, 2011)  Camp stated 
management has sold buildings that it did not think were that great or the demographics were 
changing in that area, whereas someone from a foreign land may not be able to see what WRIT 
can identify.  He feels others may see Washington D. C. and think of it only as a good market.  
However, they do not realize there are some tough parts in Washington D.C.  Camp refers to 
the fact that not every building is perfect, but others may not be aware of which ones are or are 
not, which allows WRIT to capitalize on other people’s lack of knowledge.  Being in 
Washington all the time, management is aware when certain buildings may have peaked in 
value (Camp and Shiflett, 2011).     
In terms of WRIT’s goals and strategy, Camp was asked about the comments made on 
the recent quarterly conference call concerning WRIT’s getting out of the industrial market.  
On the conference call, Camp had commented that the returns for the industrial sector were just 
not there.  To follow-up on his conference call comments, Camp noted that WRIT was in fact 
getting out of industrial.  As Camp stated: 
It is an interesting sector.  Historically through most real estate cycles that we 
have owned it, from trough to trough, it has never had returns above the other 
sectors we own.  In terms of industrial throughout the country, this would be 
good industrial.  It would have been way above average compared to all other 
industrial.  However, for us, with four other property types, it has never 
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outperformed the other sectors.  It may have gotten up to our average, but never 
brought the average up.  So, we decided if it never brings the average up 
through multiple real estate cycles, then why own it (Camp and Shiflett, 2011).   
 
He stated that management at WRIT concluded they would rather let someone else play 
with the industrial, so the decision was made to sell it off.  Camp noted that some investors 
have criticized the decision to sell off industrial, since they ask why sell it right now with 80% 
occupancy.  The real answer is, in Camp’s opinion, that they have discovered since this last 
downturn that most of their tenants were related to home building.  He said they are down and 
dirty industrial guys, and not Proctor & Gamble storing toilet paper and diapers.  He described 
these tenants as either what you would see in the alley or one-story office space.  However, he 
did not want potential buyers to think they were not getting a good deal with WRIT’s 
industrial, but he just felt like the time had come for them to make a change.  As Camp said: 
We thought since it was our lowest performing sector and everyone wants to be 
in Washington D. C., why not.  Maybe someone else can lease it better than we 
can or maybe they can get some magical revenues we could not through better 
rents.  I hope so, because we do not want an unhappy buyer.  It is a win/win for 
buyer and seller, as we are getting out of a sector we were not performing as 
well in, while someone else gets into a better market than some of their other 
properties (Camp and Shiflett, 2011).   
 
In response to the sell-off of Industrial, Camp and Shiflett were asked if since Industrial 
makes up approximately 12% of their revenue, they thought WRIT would be cash heavy for 
awhile or did they think they would be able to redeploy those funds into other properties.  
Camp stated, as he did in his conference call to investors that the company’s acquisition plate 
was relatively full.  However, he noted that due to recent developments in the stock market, 
they would have to decide if they wanted to go through with any acquisitions or hold off for 
awhile.  He felt WRIT was not in a position where they had to go through with any plans yet.  
He felt management would need to make a decision by the end of 2011, but right then they 
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could watch the stock market bounce around a little bit and decide if they wanted to be more 
cautious and lower their leverage or prefer to go out and buy buildings.  He noted that WRIT 
had just paid off $95 million in debt in June at basically the same interest rate they would get 
on a return from buying a building, so it really was not that much of a difference.  As Camp so 
adequately put it, “From an earnings perspective, it shouldn’t really matter which way I go, but 
yeah, you have to be cautious where you put your money because the acquisition market is still 
quite frothy” (Camp and Shiflett, 2011).   
In terms of the overall economy, Camp noted people were still spending money in 
Washington D. C., but that investors were cautious about putting money into stocks due to the 
United States government not being able to come up with a budget.  He said stocks are down 
because everyone is caught up in what is in the newspapers.  However, as far as investing in 
real estate, he felt everyone still wanted to own a building in Washington D.C.  Clearly, he 
feels the D. C. market is an advantage since he thinks anyone who knows anything about real 
estate knows Washington is not going away and the government is going to get bigger.  Even if 
there is discussion about cutbacks, Camp states the government will continue to get bigger, 
which is good for real estate in that area (Camp and Shiflett, 2011). 
The interview continued as Shiflett referred to a slide she had produced for another 
presentation that showed levels of government spending, regardless of whether it was 
Democrats or Republicans in power.  Camp agreed that it did not seem to matter who it was in 
charge, because basically no one was cutting spending.  He said with the latest budget deal, the 
government initially projected growth of 8% a year.  He noted that after all of the budget 
compromises were done, they were only cutting approximately $1.2 trillion, which was 
nothing.  He summed it by saying, “So people think the government is really doing something, 
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when in reality they are really doing nothing.  If you look back over history, every time the 
government threatens cutbacks, more and more companies relocate here” (Camp and Shiflett, 
2011).  He referred to it as the old theory of getting close to one’s customer.  The only way a 
business can guarantee its piece of the pie is to get closer to its customer, in Camp’s opinion.  
He cited examples of General Dynamics’ move back in the 1980s, the move of Northrop 
Grumman, and the move of Booz Allen Hamilton.  For the most part, these are defense 
contractors that have moved to Washington D. C. to be closer to the government that is 
supporting them.  He also noted that Volkswagen USA moved to Washington and many of the 
guys in the Biotech industry have also moved there.  The bottom line, he felt, is that these 
companies know where their money comes from, so regardless of what the government does, 
these companies are not going away.  He drew an analogy to the banking business, where 
banks get big and then they turn around and get small.  Government contractors deal with the 
long-term production of building things, whether for war, medicine, or whatever the case may 
be.  That is why Washington D. C. is unique, according to Camp and Shiflett (Camp and 
Shiflett, 2011). 
Shiflett expanded the discussion of the effects of government on real estate in the 
Washington D. C. area, as she stated when there were cuts, they were more peripheral and 
usually not there.  Camp agreed and stated that in the next couple of years, one has to look at 
the defense budget.  He said that budget is usually considered the biggest, besides Social 
Security and Medicare.  In addition, he said one must look at the spending for the stuff that is 
not going away, like the spy stuff and surveillance.  The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) are agencies that will always stay fully 
functioning, in Camp’s opinion, along with the contractors that work with them.  In addition, 
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he mentioned the mercenary guys, who are to go out and assassinate people in foreign lands, 
will always be headquartered out of Washington D. C.  All the security people are there too, 
and Camp does not see that being cut.  Camp cited an example of how the government process 
works and its impact on Washington D. C.: 
 One of our Board Members was talking about how the defense bill gets put 
together.  They said the government starts by cutting out all those things they 
think are non-essential.  Then, the Congressmen and Senators get involved and 
where those things that happen to be in their jurisdiction are involved, they put 
them back in.  The Defense budget is really not that big before all the 
Congressmen and Senators put things back in.  The system is flawed because of 
that.  It just does not work to keep spending money on things you do not need 
(Camp and Shiflett, 2011).   
 
The analogy was drawn that one could not make it in business working in a manner 
similar to the government.  As Camp stated, “Just because someone gets mad because you have 
to let them go, you cannot keep just growing people.  You have to retool, make new products, 
but the government doesn’t do that” (Camp and Shiflett, 2011).  In his opinion, WRIT takes 
advantage by being located in the heart of all national government activities (Camp and 
Shiflett, 2011). 
 In discussing WRIT’s goals and strategies, consistency seems to show through.  
Management at WRIT see themselves as running the same business they did decades ago.  In 
Camp’s opinion, the decision to get out of Industrial was a huge move.  He thought that when 
one looks at all the company’s sectors, taking Medical Office out of the equation, WRIT was 
only a small fraction of the total real estate market.   He cited that in Office, the company is 
probably less than 1% of the total market, with the potential to grow to 2%.  With that growth, 
they would be doubling, which would be huge for WRIT.  Thus, management felt there was 
plenty of room to grow.  The big question for WRIT management is do they have to move out 
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of Washington D.C. to grow more.  In Camp’s opinion, they do not need to go outside the area, 
as there is still room to grow where they are.  In Medical Office, he mentioned they have 
maybe 15 - 20% of the market, so they may be a little more pressed to grow in that sector.  
However, he felt any company could easily get bigger in Washington if they chose to go that 
route.  Shiflett noted that the cap rates
20
 on properties sometimes make a purchase prohibitive.  
However, Camp felt one could still grow if desired, as long as management kept from getting 
an overconcentration in any one sector (Camp and Shiflett, 2011). 
Along with growing the company, another main goal expressed by Camp and Shiflett 
was to keep the balance sheet pristine.  They both stated that management wants the company 
to remain highly rated, thus staying in the top of the ratings for publicly-traded REITs.  Shiflett 
stated they were number 11.  Camp noted that a high rating and flexible balance sheet is a high 
priority for their management team.  He stated they did not want to see another 2008, for as 
conservative as they were, it was still no fun going through 2008.  As Camp noted, “We were 
fine, but if we would have had half the leverage, I would have slept a little easier each night.  
We made it, we are through it, and we are less levered now” (Camp and Shiflett, 2011).  Thus, 
Camp stated the goal is to keep the balance sheet strong and more liquid, so there are more 
options in the market to raise capital.  He felt not every REIT is in that position, but it is 
something WRIT continually strives for. 
 Per Camp, another big strategy for WRIT is growing the other sectors, especially since 
they are getting out of Industrial.  They want to see growth in four areas, according to Camp.  
                                                          
20
 Cap rates are derived by using recent sales prices of  similar income-producing properties combined with the 
net operating income (NOI) or net rents realized from those properties in a formula of NOI/Purchase Price to yield 
the cap rate.  Cap rates are used to establish values for real estate (Kimmons, 2012).  See Glossary Terms for more 
information.  
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Number one is growing inside the Beltway, no matter the type of property (other than 
Industrial).  Second, growth by an interstate interchange or a Metro
21
 stop is desired.  WRIT 
looks for some other reason for the building to be there, other than just a spot to be physically 
located.  Third, Camp said there needs to be a major driver for properties outside the Beltway, 
such as a key employment driver.  He said, one has to ask if the population and activity that are 
present have been driven by a military base, a medical hospital, or something else.  Fourth, 
management looks at areas with high demographic income.  If there is high household income 
to support retail, then retailers know people will continue to shop, thus it pushes up rents.  
When it comes to multifamily properties, WRIT has found inside the Beltway is best for the 
company.  He stated that all their multifamily properties now, except one, are inside the 
Beltway.  Anytime in his opinion that WRIT goes looking for any type of property outside the 
Beltway, they want to identify the driver behind the area’s growth.  He said it could be as 
simple as a major Metro stop or an area that is in walking distance to a college or hospital.  To 
him, a highly dense workforce is always a good indicator.  These purchases are the kind they 
have done in the past and want to continue to do (Camp and Shiflett, 2011). 
An additional strategy WRIT would like to employ is to start selling properties four to 
five years into the ownership of the property, which would allow more overall turnover in the 
portfolio.  Camp stated WRIT would like to start an active recycling program.  He further 
mentioned that for the first forty to forty-five years of the company’s history, it did not sell 
much.  The company had a buy-and-hold-forever mentality.  In Camp’s opinion, the problem 
with that mentality is that when a company buys and holds buildings for a long-time, those 
buildings tend to cost a lot of money.  As Camp stated: 
                                                          
21
 In Washington D. C., the Metro refers to the Metrorail and Metro bus transit services.   
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As buildings get older, they generally start costing more in maintenance, roofs, 
the same types of things over and over, where you can sell that building and 
reinvest the money in a newer building that won’t cost you as much money.  
Obviously, you have a huge gain in those buildings because you have owned 
them forever, but you can put them into a new building that won’t suck 
everything out of you.  So that recycling program has gone on for the last five 
years or so in earnest, ramping up and the pinnacle being selling Industrial 
(Camp and Shiflett, 2011). 
 
Camp referred to the older age of the industrial buildings as an additional driver for getting out 
of Industrial.  The fact that industrial property could potentially cost more money in the future, 
combined with its lower return, helped clarify for management its position on Industrial.  Thus, 
Camp saw recycling, buying the right buildings, keeping the balance sheet clean, and growing 
the company as management’s goals for WRIT (Camp and Shiflett, 2011). 
 In terms of growing the company, the question of the optimal size for WRIT came up.  
Through observation of the three surviving REITs, one can see they are not the biggest REITs 
in the marketplace.  Camp responded with the comment, “Funny, how that works” (Camp and 
Shiflett, 2011).  With growth in any company, there is also the question of whether there is a 
point where one says, they do not want to get any bigger than that.  Camp stated that WRIT 
management does have a size in mind, even though they have not advertised it.  He mentioned 
WRIT is about a $3 billion size company right now.  However, he said the companies that 
appear to be the right size are more in the $5 to $7 billion range, at least in terms of how 
investors react to them. He stated that those companies seem to be a little more nimble, and the 
investment community seems to care about them more.  He stated that the investment 
community cares about Avalon Bay and Boston Properties.  He further stated that the 
investment community cares about the big monsters too, such as Simon Properties.  However, 
he said when a company gets to a certain size, it has to eat companies.  In his opinion, these big 
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companies have to buy other companies, go global, or do something that may take it off its 
mark.  He said WRIT management does not want to do that, and they will approach what they 
feel as the optimal size by recycling capital, rather than going to the market.  Thus, when they 
buy a building, they will look at selling a building.  He further explained this recycle program 
by stating: 
We have said right now we will recycle about a third of what we buy.  So, if we 
buy $100 worth of buildings, we sell $33 in buildings.  We have decided we 
would pay for a third of what we buy through selling and when you do the math 
and get closer to that number of optimal size; maybe that third becomes two-
thirds.  Thus, you are giving your shareholders something in terms of a return 
on the properties.  Hopefully, as you are turning properties, you are going from 
something that may be costing you more or has slower growth, to something 
that has better growth, even though it may cost the same.  It could be better 
located or a newer building, but you start ramping up where you are using your 
own capital instead of someone else’s (Camp and Shiflett, 2011). 
 
  Thus, Camp and Shiflett were asked, “If WRIT gets to the $5 – $7 billion range and the 
analysts are looking at the company more, would that really help with perception in the 
market?”  Camp responded that it did help with perception in the market.  Even though he said 
one may not want to be concerned about the market’s perception, he has to worry about it, 
because REITs are always using capital.  He said as a REIT, the company is always getting 
another bank loan, getting a new line of equity, or requesting some type of funding.  However, 
he said once WRIT reaches its optimal size, where it is buying a building and selling a building 
to fund it, and then it would not have to care as much about all that.  At that point, the company 
would be more self-sufficient, thus would not need the lenders as much.  Of course, he stated 
that management would always care about the share price.  However, he mentioned WRIT has 
to get to this level first (Camp and Shiflett, 2011). 
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 In line with market perception, Camp noted that any REIT wants to make a difference, 
such that even the largest dedicated REIT investor is interested in its stock and wants to 
understand its activities.  He stated a REIT also wants enough trading volume, so that the non-
dedicated REIT investor will always want to look at the company.  He said that currently 
WRIT is only trading about 500,000 shares a day at $30/share, so the company really does not 
trade that much.  So on a daily volume level, he noted that some of the biggest investors that 
have billion dollar funds cannot buy WRIT shares.  Shiflett added that WRIT does not have 
quite enough liquidity.  Camp agreed and commented that for some of the biggest investors 
that is just not enough, because it can take them three weeks to get in and out of the market. He 
elaborated by stating that is the situation a company wants to avoid.  However, he noted that 
the odd thing is that WRIT is still in the upper half of all REITs in terms of size.  Shiflett added 
that there have been so many REITs that have gone away.  Camp added that in 2009, WRIT 
was in the top 25 of all REITs, because many of the bigger REITs had collapsed and proceeded 
to fall off the face of the earth.  He noted that since then, some have come back, but others 
have gone away forever.   He concluded that a company always wants to be a big enough 
player to get the analysts’ attention, since there are always buyers and sellers in the 
marketplace (Camp and Shiflett, 2011).  
 To address the question on how Camp and Shiflett see their organization striving to 
meet its goals, some of the history of WRIT was discussed, along with some of its recent 
activities.  Once again, it was discussed that Washington REIT was the oldest of the surviving 
REITs, even though Camp commented that he thought it was only the oldest by possibly three 
weeks.  He stated that Bradley (a shopping center REIT) was older than WRIT, but it had 
failed and was no longer around.  This comment sparked a discussion on shopping centers and 
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some recent problems with Borders.
22
  Camp stated that the closing of Borders impacted the 
second quarter 2011 financial results, because WRIT had a Notes Receivable that had to be 
written off.   He commented Borders had paid rental income of $250,000 per year, which may 
seem large, other than the fact that WRIT makes rental income of $300 million a year.  Thus, 
even though it impacted WRIT, it did not materially affect the company that much in the grand 
scheme of things.  Camp noted that those companies most impacted are the shopping center 
REITs who have more than one Borders store.  He stated it is hard because it is leaving an 
empty box that has to be filled, and not many retailers are expanding in the current economy.  
He said the most successful businesses right now seem to be those that can come up with a new 
restaurant concept, but those businesses do not really fit in a Borders’ location that is typically 
20,000 square feet (Camp and Shiflett, 2011).  
 In terms of how a REIT leases its space, Camp noted that management always hopes 
that they do not have a major concentration of any one retailer.  He commented that he felt 
confident Simon Property Group
23
 had Borders locations all over the place, but he felt it was 
not going to matter that much to them.  He said REITs like Simon Properties are big enough 
that it hurts, but the company can usually fill the space.  As long as the building is in a good 
location, retailers come and go.  Camp described the retail business as such: 
There is always someone that thinks they can do it better than the next guy.  
Retail is just a funny place.  If you talk to the restaurant guys, it is rare that a 
restaurant concept works for more than 5 years.  But, the same Chef will go 
open up under a different name and it will be hot again for another 5 years with 
                                                          
22
 Borders is a national book store that filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2011 and decided to permanently close its 
store locations throughout the United States. (Retrieved from http://atlantabankruptcynews.com/2011/07/borders-
chapter-7-liquidation-leads-to-five-atlanta-area-stores-closing.html) 
23
 Simon Property Group is an S & P 500 company and the largest real estate company in the United States.  It 
primarily focuses on the retail sector. (Retrieved from http://www.simon.com/about_simon/index.aspx) 
114 
 
the same guy doing the same thing, maybe with the same menu.  But, now he is 
successful again.  Retail is just a funny business like that (Camp and Shiflett, 
2011). 
 
  One of the strategies employed by WRIT, according to Camp, is to emphasize stock 
multiples over growth rates.  He stated management wants to grow, but stay small enough, 
since once companies get bigger, stock multiples drop.   Camp stated that multiples are 
cyclical, and that a company cannot carry multiples forever.  Historically, Corporate Offices 
Properties Trust
24
 has had the highest multiples, he stated, but now they have reversed.  Camp 
said one of WRIT’s goals is to ensure its stock multiples remain strong (Camp and Shiflett, 
2011). 
   In discussing the items that can attribute to WRIT’s success over the last fifty years, 
several factors come to mind.  Factors, such as location, good size, knowledge of the market, 
and staying the course have been highlighted as some of the strong points of WRIT.  As Camp 
discussed WRIT’s fifty-year success, he stated “I would like to say it is the brilliant 
management team, but we are in the best market in the nation and one of the best in the world.  
It is a huge engine driven market.” (Camp and Shiflett, 2011)  He said he does not really look 
at the government as being a growth engine for the market, but more as a stabilizer.   Camp 
stated with the government, one may know where the ship is going, but it takes a long time for 
it to ultimately get there, allowing time to react.  He said they will know five years in advance 
whether a defense budget is going to be cut, and management at WRIT can make adjustments 
                                                          
24
 Corporate Office Properties Trust is a specialty office REIT with properties mostly in the Baltimore and 
Washington D. C. area, with some expansion into other areas as mandated by its predominantly governmental 
client base.  The company has received numerous accolades for being one of the best companies in its industry 
year after year. (Retrieved from http://copt.com/web/page/554/sectionid/554/pagelevel/1/interior.asp)   
115 
 
accordingly.  Either way, Camp noted they will still have some people in D.C., even with the 
cuts (Camp and Shiflett, 2011). 
 In terms of the unique characteristics of WRIT, Camp noted that their small 
management team is one of the unique characteristics.  He stated that the management team 
consists of only seven people.  Even with their arguments, he said the small group does a good 
job in coming together to make key decisions.  He said compared to other REITs that have six 
or seven members of management in each city that report up through a bigger pyramid 
structure, they are quite small in number.  In Camp’s opinion, “I think it is an advantage that 
we are pretty small and nimble and can make quick decisions in the marketplace” (Camp and 
Shiflett, 2011).  However, he noted for other employees away from the management team, the 
small size of management may not be as good of a thing.  He commented that if one of the 
other employees wants to aspire to be one of the seven management team members, he has to 
wait for someone to quit or die, which is a tough thing.  In addition, the smaller size team does 
cause everyone to have a pretty large area of responsibility, according to Camp.  Shiflett agreed 
with Camp’s comments and mentioned that since they were a smaller size they could spend 
time producing unique materials or getting to know their investors and each other on a more 
personal basis (Camp and Shiflett, 2011). 
 Another unique characteristic of WRIT is the longevity of the senior members of the 
team, as evidenced by documentation in their 2010 Annual Report.  In addition, retired 
members of management, such as Ed Cronin, are still involved with the firm, according to 
Shiflett.  Camp stated Cronin had just attended the last shareholders’ meeting.  Camp noted 
that Cronin has many stories related to the history of the company and his role in taking it over.  
Prior to Cronin, Camp stated the original founder was Frank Kuhn.  Camp noted that Cronin 
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came in around 1994, while Kuhn was still at the company.  Camp said that Frank Kuhn and 
the Board hired Cronin to eventually take over Frank’s job.  He stated he was not sure how the 
dynamics worked, but eventually Frank was gone and Ed was in charge.  As Camp put it, “It 
was basically a changing of the guard when you have had a guy who has been there for 35 
years that is now leaving” (Camp and Shiflett, 2011).  Shiflett added, “Yes, so you had Frank 
and Arthur starting the company and I think we have had only three CEOs.  I think Skip is 
actually the 3
rd
 CFO in a 50-year company” (Camp and Shiflett, 2011).  Additionally, Camp 
mentioned that WRIT was only on its 4
th
 Chairman, as Frank was always the Chairman and 
CEO as long as Camp had been there.  Camp noted that when Frank Kuhn left as Chairman, 
then Arthur Birney was Chairman for a short time, and then Ed Cronin became Chairman and 
CEO, and currently John McDaniel was the Chairman (Camp and Shiflett, 2011).   
 To add to the discussion of longevity at WRIT, Camp elaborated on his statement that 
WRIT had maintained a REIT structure that did not fall apart throughout the real estate cycles.  
He stated that the 1980s wiped out many of the REITs that were in existence at that time and 
the market tried to do it again last year, and really even three years ago.  He commented that 
there has been a lot of cyclicality to REITs and real estate investing, and it has lost investor 
population over the years.  Camp related the history of REITs to the history of other forms of 
entity structures.  He discussed the failure of partnerships in the 1970s, which wiped out almost 
everyone.  Then he commented on the partnerships that failed in the 1980s, and wiped out most 
of the investors with them, making investors lose all their money all over again.  Then, he 
mentioned the 1990s with the resurgence of the REIT world, and what had generally been 
regarded as the new formation of the REIT industry.  He contended that this history discussion 
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is important because it showed why there have not been many REITs that have held on for fifty 
years.  In Camp’s opinion: 
This structure has to be set up for the right reason and most of these guys have 
not set it up for the right reason.  Most of the guys were setting it up for their tax 
planning or their ownership structure, or all their personal things.  Whereas, if 
you set these things up for the way Congress intended to be set up, which is for 
individual investors to be able to invest in real estate in small chunks, and the 
management team comes in and caters to that shareholder, then the system 
works.  Once you get away from that very basic philosophy, they don’t work 
very well.  Too much ego and greed in the world and that is what cost them.  
Partnerships got over-levered because everyone was trying to get that last little 
return on everything and then everyone got wiped out (Camp and Shiflett, 
2011).  
 
 Looking back at the partnerships of the 1980s, Camp stated they got over-levered and 
they were all developers.  He said they all built buildings, thus everything got overbuilt.  He 
said from his experience following the companies as a broker, one could see that they were not 
just owning buildings to generate revenue, which is what a REIT should do, but they were 
building a lot.  The difference today, he stated, is that REITs do still build some, but that is not 
primarily what they do (Camp and Shiflett, 2011). 
 To further document the change in REIT focus, Camp continued his discussion of the 
events in the 1980s and 1990s.  He stated that in the 80s, developers overbuilt as everyone 
wanted a new building.  Then, he noted, when the recession hit in the 1990s, the country was 
not only in a recession, but many markets were overbuilt with no demand for anything.  Thus, 
Camp stated all these developers were leveraged and had no way to refinance, so banks and 
creditors foreclosed on these buildings.  For those companies that were still on the edge and 
sitting on the brink of bankruptcy, Duke,
25
 Liberty,
26
 and at least thirty others, they sought out 
                                                          
25
 Duke Realty was established in 1972, but went public in 1993, and started major expansions from there.  It 
specializes in industrial, office, and medical office properties.  (Retrieved from 
http://www.dukerealty.com/company/history.aspx) 
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the public markets to bail them out by forming a REIT.  Thus, Camp concluded that REITs 
formed in 1991 to 1993 were almost all bailouts, because the companies were overleveraged 
and initially established as general real estate partnerships, which had to recapitalize. Camp 
noted these events were a similar story to what happened to REITs in 2008, where most all 
companies had to go get money to de-lever.  The main difference between the 1980s/1990s and 
2008 he pointed out was that the companies were able to do it in 2008.  In earlier periods, they 
had no ability to do it, as they were more private companies (Camp and Shiflett, 2011).   
 Camp continued his discussion by noting that the sentiment during the 1990s seemed to 
be that everyone who owned a portfolio of properties decided they might as well be a REIT to 
get capital whenever they needed it.  Because this sentiment carried forward, many more 
companies were REITs in 2008, when the latest downturn occurred.  This access to the public 
markets, in Camp’s opinion, is what helped more companies survive in this later period than 
those that did in the early 1990s.  Even with the tightening of the credit markets in 2008, which 
was something most current real estate managers had not personally experienced, only one 
major REIT did not survive.  Camp commented that General Growth Properties (GGP)
27
 could 
not pull through, and he was sure there were small REITs that also failed. In Camp’s opinion, 
that proved the REIT structure worked and it saved almost everyone.  Thus, he felt no one lost 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
26
 Liberty Property Trust, formerly known as Rouse & Associates, was established in 1972 and formed as a REIT 
and went public in 1994.  It is currently one of the largest commercial real estate companies.    (Retrieved from 
http://www.libertyproperty.com/timeline.asp) 
27
 General Growth Properties is a shopping center REIT that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2009 due to its 
inability to refinance maturing debt.  It was the largest U. S. real estate company to file bankruptcy.  However, 
General Growth emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection one and a half years later in 2010 by splitting up 
the company and selling off Howard Hughes Corp. (Retrieved from http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-11-
09/business/bs-bz-general-growth-emerges-20101109_1_general-growth-mall-operator-chief-executive-adam-
metz) 
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all their money, which was better than the ways of the past.  Camp commented that the way the 
real estate world operated before consisted of everyone basically getting wiped out, so that they 
could start over.  Shiflett commented that Mr. Trump
28
 was an example of the past, where 
banks lost money through real estate ventures, but the individual was able to come back.  
Shiflett was familiar with the Trump organization, because in her former position, she actually 
worked with Trump and listed Trump Entertainment on NASDAQ (Camp and Shiflett, 2011). 
 In conclusion, through review of written documentation and the interview with Camp 
and Shiflett, WRIT has provided consistency in its investing policies, dividend policies, and 
management philosophy throughout its fifty years.  Once a model for the company was 
developed in the 1960s, WRIT has stayed with that model and provided consistent 
performance and results for its stockholders.  With a prime geographic location in and around 
Washington D. C., WRIT has been positioned to take advantage of a stable economy driven by 
governmental structures.  WRIT has capitalized on its location, strong management, and 
knowledge base, to provide a strong balance sheet and cash flow. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                          
28
 Mr. Trump refers to Donald Trump of Trump Entertainment and other real estate ventures.  The Trump 
organization, or companies bearing his name, have filed bankruptcy four times.  Donald Trump admits that he has 
used the laws to help reduce debt and in his opinion, negotiate with the banks for better deals.  (Retrieved from 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-filed-bankruptcy-times/story?id=13419250) 
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CHAPTER VI 
PENNSYLVANIA REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST 
 
To appreciate the history and success of PREIT over the last fifty years, it was 
evaluated both qualitatively and quantitatively. Qualitative evaluation was performed through 
review of historical documents and interviews with management.  Interviews were conducted 
with Edward (Ed) Glickman, President and Chief Operating Officer (COO), and Jeffrey (Jeff) 
Linn, Executive Vice President of Acquisitions.  These interviews provided information on 
PREIT’s history, strategies, management, and future direction. 
Throughout PREIT’s fifty-year history, significant changes have occurred that have 
impacted its direction and focus.  A few of the most significant events are highlighted here.  In 
1960, PREIT was founded and became one of the first publicly traded equity REITs in the 
United States.  Its first dividend was paid in 1962, which was the same year it did its first 
public offering raising $5 million.  In 1970, PREIT started trading on the American Stock 
Exchange under ticker PEI, which it still utilizes today.  In 1997, PREIT merged with The 
Rubin Organization and PREIT was converted to an UPREIT with Ronald Rubin named Chief 
Executive Officer.  In that same year, the stock moved to the New York Stock Exchange and 
PREIT’s fiscal year end was changed from August 31 to December 31.  In 2002, PREIT paid 
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its 100
th
 consecutive dividend after forty years of continuous dividends.  In that same year, it 
changed its strategic focus from diversified to retail, with Crown American Realty Trust 
merging with PREIT in 2003 (PREIT Company History, 2011). 
 
Review of Historical Documents 
In PREIT’s Prospectus dated June 18, 1962, information about the firm’s beginnings 
was documented.  PREIT was created in Pennsylvania on December 27, 1960, as an 
unincorporated business trust with a perpetual term.  The stated purpose of the trust was to 
provide investors with an opportunity to own an interest in the trust, through transferrable, 
limited-voting shares.  The Trust would own diversified properties, mainly consisting of real 
estate interests (PREIT Prospectus, June 18, 1962). 
On June 9, 1961, PREIT made a $2 million public offering to Pennsylvania residents of 
20,000 shares at a par value of $100 per share.  The Trust received $1,981,720 after 
organizational costs.  With these funds, the Trust spent $1,146,481 in 1961 to acquire two 
properties, both in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  On February 28, 1962, the Trust borrowed 
from banks $1,750,000, which with its own funds of $629,595 acquired the 25
th
 Street 
Shopping Center near Easton, PA and the School Lane Apartments in Philadelphia, PA.  In the 
1962 Prospectus, it states that the funds raised from the offering of 500,000 shares at $8 par 
value will be used to pay back the $1,750,000 bank loans and to purchase $1,200,000 stock of 
a corporation owning the Maryland Apartments in Baltimore, MD.  The additional amount 
estimated to be made from the offering will be used to provide working capital for future 
acquisitions equal to an approximate amount of $1,500,000 (PREIT Prospectus, June 18, 
1962).     
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In August 1964, PREIT issued a prospectus for $4,500,000 in 6 ¼ debentures due 1979. 
According to that prospectus, PREIT had increased its portfolio to five apartment properties, 
one office property, six industrial properties, five shopping centers, and four mortgages.  In 
addition the Prospectus states that as of March 31, 1964, PREIT had assets with a net book 
value of $6,251,351.  In addition, it states that the company uses a cash-flow basis for its 
accounting and does not manage or operate the properties it owns, pursuant to REIT 
provisions.  It also states that PREIT has a high debt-to-capital ratio of 4 to 1, which it says is 
typical of companies utilizing a cash flow basis.  The Prospectus also states that the officers 
and directors own 228,847 shares or 30.5% of the outstanding shares, of which Sylvan Cohen, 
one of the key promoters of the Trust and President owns 37,209 shares.  Of the proceeds from 
this debenture issue, $4,000,000 was to be used to repay bank loans (PREIT Prospectus, 
August 18, 1964). 
On January 14, 1969, PREIT issued a prospectus for $7,500,000 in 6 ¾ debentures due 
1984.  By 1969, the portfolio had increased to seven apartment properties, one motel, one 
office property, six industrial properties, thirteen retail and shopping centers, two tracts of 
unimproved land, and four mortgages.  As of August 31, 1968, the net book value of assets was 
$8,785,084.  Of the proceeds, $4,300,000 was to be utilized to repay bank loans, with the 
remainder used for working capital and future acquisitions.  The Prospectus noted the company 
would pay a dividend of $.40 per share semiannually, which it had since its inception except 
for the initial dividend of $.20 per share paid on August 1962 (PREIT Prospectus, January. 14, 
1969). 
Since 1971, automated databases have been implemented, such as Compustat and 
CRSP.  In addition, PREIT became listed on the American Stock Exchange, which allows 
123 
 
changes in total equity, debt, and assets to be tracked.  As with most REITs, real growth 
occurred in the early 1990s with expanded REIT powers that permitted both management and 
ownership of properties.  Prior to 1997, PREIT was diversified with a heavy multifamily 
emphasis, per interviews with management.  With the merger with The Rubin Organization in 
1997, net assets grew in 1998 with further increases realized with the merger with Crown 
American (Compustat, 2011).      
Holcomb (2002) discussed the success of Pennsylvania REIT and how it highlighted 
changes in real estate investing.  Holcomb noted the combination of two Philadelphia firms, 
PREIT and The Rubin Organization in 1997, and how it changed PREIT into a successful 
investment vehicle.  He further commented that its success revealed the manner in which real 
estate investing was changing, and that REIT stocks were becoming a staple in many portfolios 
(Holcomb, 2002). 
Jack McAllister, a Vice President at NAREIT, noted in this same article, that since the 
utility industry had become deregulated, it had become a different investment with growth 
potential.  People related to REIT stocks like they used to relate to utility stocks as primarily 
income producers, per McAllister.  In addition, McAllister noted that people like REIT stocks 
because they can see what REIT’s own and they associate office buildings with rent (Holcomb, 
2002). 
In the article, Holcomb noted that before the merger with The Rubin Organization, 
PREIT passively owned apartments going back to its beginnings in 1960.  Likewise, The 
Rubin Organization at one time was much different, being perceived as the largest office 
landlord in the Philadelphia area.  Rubin noted that office buildings were not part of their 
investment strategy anymore and that PREIT invested in retail and apartments.  As of 2002, the 
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two largest retail centers owned by PREIT were Willow Grove Park and Lehigh Valley Mall, 
both having in excess of 1 million square feet.  PREIT was a developer, unlike early REITs 
that were primarily passive owners of real estate (Holcomb, 2002).   
On March 24, 2003, National Mortgage News reported that PREIT sold its multifamily 
portfolio to Morgan Properties for $420 million in a deal that signaled PREIT’s exit from the 
multifamily sector.  PREIT would now become a REIT focused on the retail sector solely.  
PREIT would in turn be purchasing six retail properties in Philadelphia from The Rouse Co. 
for $548 million.  PREIT’s management stated it would be the largest retail owner and operator 
in the Philadelphia market.  The gain from the sale of the multifamily portfolio would become 
part of a like-kind exchange with the retail purchase from Rouse, thus allowing PREIT to avoid 
taxation on the majority of the gain.  With the purchase, PREIT would assume $285 million of 
mortgage debt.  PREIT management stated they were pursuing other shopping mall purchases 
and discussing the purchase of another significant portfolio (Roundup:  PREIT, 2003).    
 In May 2003, PREIT acquired Crown American Realty Trust, which owned multiple 
retail properties and a mall.  The deal involved $300 million in stock and $600 million in 
mortgage debt.  This deal continued the transition from diversified to retail for PREIT.  
Properties were concentrated in Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, and Delaware.  Rubin 
stated that the merger with Crown American strengthened the company’s retail focus and 
allowed the company to grow more aggressively in retail.  Crown American owned 26 malls, 
mostly in Pennsylvania.  Six of the Crown American properties would be refurbished and 
subsequently sold over the next few years.  The properties to be sold were located in 
Tennessee, Georgia, and Pennsylvania, and had an occupancy rate of 72.6 percent.  The Crown 
American properties that would be kept had an occupancy rate of 90.5 percent.  Mark 
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Pasquerilla, Chairman and CEO of Crown American, saw the merger with PREIT as a positive 
move for his company and considered it to be timely and logical.  He felt that the larger 
property portfolio would have a great impact on leasing opportunities and relationships with 
tenants.  With a 9.3 percent ownership of Crown American, Pasquerilla supported the merger.  
He was to be added to PREIT’s Board of Trustees, along with another member of the Board at 
Crown American.  Not surprisingly, PREIT stock increased in price with the announcement of 
the merger with Crown American.  It is worth noting that PREIT gained its first retailing 
location in Harrisburg in the late 1990s (Dochat, 2003).         
 On November 12, 2003, the shareholders agreed to PREIT’s acquisition of Crown 
American Realty Trust.  The newspaper reported it would result in two major mid-state 
shopping complexes being owned by one owner.  Crown American owned Capital City Mall, 
while PREIT owned Paxton Towne Center.  PREIT, with the merger, owned 40 malls, 14 
shopping centers, and 19 apartments, mostly in the mid-Atlantic area.  The article mentioned 
both companies were reporting profits (Sulon, 2003).  
 On November 20, 2003, PREIT completed its $1.4 billion purchase of Crown American 
that owned 27 malls.  The final purchase price for Crown American was $642 million in stock 
and $758.5 million in debt.  With this purchase, PREIT was the largest mall owner and a large 
property taxpayer in the state of Pennsylvania.  The newspaper reported that Wall Street 
seemed to agree with PREIT’s strategy as the stock price had climbed approximately $9 a 
share since January 2003 (Fernandez, 2003). 
 March 1, 2004, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) approved relief to PREIT to allow it 
to remain a REIT.  The decision by the IRS came several days after PREIT declared its REIT 
status was at risk due to a mistake in electing to regard a corporation in which it owned more 
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than 10% of the stock as a taxable REIT subsidiary.  The particular corporation was created 
October 12, 2001, and PREIT received permission to make the subsidiary election be effective 
on that date.  This action affected the taxable years 2001, 2002, and 2003.  If PREIT was not 
granted relief from the IRS, PREIT would incur corporate income taxes, interest, and penalties 
for three years.  Speculation existed that PREIT might not have access to enough capital to pay 
the taxes, if required.  In addition, PREIT may not have been able to qualify as a REIT until 
2006.  Due to the mistake, PREIT had already withdrawn a stock offering of 4.4 million 
common shares at a price of $37.08 a share, and this offering had not been rescheduled (IRS 
Says, 2004).   
 In March 2004, it was announced that PREIT reported higher earnings for year-end 
2003 and its fourth quarter of that year.  Part of the increase in earnings was attributed to the 
acquisition of Crown American by PREIT, even though the deal decreased earnings per share 
in the fourth quarter, as it was concluded in November 2003 with the issuance of additional 
shares.  Fourth quarter earnings of $11.5 million or $.40 per share were reported compared to 
$7.3 million or $.45 per share for the same quarter in 2002.  Fortunately for PREIT, the IRS 
granted relief and PRETI could remain a REIT (McCready, 2004). 
 In February 2005, Mark Hequet wrote an article about PREIT’s mall shopping.  He 
referred to the old notion that “timing is everything” when he discussed PREIT’s sale of its 
multifamily units around the same time it purchased retail properties, with a $500 million price 
tag to utilize section 1031 exchange treatment and defer capital gains.  Hequet wrote how it all 
came together in March 2003 as Morgan Properties of King of Prussia, PA. purchased the 
apartments for $420 million from PREIT, while PREIT purchased $548 million worth of retail 
property from The Rouse Co.  This purchase marked the beginnings of PREIT becoming a 
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major mall owner.  PREIT increased equity two times in 2003, with a credit line and income 
from the retail acquisitions.  PREIT’s biggest challenge was to find potential retail acquisitions 
that were prime for renovations, according to David Shulman, a senior REIT analyst at 
Lehman Brothers.  He saw malls as pricey, but stated PREIT was selective.  Shulman noted 
that the market seemed to be granting PREIT credit that it should be able to utilize fairly well.  
Having access to a $500 million line, Shulman noted, allowed PREIT to search out other malls 
(Hequet, 2005). 
 Hequet noted that with the Crown American Realty Trust merger, PREIT picked up 
twenty-seven more malls in late 2003.  Over the two-year period, PREIT had become a player 
in the big leagues of retail, and now had a line of credit to enable it to move even further into 
retail.  In late 2005, PREIT had 16 retail properties in its pipeline that could be refurbished and 
management felt more properties could be added.  However, renovations take a couple of years 
to show significant gains.  Having past experience with power centers, PREIT does not hesitate 
in putting a Wal-Mart or Target as an anchor in a regional mall (Hequet, 2005). 
 Hequet (2005) stated PREIT’s situation as smart growth.  PREIT’s problem and its 
solution are summed up by him as: 
Problem:  PREIT wants to move into regional malls from a mix of power 
centers, strip malls, and apartments.  Growing by buying more multifamily 
properties is out, and selling its apartment asset value would mean significant 
tax liability.     
Solution:  PREIT waits patiently for the right deals and sell apartments and buys 
malls at about the same time to execute a 1031 exchange.  It also buys and 
renovates big mall properties to leverage its existing staff to the max 
(Hequet, 2005).              
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As of 2005, PREIT had made its commitment to retail known and had moved away from the 
residential sector. With this renewed focus and its management team, it appeared ready to 
move forward.   
 In May 2007, PREIT was reported as refurbishing some of its aging malls by adding 
lifestyle and retail components at three of its older malls in the greater Philadelphia area.  
PREIT was looking to grow FFO and increase sales (Kirk, 2007).   
 On September 5, 2008, as the market was not doing well, several executives and 
directors of PREIT were reported purchasing stock while it was trading at less than 50%  of its 
52-week high.  The total purchases exceeded $1.32 million and included such insiders as 
Ronald Rubin (Chairman/CEO) and George Rubin (Vice Chairman).  Over the previous four 
weeks, several other purchases totaling in excess of $1.81 million were reported.  Those 
purchases were again made by Ronald Rubin and George Rubin, but also included Korman 
Leonard, a Director at PREIT (Boston, MA, 09/05/2008).  These purchases indicated that 
officers were committed and confident in the future of PREIT during that time. 
 Even though the credit market was tight during the latter part of 2008, PREIT was able 
to obtain financing for several of its major projects.  On December 16, 2008, it was reported 
that PREIT had completed three non-recourse mortgage loans secured individually by Exton 
Square, Francis Scott Key, and Viewmont Malls that amounted to $173 million.  Throughout 
2008, PREIT had been successful in obtaining 14 separate financing arrangements for a total in 
excess of $820 million (Pennsylvania…Hot Stock, 12/17/2008).  Lenders appeared to be 
confident in PREIT management and the company’s ability to repay loans, as large amounts of 
credit continued to be extended in PREIT’s direction during 2008. 
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 On January 19, 2009, The Wall Street Journal conducted an interview with Edward A. 
Glickman, President and Chief Operating, Officer of PREIT since 2004.  Glickman joined 
PREIT in 1997 when the company enlisted forces with The Rubin Organization.  He had been 
with Rubin since 1993 and had served as their Executive Vice President and Chief Financial 
Officer.  Prior to working with Rubin, he had been Executive Vice President and Chief 
Financial Officer at another real estate entity, Presidential Realty Corporation.  For nine years 
prior to that, he worked in the investment banking industry, for companies such as Lehman 
Brothers and Smith Barney (TWST, 2009).   
Glickman commented that as of September 30, 2008, occupancy at the malls was 
88.8% and at the strip and power centers it was 97.1%.  Glickman further noted that the 
transitioning of anchor stores in some of the malls was holding down occupancy rates, which 
was a cyclical component of retail and one the present economic environment had worsened.  
He also discussed how renovations hurt properties in the short-term, due to parking lot 
interruptions and relocations of tenants, but in the long-term, better trade should result.  With 
better trade, occupancy improves (TWST, 2009). 
 When asked about retailers filing bankruptcy, Glickman noted that improving the 
physical shape of the properties makes them able to compete better to get the consumers’ 
spending.  The more the company can improve PREIT’s market share, the better insulation 
against declines in spending.  Customers like to see state-of-the-art amenities, restaurants, and 
shops.  Providing the best venues allows a company to work with the best retailers.  Sixteen 
properties had been repositioned over the last several years according to Glickman, with seven 
more projects in the works (TWST, 2009). 
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 Fundamentally, Glickman stated the company still focused on liquidity, capital 
allocation, and project completion.  In addition, the relationships with retailers are a priority to 
keep occupancy high and draw shoppers.  The year 2008, Glickman noted, was hard for PREIT 
and the market in general.  However, PREIT was able to complete $800 million of new 
financings, with little need for refinancing in 2009.  Glickman noted the line of credit that 
came due in 2010 presented the next major challenge for the balance sheet.  New capital 
projects, he stated, were on hold until the capital markets and retail environment improved.  
Over three-fourths of the redevelopment projects in the pipeline by the end of 2008 were 
completed, with sufficient liquidity in Glickman’s opinion to complete those projects in 
process.  Some remaining projects, he noted, will be put back for now until the market is better.  
Glickman stated that the few mortgages coming due are nothing compared to the financings 
PREIT needed in 2008, so he felt liquidity would not be a big issue in 2009 (TWST, 2009). 
 In terms of its Shareholder base, Glickman responded that PREIT was 70% institutions, 
20% retail owners, and 10% management.  He stated that PREIT is a little more complicated 
than some of the other REITs, because management focuses on an opportunistic investment 
strategy.  While some REITs may focus on asset management, PREIT looks to develop value 
through redevelopment.  He considered the strategy at PREIT to put the company in a niche 
that is not as well understood by the investment community.  As Glickman states, “It is a more 
complex process to reposition existing assets, in many cases, than it is to build new properties 
or to acquire existing properties” (TWST 2009).  The main priority of the shareholders, he 
thought, was for PREIT to complete and implement those properties that were being 
redeveloped.  Glickman added that more projects may come up that need repositioning, 
whether the recession draws to a close or continues.  The longer the recession continues, he felt 
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the more financial institutions would have assets that need repositioning or redevelopment and 
that he hoped PREIT could partner with them (TWST, 2009). 
 Concluding the interview with The Wall Street Journal, Glickman reiterated the 
strength of PREIT’s management team and their experience in surviving economic downturns.  
The last major downturn, he noted, was the recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Thus, 
as difficult an economic environment that was faced in 2009, Glickman felt PREIT could 
navigate through it.  He also noted that the price PREIT’s equity was trading at in January 
2009 did not reflect the value of the underlying portfolio or the management team (TWST, 
2009). 
 As more evidence of PREIT’s executive officers and directors’ confidence in PREIT, 
several insiders purchased an aggregate of $1.94 million in stock over a four-week period 
ending March 23, 2009.  The stock was still trading at less than 50% of its 52-week high when 
the shares were purchased.  Some of the purchasers were Ronald Rubin (Chairman/CEO) 
increasing holdings by 23%, Douglas Grayson (EVP Development) increasing holdings by 
38%, Ira Lubert (Director) increasing holdings by 203%, and Leonard Korman (Director) 
increasing holdings by 28% (Boston, MA, 03/23/2009).      
 PREIT reported on July 29, 2009, that the company had a loss of $4 million in the 
second quarter of 2009 or $.11 per share.  In the prior year, for the three months ended June 30, 
$.10 per share loss was reported with a total loss of $3.8 million.  The poor 2009 results were 
attributed to store closings due to bankrupt retailers.  However, PREIT predicted that financial 
results would improve with the new store openings in some of the redeveloped malls (Panaritis, 
07/29/2009). 
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 In 2010, PREIT faced the maturity of one of its large credit lines, which Glickman had 
stated in an interview was one of the major challenges for the balance sheet.  On March 8, 
2010, it was reported that PREIT had completed a deal of $670 million in secured credit.  Of 
the total credit, $520 million was in term loans with a $150 million line of revolving credit.  
Most importantly, this new debt allowed PREIT to pay off its $500 million unsecured 
revolving line of credit and $170 million unsecured term loan that were due on March 20, 
2010.  The new credit has a maturity of three years and allowed for a one-year extension if 
certain conditions were met (Pennsylvania REIT Inks, 3/8/2010).   
 On March 11, 2010, Panaritis reported on PREIT’s $670 million financing deal.  She 
stated that this financing deal calmed investor’s concerns over PREIT’s ability to renegotiate 
its loans during a time when banks were more cautious in extending credit.  The company had 
taken on additional debt to renovate its malls, and investors were waiting to see how the 
company would address it.  Chairman Rubin stated PREIT had been working on this deal for 
about six months and had been talking with fifteen different domestic and international banks.  
Rubin stated that the banks for the most part were behind the deal because they understood the 
financing would be secured by valuable real estate.  Panaritis reported that analysts had been 
focused on this debt and its pending deadline for months, as PREIT had drawn just about all its 
$500 million available credit.  The debt could have been called due, if Wells Fargo and other 
banks had not been in agreement that credit should be extended.  Even more important, without 
a renewal of the credit, PREIT could have been forced into bankruptcy, since it had a high ratio 
of debt to assets.  Just a year earlier, debt had forced General Growth Properties Inc. into 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  General Growth was one of the nation’s largest mall owners, which 
made its similarity to PREIT, even more worrisome (Panaritis, 2010). 
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 Panaritis noted that PREIT was in its loan situation due to its $1 billion mall 
redevelopment project started in 2005.  Almost half of the $1 billion was spent by PREIT in its 
malls in South Jersey and South Pennsylvania, which is at the heart of the company’s market.  
Borrowed money renovated the malls in a strategy to visually improve the locations, attract 
shoppers, and receive higher rents in return.  Unfortunately, the economic conditions forced 
some retailers into bankruptcy, others to terminate leases, and some to negotiate for lower 
rents.  Cash was impaired for PREIT due to these conditions, which subsequently hurt the 
company’s ability to repay debt (Panaritis, 2010).  
 On October 28, 2010, in connection with its 50
th
 Anniversary, City of Philadelphia 
Mayor Michael A. Nutter wrote a Tribute to PREIT (Tribute, 2010).  On November 15, 2010, 
Governor Edward G. Rendell recognized PREIT on its 50
th
 Anniversary as a valued presence 
in the Pennsylvania.  He also commended the company for its contribution to the economic 
growth of the state and nation (Commonwealth, 2010). 
In late 2010, PREIT was honored with the Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
Design Core and Shell (LEED-CS) Gold certification from the U. S. Green Building Council 
for its rehabilitation work in Philadelphia at 801 Market Street.  The building was initially built 
as two adjoining buildings, with one built in 1902 and the other in 1929.  PREIT incorporated 
water and energy efficient features, used recycled materials and resources from the local area, 
and reduced carbon dioxide emissions.  Overall, PREIT improved the environment inside the 
building, while conserving resources (PREIT Gets Gold, 2010).     
 In PREIT’s second quarter 2011 conference call held on July 28, 2011, Ronald Rubin 
and Edward Glickman discussed the company’s growth and profitability.  Rubin stated that 
PREIT had six consecutive quarters of sales growth, with 29 of 38 malls showing increases.  
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Glickman stated PREIT had strong growth and a 90.8% occupancy level (Second Quarter 
Conference Call, 07/28/2011). 
 In PREIT’s third quarter 2011 conference call on October 27, 2011, Ronald Rubin, 
Edward Glickman, George Rubin, and Bruce Goldman were all present.  Company executives 
announced the seventh consecutive quarter of same store sales growth, which is quite 
commendable for a recessionary economy.  They noted that it was reflective of the 
demographics of the assets and managements’ efforts, but the recovery was fragile.  They were 
working to improve the balance sheet and increase NOI.  In terms of debt, Glickman noted 
they would be able to cover exchangeable notes due next May and that there was availability in 
their lines of credit and spreads to cover any development activities in 2012.  Their focus, 
though, was on existing properties and continuing to improve NOI (Third Quarter Conference 
Call, October, 27, 2011). 
 
Interviews with PREIT Management 
Interviews were conducted with both the President/Chief Operating Officer and the 
Executive Vice President of Acquisitions.  Both individuals were highly regarded for their 
knowledge of not only PREIT, but also the historical development of the REIT industry.  These 
interviews revealed information about PREIT from people involved in the management and 
decision making of the entity.  They provide valuable insight into the management team’s 
philosophies, organizational structure, and significant events related to the development and 
growth of the company.  In the paragraphs that follow are the details related to the specific 
interviews. 
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Interview with Edward Glickman 
Ed Glickman, President and Chief Operation Officer, has been at PREIT since 1997, 
when he came over with the merger with the Rubin Organization.  He previously served as 
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Rubin Organization.  He became 
President of PREIT in 2004.  In NAREIT’s weekly newsletter, NewsBrief, Ed Glickman in 
2010 discussed PREIT’s market condition.  He stated that the key to long-term success for 
PREIT was employment numbers rising.  Glickman stated, “Workers shop so their prosperity 
is critical to our business” (NAREIT, REIT.com Video, 2010).  He discussed PREIT’s strategy 
in these down market conditions as scaling back on development and focusing on building up 
properties already owned. 
In discussing PREIT’s beginning, Ed Glickman referred to the focus of early PREIT as 
being a small asset management company.  He mentioned that REITs’ activities were more 
constrained in the early days.  PREIT became largely invested in multifamily mostly in the 
East, both as managers and developers. Before the 1990s, multifamily and some legacy 
buildings were the main source of the company’s portfolio.  In 1997, PREIT merged with the 
Rubin Organization, and the portfolio expanded to include retail.  In 2003, PREIT merged with 
Crown American Realty Trust and incurred the biggest shift in its portfolio, as it took on 
twenty-six more retail properties.  As diversified REITs were falling more out of favor, PREIT 
was able to become singularly focused on retail with this latest merger.  As developers and 
managers, PREIT could focus on becoming vertically integrated.  Glickman stated PREIT’s 
resilience during the downturns is due to its core geographical base and varied tenants.  A good 
shopping climate adds to the area’s strength as a strong retail hub.  Industrial sites and older 
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malls have been renovated successfully by PREIT, who have shown the expertise to dive into 
such projects (Lerner, 2010). 
When asked about his primary duties, Glickman stated he represents the company to 
the public and investors. He said he deals with the bankers, investors, and capital source 
providers, with a great deal of his time spent talking with them.  He also works on public 
policies and interacting with the Board of Directors. His responsibilities include working on 
PREIT’s Business Plan and strategy issues.  In addition, he does anything else the CEO wants 
him to do, which depends on what is going on with the business at any point in time. He stated, 
“This job is like being the Vice President of the United States.” (Glickman, 2012) 
When asked in his opinion, “What are the strengths of your organization?” Ed 
Glickman stated the strengths of the organization are its resilience and its ability to take a long-
term view.  He said, “We are not about really the next quarter, but trying to create long-term 
value through multiple business cycles.  More and more companies are being pushed to being 
more reactive, which we are not.” (Glickman, 2012)  He stated that with PREIT being a 50-
year old company, management tries to take the view of a longer investment horizon, which is 
rewarding, but sometimes can be frustrating.  He discussed that PREIT was in the multifamily 
market, but had a good opportunity to sell out of it, which they did.  At some point, he 
mentioned PREIT might go back to multifamily.  Over the fifty years, the company has been in 
many property types, thus management does not see themselves fundamentally limited to any 
one property type. 
With over fifty years operating in many different businesses, Glickman feels 
management at PREIT keep an open mind about what types of real estate they might want to 
invest in.  PREIT is clearly invested in retail as of 2012, but looking at what they have done 
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over the last few years, one can see they have added other uses to their properties.   Glickman 
states that their ability and willingness to do that has come from their background of being in 
multiple businesses.  Management tries to keep abreast of all the opportunities for the real 
estate PREIT owns.  Glickman states that if they have a retail property and it has the ability to 
have something added to it or to be changed from retail to something else, management does 
not rule that option out just because it is not retail.  He refers to the time when PREIT was 
diversified.  PREIT owns some offices and has been utilizing office space with some retail 
space.  In addition, Glickman says if they have issues leasing it out to retail tenants, then they 
could consider leasing it out for offices.  Or, if they feel the demand is greater for retail space 
where they are leasing out office space, then management might lease it out as retail.  As 
Glickman states, “We are primarily retail, but not exclusively retail, in either our thinking or 
our skill set.” (Glickman, 2012)      
When asked about the strengths of PREIT, Glickman thinks there are two that are most 
descriptive of the company.  The first strength is an entrepreneurial bent to the company.  
Glickman see this strength as management being interested in investing in different 
opportunities, growing the company, and taking risks where appropriate. Management consider 
themselves real estate entrepreneurs, as they are not afraid of complexity and not afraid of risk.   
The other strength, Glickman notes, is that PREIT has had a focus for a number of years on 
ground development, so they are not afraid to blow up buildings to build back.  He notes that 
management keeps in mind the possibility for physically reconstructing property to a greater 
extent than those companies that are classified as asset managers.  Glickman states, “We can 
reconfigure a property and have the skill set to do so, thus we are not afraid to go in that 
direction when it makes sense.  We endeavor to have it make sense.” (Glickman, 2012)   He 
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feels PREIT has the skill set and can put it into play, when and if, it is the most appropriate 
strategy for the company.  In his opinion, companies that are more focused in asset 
management would not want to take that same tactic with the property (Glickman, 2012).   
When asked about his organization’s goals and strategy, Glickman states PREIT’s goal 
is to provide long-term returns to its shareholders.  He notes that for most of management, their 
holdings in PREIT are a significant component of their personal net worth.  Thus, he feels like 
it is not contrite to say they are truly focused on creating value for the company for the long 
term.  To do that, Glickman says they want to take appropriate risks and reach levels of 
diversification in the portfolio.  Glickman says, “Our goal is to take assets that may be under-
positioned and attempt to work the redevelopments aspects of it and position it more 
appropriately for the particular market.  It may be blowing that asset up, may be expanding it, 
changing tenants, or maybe recreating space.  Because we have the physical construction 
knowledge, we tend to take a broader position on what property may become.” (Glickman, 
2012)  In Glickman’s opinion, PREIT is using that vision to create money over the long term, 
which is what he feels management at PREIT really strive to do. 
In addressing efforts the organization is making in striving to meet its goals, he refers to 
management’s conscious effort to become more efficient and more effective at the task that 
they have weighed out as being the best course for the company.  He states they accomplish 
this task by utilizing technology, improving their business practices, and tightly managing their 
assets.  Their continuous efforts to remain abreast of happenings in the industry and their 
flexibility in responding to changing conditions are what he feels has helped PREIT survive 
throughout the last fifty years.  Glickman states, “We are always thinking of ways we can 
address opportunities we hear about in the world and bring them into our properties.  The lack 
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of rigidity is one of the things that have protected the company over the long term.  Our ability 
and willingness to re-vision a property has protected our portfolio over the long haul.” 
(Glickman, 2012) 
Lastly in addressing the unique characteristics of PREIT, Glickman sees a high level of 
entrepreneurial activity, an understanding of the development process, and an ability to 
interpret and manage risk as the company’s characteristics.  While some companies only have 
the ability to focus on asset management, PREIT ‘s expertise extends beyond that.  Being able 
to survive through multiple economic cycles shows the resilience of the company (Glickman, 
2012). 
 
Interview with Jeffrey Linn 
Along with Ed Glickman, another interview was conducted with Jeffrey Linn, 
Executive Vice President of Acquisitions.  He has worked for PREIT for thirty-seven years, 
previously working for a mortgage company for one year prior to that.  He states that he used 
to do financings for acquisitions at PREIT, but now they have someone else to do that since he 
has moved into his present position.  He sees his primary duties as focusing on property 
acquisitions and sales, with some involvement in strategic planning (Linn, 2012). 
Linn was asked in his opinion about the strengths of PREIT.  He states that 
management is good at sourcing opportunities and creating deals.  He feels PREIT can 
effectively acquire and develop real estate.  He states there is not as much development lately, 
since PREIT is focused on retail properties and the rents have not been as good as they used to 
be.  He referred to mid-size box tenants who do not pay the rents they used to pay.  This 
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reduced rent, combined with an overall economic downturn, decreases the opportunity for new 
development as of late (Linn, 2012).   
One of the additional strengths Linn sees with PREIT is leasing. He feels the company 
is very good at making the best out of leasing opportunities.  It helps that the company has 
good relationships with retailers, investors, and lenders.  Linn also notes that the organization 
has always been entrepreneurial and has good management. In addition, he feels the finance 
department is effective at financial engineering when an opportunity presents itself (Linn, 
2012). 
  As Linn discussed PREIT’s strength’s, he affirmed the focus and history of the 
company.  He noted they specialize in retail.  However, PREIT was once diversified in focus, 
until the merger with the Rubin Organization.  At that time, the company sold off the 
apartments and industrial.  Linn states the company had already sold the one office building it 
owned.  When he joined the company, Linn asserts it was diversified and he used to run the 
apartments.  Whether it was the right decision or not, he states the yields were higher on retail 
than they were on multifamily, so the decision was made to switch to a retail focus.  In 
addition, the Rubin Company was more of a retail or office company than it was multifamily, 
so it was much more comfortable in letting Linn acquire shopping centers, so that was what he 
did.  PREIT sold off the apartments to provide money to put into retail (Linn, 2012). 
During the interview, Linn was asked about his organization’s goals and strategy.  He 
stated that as a public company, the shareholders are served if PREIT maximizes its returns.  In 
his opinion, the best way to do that is to grow the net operating income (NOI).  Being in 
acquisitions, Linn stated he is open to opportunities if the situation is right.  Linn discussed a 
mall in Colorado Springs that he would have considered, but the company had other uses for 
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the capital.  He noted the relationships are with the national retailers, so it does not matter so 
much where the retail locations lie.  Linn stated that PREIT does have two customers.  
However, even though the shopper is one, the company is one layer removed from the shopper.  
Thus, Linn feels PREIT’s true customer is the retailer, which is a national relationship.  In his 
opinion, it really does not matter if the property is in Philadelphia or Memphis, even though he 
notes it is a little less efficient to have properties scattered.  Linn referred to the one property in 
Wisconsin the company owns and one he was looking at purchasing in North Dakota, as 
examples of scattered properties that are a little more difficult to manage.  Increasing the 
geographic scope is somewhat of a modest change, but one worth considering, if it is cost 
efficient according to Linn.  The essence of the national relationship is what offers the 
company its increased geographic scope (Interview with Jeff Linn, 2012). 
After the discussion with Linn concerning the organization’s goals and strategy, the 
topic of how the organization was striving to meet its goals was the next issue on the agenda. 
Linn discussed the company’s endeavors to grow NOI.  One of the ways Linn sees PREIT 
growing NOI is through a joint venture with institutional money, where the two combined have 
the expertise to lease the assets, manage them, or redevelop them.  He stated that PREIT is 
looking into doing that for some fortress malls and also B malls that dominate small trade 
areas, like secondary markets.  In addition, he notes that PREIT is going to sell some of its 
assets that are not growing and refocus the capital elsewhere. As Linn states, “We are an 
entrepreneurial organization, so we have looked at things that were not straight retail if the 
returns were appropriate and we could use our expertise.  Our primary focus is retail and when 
we have stepped out of it, it usually has been related somehow” (Linn, 2012). To provide an 
example where PREIT has ventured out from its retail focus, Linn discussed the experience 
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with a cell tower company.  He noted that before the merger of Rubin Company and PREIT,  
PREIT had a piece of a cell tower company and wisely used the roofs of the buildings they 
owned to house the cell towers.  It was not retail, but it was related, in his opinion.  Thus, he 
sees opportunities in related areas that become available because PREIT is a landlord (Linn, 
2012).  
In addition, Linn discussed the implementation of mixed-use properties as part of 
PREIT’s plan to implement its strategy.  He stated, “We have done one mixed use property, 
where it was a shopping center that we owned and we blew up a couple of the department 
stores and some of the mall and turned it into open air shopping for that part of the center.  
Above the retail, there is multifamily and there is more multifamily and condos on some of the 
remaining ground” (Linn, 2012).  For PREIT, the multifamily has done extremely well.  The 
demographics and lower percentage home ownership will support multifamily for awhile. Due 
to these factors and others, PREIT will consider other mixed use properties, as it seems right.    
Upon being asked to what he attributes his organization’s success over the last fifty 
years, Linn responded that good relationships and strong personnel who understand the 
industry and economic environment were essential to the company’s success.  He sees 
personnel and management that understand alternatives and can identify different avenues for 
the company as key to the company’s long-term success.  In addition, having older 
management has its advantages, in Linn’s opinion, but is not always crucial.  As Linn states, 
“Hopefully they will not make some of the mistakes a new MBA out of graduate school would 
make, but some new blood is important for innovation and some of the new things that are 
happening” (Linn, 2012).  Linn further commented that retail is changing and all the shopping 
that is done now is not done in malls.  So experience is definitely valuable, but it is just a piece 
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of the puzzle.  He noted that all of PREIT’s senior management has been through multiple 
recessions, even though this last one is the worst one Linn has seen.  So, in his opinion, it was 
not the first instance when times got difficult for the company.  Of course, just being in 
business for over fifty years lends credibility to the company, which has also added to its 
success. In addition, the company’s dividend record has contributed to its success, as PREIT 
has never interrupted its dividend payments. The first time PREIT lowered dividends was in 
this current recession.  Even though the dividend per share went down, PREIT still was able to 
pay out cash dividends, even though the IRS permitted some dividends to be paid in stock 
(Linn, 2012). 
In discussing the unique characteristics of PREIT, Linn commented, “There are a lot of 
other people in the retail business besides us, so I am not sure how unique we are.  Other 
people have relationships and some others have long histories, so if you have fifty years or 
forty years, I do not know that it makes that much of a difference” (Linn, 2012).  As a seasoned 
member of management who has been with the company for thirty-seven of its fifty years, 
Linn was able to provide valuable insight into the workings of PREIT (Linn, 2012). 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
WINTHROP REALTY TRUST 
 
To appreciate the history and success of Winthrop over the last fifty years, it was 
evaluated both qualitatively and quantitatively. Qualitative evaluation was performed through a 
review of historical documents and an in-depth interview with Michael Ashner, Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer.  The interview provided information on Winthrop’s strategies, 
management, and future direction.  After review and discussion of the historical documents, 
the details related to the interview will be presented, followed by closing comments. 
Winthrop Realty Trust has not only changed its name since it began in the early 1960s, 
but it has also changed its focus.  With the name change from First Union Real Estate Equity 
and Mortgage Investments to Winthrop Realty Trust on December 1, 2005, the company has 
aligned its identity to its management and investment philosophy.  As Michael Ashner stated at 
the time of the 8-K SEC filing related to the name change: 
the change in our name both enables us to more closely identify with our 
management team and the investment philosophy we have developed at 
Winthrop over the past nine years and eliminate the continuing confusion 
engendered by the similarity between the Trust’s former name and that of the 
former First Union bank (Winthrop Realty Trust 8-K, December 2005).   
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 As it was called in its beginning, First Union Realty was organized in Ohio as an 
unincorporated business trust under a Declaration of Trust dated August 1, 1961.  The 
organization was formed to participate in the new rules governing Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs).  In 1969, the name was changed to First Union Real Estate Equity and 
Mortgage Investments.  As mentioned above, the name was changed again to Winthrop Realty 
Trust in 2005 (Second Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust, 2009). 
 Since management has changed hands multiple times throughout Winthrop’s history, 
early information on Winthrop was difficult to locate.  Through discussions with Michael 
Ashner, he was unaware of where any old information on the company existed.  His assistant 
checked with officers in the company’s Boston location where the accounting and operations 
resided, and no one was aware of any old information or how it could be located.  Thus, the 
facts presented below were derived from public information available through automated 
databases.  In particular, The Wall Street Journal archives was used to build a historical 
perspective of the company during its early years. 
 On November 30, 1962, First Union Realty announced it would issue 880,000 shares of 
beneficial interest with funds utilized to acquire an office building.  The price of the shares 
would be based on bid prices at that time, which ranged from $13.12 to $13.75, in the Over-
the-Counter (OTC) market.  The article mentioned that Hayden, Miller & Co. in Cleveland and 
Harriman Ripley & Co. in New York were the underwriters and original trust sponsors (Staff 
Reporter, WSJ, 1962).  The 880,000 shares were actually offered at $13 per share on January 9, 
1963 (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1963).  On August 2, 1968, First Union filed another offering with 
the SEC for 600,000 shares of beneficial interest (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1968).  A third offering 
was registered with the SEC on March 10, 1970 consisting of 1,000,000 shares of beneficial 
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interest (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1970).  Additionally, on November 16, 1971, First Union Realty 
announced a scheduled offering of $20 million in 20-year convertible bonds that were to be 
used to purchase shares (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1971). 
 On November 22, 1974, First Union announced it would not follow other REITs that 
were choosing to lower or not pay a dividend for the current period, opting instead to continue 
to pay its dividend (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1974).  In 1978, First Union’s President, Thomas 
Hartigan, resigned (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1978), and in 1979 First Union changed its fiscal year 
from October 31
st
 to December 31
st
.  In addition, in 1979, First Union announced an offering of 
$40 million convertible bonds (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1979).  At the beginning of the 1980s, 
First Union conducted another offering of $50 million in 25-year convertible bonds (Staff 
Reporter, WSJ, 1980).   
What marked the early part of the decade of the 1980s for First Union was its 
relationship and battles with Unicorp Financial Corp, a company based in Canada.  On March 
31, 1981, First Union was reported as suing Unicorp for behavior it deemed could cause the 
company to lose its REIT status.  First Union stated in its lawsuit that Unicorp was conducting 
business in a manner to take over control of the REIT (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1981).  On 
February 16, 1982 Unicorp was reported as being positioned to fight for control of First Union.  
Unicorp owned 26% of the shares of the REIT and was fighting for a spot on the Board of 
Directors (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1982).  However, by February 26, 1982, Unicorp was ready to 
end the one-year-long battle with First Union.  Unicorp agreed to sell all its shares for $46 
million payable over a two-year period to First Union (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1982).  The events 
with Unicorp led to future actions by First Union over the remaining decade to avoid hostile 
takeovers. 
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 On April 1, 1984, the shareholders of First Union instituted procedures to prevent 
hostile takeovers.  However, those procedures were designed to allow the company to undergo 
a friendly merger with an entity, even if it risked the REIT status.  In order for a merger to 
occur, 70% of the shareholders and the majority of trustees would have to agree.  At the time 
of this announcement, First Union was noted as unaware of any specific attempts.  The WSJ 
article noted that First Union was known for its ownership of downtown offices and retail 
malls (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1984).  
 On August 20, 1984, First Union announced the registration of $50 million of 25-year 
convertible bonds (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1984).  On October 18, 1984, First Union reported it 
was redeeming the remaining $12.2 million of its convertible bonds outstanding that were 
issued in 1980.  First Union did this redemption to strengthen its balance sheet after its prior 
month issuance of $35 million of convertible bonds (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1984).  On May 29, 
1985, First Union sold $50 million of 5-year notes (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1985).   
 In 1986, the board at First Union approved a 3-for-2 stock split and increased its 
dividend 3% to a quarterly amount of $.35.  With the stock split, approximately 18.1 million 
common shares were outstanding (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1986).  In 1988, Moody’s dropped the 
rating on $135 million of First Union’s long-term debt.  The downgrade was initiated by 
weakening in the debt coverage ratios, significant renovations to its properties, and reduced 
occupancy.  While First Union contended that its coverage ratios had not changed much in the 
last three years, Moody’s was concerned about the company’s $370 million in assets as of June 
30, 1988 (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1988). 
 In conjunction with the overall decline in the real estate industry, First Union cut its 
dividend 28% to $.18 (from .$.25) on Dec 5, 1991.  Liquidity and problems in the real estate 
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industry were the reasons given.  Additionally, First Union noted the reluctance of lenders to 
refinance short-term debt of $70 million.  Management noted that the reduced dividend was in 
line with IRS guidelines for REITs (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1991). 
 On January 1, 1994, James C. Mastandrea became Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer of what was then First Union Real Estate Equity and Mortgage Investments.  First 
Union was noted as being a Cleveland-based REIT.  Mastandrea came on board and set out a 
strategic plan, as he noted that the company had been sleeping and was not well-liked by Wall 
Street.  He stated, “At one time we were the premier company in the industry and then, all of a 
sudden, along comes all these darling REITs, and we found ourselves just way way way 
behind.” (King, 1997)  Mastandrea worked to restructure the company in every way.  The 
property net operating income was down to $40 million in 1993, whereas it had been at $48 
million in 1990.  He created divisions for retail, apartment, parking, and office to operate as 
separate companies.  Capital expenditures increased from $5 million in 1990 to $14 million in 
1994, while net operating income rose to $42 million under his tenure.  Mastandrea 
repositioned First Union’s portfolio by buying and selling properties through tax-free 
exchanges and increasing capital expenditures.  After getting his tools in place, his next step 
was major, as he stated, “The two things I wanted to do next was to make a ‘quantum 
leap’...which meant we wanted to buy a company at least our size, and then we wanted to 
clarify who we were to investors.” (King, 1997)  
In 1996, First Union entered into partnership with GMAC Commercial Mortgage and 
Cargill to purchase the Marathon portfolio.  This portfolio consisted of nine southwestern malls 
at a cost of $312 million.  This purchase prompted First Union to enact a public offering, which 
was the first one in 20 years.  The offering consisted of convertible preferred stock at an 
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amount that got the notice of Wall Street.  Before this issuance of stock, the stock traded at a 
price of approximately $7 per share.  After the issuance, the stock increased to $13 a share.  
Mastandrea’s plan was to continue buying out his partners in Marathon to increase net 
operating income to $80 million and above (King, 1997). 
 Mastandrea also commented about the low dividend rate, as compared to other REITs.  
He mentioned that he cut it another 44% upon his arrival, so the funds could be employed into 
the properties.  The decision was not well-liked and he continued to keep the dividend rate 
down to improve existing properties.
29
  In response to the low dividend, he commented 
What that says is that we have a lot of opportunity to raise that…We have about 
another 12 to 18 months of improvements we want to do to our properties so, 
when we do, we’ll have all that extra cash to start paying out (King, 1997). 
 
King (1997) discussed the company’s stock structure as a stapled REIT, which was 
only found in four of the existing REITs.  This structure had allowed First Union to purchase 
and manage properties with additional profit opportunities occurring from other corresponding 
operating businesses.  This structure had set it apart from other REITs and gave it a 
competitive advantage.  As an affiliate of First Union (REIT), First Union Management, Inc. 
handled the leasing and operation of the REIT’s properties.  The stock from First Union 
Management resided in a fiduciary trust with the profit of that trust transferring to the 
shareholders of First Union (REIT).  To describe the mechanics, Daniel E. Nixon, Executive 
Vice President and Director of Retail for First Union Management, Inc. stated, “So if you 
would own one share of First Union, the public company, you would also own one share, 
                                                          
29
First Union was still required to pay out at least 95% of its earnings in dividends.  The dividends he did not 
choose to pay out were known as discretionary dividends, since they were in excess of the amount required by 
law.  Since the dividend requirement is calculated off of net income, most REITs have the cash flow to pay out in 
dividends over the 90% or 95% required by law, due to large depreciation charges associated with real estate. 
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which is almost like a phantom share or a stapled share, of the management company” (King, 
1997).  In Nixon’s opinion, this structure removed any conflicts of interest, whether real or 
perceived, since owning the real estate allowed one to also own the management company.  
Nixon stated that investors liked the concept, whether they own one share or a million shares 
(King, 1997). 
During this period, King (1997) stated that First Union was fine tuning its operations.  
The company was expanding its parking business by purchasing locations in Canada and 
expanding operations in the United States.  Mastandrea commented on the increasing use of 
software and how computers were helping him function more effectively.  In addition, he noted 
the flow of knowledge with weekly meetings to kick around ideas.  Nixon referred to the 
culture established by Mastandrea as entrepreneurial, while operating in the midst of a public 
company.  For a company that seemed dead, Mastandrea commented that people were 
inquiring about it and management was being asked for interviews (King, 1997). 
Kirkpatrick (1998) wrote that Mastandrea discovered gold in First Union’s unique 
stapled REIT status when reviewing its bylaws.   However, he wrote that its value was at risk, 
as legislation was proposed preventing stapled REITs from using their tax preferences for any 
new acquisitions.  With news of the proposed legislation, First Union’s stock was downgraded 
by analysts, as part of the value of the stock was due to its stapled REIT status.  Kirkpatrick 
(1998) discussed the struggles of the company, especially with the purchase of company stock 
by some hedge funds in an effort to gain control and sell off the company.  Gotham Partners 
Management Co., one of the largest hedge funds based in New York, attempted through proxy 
to oust Mastandrea.  Mastandrea, meanwhile, was trying to look at alternatives, such as 
splitting the company into its asset base and stapled REIT structure.  Analysts noted First 
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Union’s financial difficulties, as its FFO declined 11%, while other stapled REITs showed 
large gains.  Gotham claimed Mastandrea did not realize soon enough the benefit it had in its 
structure, while the other stapled REITs were taking advantage of it for over a year.  The $325 
million purchase of malls, which do not utilize the benefits of the stapled REIT, was seen as a 
bad investment decision.  Not much of the revenue of the malls comes from their operation, 
which was the main advantage stapled REITs enjoyed.  In addition, Gotham and others 
disagreed with Mastandrea’s decision to institute a $125 million equity offering in 1997 that 
doubled shares, diluted earnings, and diluted interests of the opposing shareholders.  
Mastandrea contended that the proceeds from the stock issuance allowed First Union to 
purchase a parking lot, which utilized the stapled REIT structure.  At that time, Mastandrea 
mentioned future purchases of operating parking lots were planned (Kirkpatrick, 1998). 
The years of 1997 and 1998 for First Union were centered on its power struggle with 
the hedge funds, in particular Gotham Partners.  In an Ohio courtroom, First Union fought 
against Gotham’s proxy battle and attempted to strip Gotham of its voting rights for failure to 
disclose its investors.  Gotham stated if they gained control of First Union’s board they would 
merge with an entity to grow in a much quicker manner.  Two other hedge funds, with 17% 
combined ownership, supported Gotham’s efforts.  The other three stapled REITs were 
purchased by aggressive property dealers and grew rapidly with an average return of 228% 
from July 1995 to December 1997.  First Union reflected a return of 145%, which led to the 
concern that management was not utilizing the advantages of its structure.  Gotham became 
interested in 1996, once First Union disclosed its special status.  Mastandrea was not seen as 
having the expertise to deal with a stapled REIT.  Gotham wanted to replace him and two other 
members of the board, while also increasing the board from nine to fifteen members.  First  
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Union sued Gotham, claiming since it did not provide the information on its investors, it should 
have no voting rights, not be allowed to put proposals before the shareholders, or receive 
dividends (Pacelle, 1998).  On May 27, 1998, WSJ reported that First Union’s shareholders 
gave control to Gotham Partners.  Mastandrea was terminated by the board, receiving a $3.4 
million buyout on his contract (Staff Reporter, WSJ, 1998).  However, with passage of the IRS 
Restructuring Bill in August, First Union lost its advantage over other REITs for acquisitions 
made after March 26, 1998, slowing acquisition activity over the next few years. 
    In his 2003 Letter to the Shareholders, Ashner stated he would address the 
company’s plans, strategies, and ambitions, as this was the first letter under the new 
management structure at Winthrop.  Ashner stated Winthrop had been acquired by FUR 
Investors LLC, an entity solely managed by him, on December 31, 2003, through the purchase 
of 10 million shares of the company’s stock.  At that time, he was appointed President and 
CEO, while other associates of his were appointed to executive management positions.  He 
stated that FUR would be restricted in the number of common shares it could purchase in the 
future, to ensure that REIT status was maintained.  In addition, he noted that all his real estate 
activities in the future would flow through the company (Ashner, Letter, 2003).   
In the letter, Ashner introduced his management team and their investment philosophy, 
emphasizing opportunistic investing without restriction on asset type or geographical location.  
His main restriction for a purchase was that they obtain 100% control over the asset or they 
have the ability to exit the asset when the price has reached its fair value.  He stated that this 
investment philosophy might confuse some investors, as this approach was different.  In 
addition, he stated that only low interest rates had kept real estate foreclosures from occurring 
in a market that he felt was overbuilt and overpriced.  He felt that due to the cyclical nature of 
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real estate, the opportunities presented in the 1990s for opportunistic investing would happen 
again.  Additionally, he stated that when the environment consists of higher rates again with 
lower liquidity, then management may decide to focus in on one sector.  He provided two 
examples of the company’s investment strategy by referring to a purchase of shares in an entity 
whose net asset value was greater than its purchase price and a loan at 12% to deploy capital in 
the current interest rate market.  He stated that he hoped investors could comprehend what 
management was trying to create: 
a publicly traded real estate opportunity vehicle in which management’s 
interests are closely aligned with those of shareholders. In so doing, we 
recognize that we will face significant challenges and competition in sourcing 
appropriate investments from larger and better capitalized real estate investment 
trusts and real estate opportunity funds. Further, we also acknowledge that the 
near term investment environment is less conducive to our type of investing 
than we would like. Hopefully, we will prove to be nimble and fleet of foot 
(Ashner, Letter, 2003). 
 
He further stated that this company may not be for the short-term investor, the investor with a 
small risk tolerance, or an investor looking for recurring themes.  However, he was opening up 
the lines of communication between management and its investors during a time of great 
change in the organization (Ashner, Letter, 2003). 
In 2004, First Union reported net income of $19.9 million for its second quarter results, 
compared to the prior year’s second quarter results of $3.6 million.  For the first half of 2004, 
First Union earned $19.2 million, as opposed to a $3 million loss the prior year.  Even though 
the results were promising for First Union, the improvement in earnings was primarily 
attributable to a $19.7 million accounting gain on a sale occurring in the second quarter 2004.  
The improvement in earnings was a positive sign that First Union appeared to be moving in the 
right direction (Bergquist, 2004). 
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In his 2004 CEO Letter to the Shareholders, Ashner recapped some of the activities of 
the company’s first year under new management and outlined its direction moving forward.  
Ashner reiterated the company’s investment philosophy and stated the goal to implement the 
business plan for opportunistic investing was in process.  He mentioned they had solved some 
problems existing from prior management’s tenure and repositioned company assets to 
maximize return.  He stated that the company had only two assets when they took it over, a 
retail mall in Little Rock and an office complex in Indianapolis.  During 2004, the company 
was able to sell the retail mall for a gain and redeploy that capital into existing property around 
the office complex in Indianapolis.  Due to the current economic environment in 2004, Ashner 
stated the company focused on real estate debt, undervalued public equity securities, and 
portfolio real estate acquisitions.  The company originated three first mortgage loans and one 
mezzanine loan, of which two were paid off by the end of the year at a return of over 12%.  In 
addition, the company purchased a portfolio of 16 properties for $91 million, rolling over the 
gain from the Little Rock mall in a like-kind exchange.  During 2004, Winthrop also entered a 
joint venture and provided convertible debt financing.  Net book value increased by 31.6% 
from $2.37 to $3.12 per share and positive net income from continuing operations resulted 
after a loss in 2003.  Also important was an increase in the square footage managed from 
380,000 to 3,200,000 square feet as of March 1, 2005 (Ashner, Letter, 2004).  
In 2005, First Union announced its name change to Winthrop Realty Trust.  Its 
operating partnership, First Union REIT, L.P., changed its name to WRT Realty L.P.  The 
name change had been previously approved by the shareholders of the Trust during its 2005 
Annual Meeting.  The Trustees felt that the previous First Union name for the REIT was too 
closely identified with the former First Union Bank.  In addition, the Trustees felt that the 
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Winthrop name more closely identified the company with the new management team and its 
investment philosophy (First Union, December 1, 1005). 
Peter Braverman, Executive Vice President of Winthrop Realty Trust and Winthrop 
Realty Partners was interviewed in October 2006 as part of a company interview with The Wall 
Street Transcripts (TWST).  At the time of the interview, Braverman was President and a 
Director of both Winthrop Realty Trust and Newkirk Realty Trust, Inc., and had been 
associated with Winthrop since January 1996.  In addition, he served as a Director and 
Executive Vice President of Shelbourne Properties I, Inc., Shelbourne Properties II, Inc., and 
Shelbourne Properties III, Inc. from August 2002 until they were liquidated in April 2004 
(TWST, 2006). 
When asked what Winthrop Realty was, Braverman responded that it was a diversified 
public REIT actively traded on the NYSE.  He stated it was in a select group of REITs that 
were open to investing in all property types throughout the U. S.  He asserted their investment 
strategy was built upon opportunistic investing.  The senior management team had been 
together for fifteen years and purchased assets in all fifty states and across all sectors.  That 
experience and knowledge was now being applied at Winthrop.  He stated they utilized four 
distinct arrangements in their investment strategy.  They directly purchase real property that is 
undervalued, which he cited the Finova portfolio as an example.  He noted that acquisition had 
sixteen properties leased to tenants such as CBS Viacom and BellSouth, and yielded a cash 
return on a leveraged basis of greater than 20%.  A second arrangement they utilize is platform 
investments.  Joint ventures are formed with operating partners in different locations to provide 
a local presence in one or more unique locations.  He cited Marc Realty as an example, where 
they jointly own office properties through mezzanine loans and ownership interests.  He noted 
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that Marc works with smaller tenants and shorter leases allowing them to realize a higher 
occupancy rate and regular rents.  Not only was management at Winthrop pleased with the 
financial results, but they liked having a presence in Chicago through the platform with Marc.  
A third arrangement utilizes the purchase of securities in other REITs.  He cited the shares they 
acquired in Sizeler Property Investors, which was based outside of New Orleans.  He noted 
they purchased 8% of the securities over time and ended up selling the stock for a gain of 
approximately $6.65 per share.
30
  He stated actions were taken such that Michael Ashner was 
appointed to Sizeler’s Board of Directors, and through events initiated by others, the share 
price was increased to its real value and Winthrop exited.  The fourth arrangement utilizes 
debt, whereas Winthrop is making or buying loans with a high yield (TWST, 2006).     
    In 2006, when the interview was conducted, Braverman stated the market was 
choppy, implying opportunities are there, but harder to find.  Winthrop identified opportunities 
in the debt market.  He stated there are some properties that the price is too high for the 
company to bid on, but they are comfortable extending credit.  Thus, they can earn a return and 
become involved in a market that they feel is too highly priced.  Acquisitions in secondary 
markets are available at a reasonable price, according to Braverman (TWST, 2006). 
Braverman was asked about any specific strategies on investment yields, to which he 
responded that the highest total return and the payment of dividends was one of Winthrop’s 
goals.  He stated that when their management team took over in January 2004, the company 
was not paying a dividend and had a lack of cash flow.  He said they were now paying a 
quarterly dividend of $0.06 per share and the net cash flow from operations for six months 
                                                          
30
 The price of the Sizeler stock when acquired by Winthrop was approximately $7.70.  It was subsequently sold 
by Winthrop for $14.35.  During the time it was held by Winthrop, Michael Ashner was nominated to the Sizeler 
Board of Directors with a liquidation plan in tow, which assisted in the price appreciation.   
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ended June 30, 2006, was $17.9 million.  Over the long term, Winthrop looked to improve 
performance (TWST, 2006). 
Asked about key individuals in the company, Braverman referred to Michael Ashner, 
Chairman and CEO, as management’s leader.  Other important members of management were 
Carolyn Tiffany, Chief Operating Officer, who was located in Boston, John Alba, Chief 
Investment Officer, who was located in New York, and Tom Staples, CFO. All of management 
had been together for at least ten years and the entire team had spent their careers in real estate 
(TWST, 2006). 
When asked about fund raising at Winthrop, Braverman responded by stating: 
The nature of all REITs is that they are capital hogs.  At some point, every 
successful REIT by definition raises both equity and debt funds in any number 
of fashions.  So we will continue to take advantage of both markets over the 
course of time (TWST, 2006). 
 
Braverman stated that the shareholder base has been fairly stable since December 2003 when 
the existing management achieved control.  He stated that Vornado and Kimco both have 
holdings in their firm, along with some institutional investors that have remained throughout 
their tenure.  Braverman stated he was not sure investors comprehend what Winthrop is doing, 
but they like the financial results they see.  The growth and return is what keeps them 
interested.  The fact that Winthrop is diversified adds to its complexity, because investors 
cannot easily label it as focused on a sector.  However, he feels they know Ashner and the type 
of investor he is and they buy into that.  He further stated: 
In essence, they are getting the benefits of private equity fund-type investing or 
opportunity investing, but in the form of a public REIT, which gives you 
liquidity, something you will not receive in most private enterprises (TWST, 
2006). 
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   Asked about key metrics that investors should look at when evaluating Winthrop, 
Braverman responded that total return was probably the most important for Winthrop.  He 
stated that Winthrop was leading in the 12-month and 36-month total return for all REITs.  In 
addition, Braverman stated that he felt the management team’s philosophy of investing would 
be successful in any real estate cycle.  He thought that an investor that was looking for 
diversification in sectors as part of their allocation among REITs could find balance by 
investing in Winthrop (TWST, 2006).  
Braverman’s comments concerning Winthrop as a cycle-proof REIT investment were 
important, especially in 2006 as a real estate bubble was beginning to be discussed.  Phoenix 
Management Services revealed that two-thirds of lenders in the country were under the opinion 
that a real estate bubble existed in the industry.  In an article discussing the housing bubble and 
mortgage news, the joint venture of Winthrop Realty Trust and Newkirk Realty Trust, Inc. was 
mentioned as a business combination structured to acquire and originate real estate secured 
loans (Roundup, 2006). 
In March 2008, StreetInvesting.com was noted as resuming its progressive review of 
Winthrop by following the impact of the markets and its effects on the company’s 
developments.  The review was resumed due to Winthrop’s stock trading up 2% and recent 
company news releases showing year-ended 2007 results. What is important about this analyst 
following is that Streetinvesting.com is considered an aggressive-growth research company 
with its goal to bring unique trading opportunities to investors interested in different and 
special investment proposals.  The analyst following was confirmation that the investment 
community was taking notice of Winthrop and its unique investment philosophy (Progressive 
Following, 3/12/2008).  In addition, InvestorIM also began following Winthrop in March 2008 
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due to what they described as a 3% increase in its trading price (Progressive Following, 
3/13/2008).   
On April 1, 2008, Streetinvesting.com reported that Winthrop announced that due to a 
recent sale of stock in Lexington Realty Trust and the repayment of a mortgage loan 
receivable, liquidity had increased and cash would be available for investment.  In addition, 
Ashner stated that with the cash available of $130 million and an untapped $70 million line of 
credit, Winthrop would be in a good position to take advantage of opportunities he believed 
would be coming up due to the dislocation of the current credit market.  These results were 
reported with the ending of Winthrop’s first quarter of March 31, 2008 (Progressive Following, 
4/01/2008).  This information on Winthrop’s liquidity is important since it shows that 
Winthrop was positioning itself for liquidity shortfalls to come.  As anyone following history 
knows, credit problems ultimately occurred in the fall of 2008 with the filing of bankruptcy by 
Lehman Brothers and the credit crisis that ensued afterwards.    
On March 23, 2009, Winthrop nearly tripled its investment in the preferred stock of 
Maguire Properties, an office REIT based out of Los Angeles.  Maguire had been experiencing 
financial troubles, and with Winthrop’s latest purchase, its investment increased to 9.5% of the 
outstanding preferred stock of Maguire. Even with Maguire’s threat of bankruptcy, Winthrop 
saw value over the long term.  However, the preferred stock did not carry voting rights and 
Winthrop could not initially exercise influence over Maguire’s management (Winthrop Boosts, 
3/23/2009).    
In his 2009 Letter to Shareholders written April 2010, Ashner discussed not only the 
market conditions, but also Winthrop’s activities.  He stated that the market showed some 
indications of recovery, while at the same time REIT earnings declined in 2009 and were 
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expected to continue to decline in 2010.  In the shareholder’s letter, the following quote from 
the executive summary of the February 10, 2010 Congressional Oversight’s Panel Special 
Report named “Commercial Real Estate Losses and the Risk to Financial Stability” stated: 
Between 2010 and 2014 about $1.4 trillion in commercial real estate loans will 
reach the end of their terms.  Nearly half are at present “under water”- that is the 
borrower owes more than the underlying property is currently worth.  
Commercial property values have fallen more than 40 percent since the 
beginning of 2007.  Increased vacancy rates which now range from 8 percent 
for multifamily housing to 18 percent for office buildings, and falling rents, 
which have declined by 40 percent for office space and 33 percent for retail 
space, have exerted a powerful downward pressure on the value of commercial 
properties (Ashner, April 2010). 
 
Ashner further stated that according to Fitch ratings, 20% of all CMBS loans are predicted to 
need special servicing by 2012.  In addition, Ashner stated job growth was still an unknown, 
which predominately drives occupancy rates.  All this information, in Ashner’s opinion, 
disproves the concept of improving real estate markets (Ashner, April 2010).  
 In 2010, Winthrop, with some other senior mezzanine debt holders, proceeded to 
foreclose on Peter Cooper/Stuyvesant Town (an apartment complex in Manhattan).  The effort 
to foreclose was being initiated through Concord Real Estate, and included Wachovia, Hartford 
Investment Management Company, Allied Irish, and Deutsche Genossenschafts-
Hypothekenbank.  This move was prompted when the borrowers stated they could no longer 
comply with the terms of their debt service on $3 billion of senior mortgage debt.  Junior debt 
holders were notified of Winthrop’s foreclosure move and some were interested in a negotiated 
settlement.  Winthrop declined these negotiations due to the difficulties of working with the 
borrowers to settle earlier.  If the foreclosure was not contested, it could occur in 90 days.  One 
of the key issues in the foreclosure was a $100 million transfer tax to be paid by the controlling 
party, which was approximately 3% of the balance of the unpaid debt.  New York City is 
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unique in that mezzanine loans have this tax, which was established by Governor Cuomo, to 
close what he deemed a real estate loophole.  Many investors in subordinate debt are not aware 
they owe the tax when they decide to foreclose, as they battle with other mezzanine investors 
to keep their equity.  The current valuation was also a concern, as most properties placed in this 
situation experience declines in value (Winthrop-Led, 1/18/2010). 
On October 4, 2010, CWCapital worked out a deal to purchase the mezzanine debt on 
StuyTown from Winthrop and Pershing, which would end the issue on who has the right to 
foreclose.  Thus, CWCapital would purchase the property at a future foreclosure auction.  
CWCapital took this action to reduce the mortgage recording tax that could amount to $60 to 
$90 million, upon acquisition.  The proposed auction date was set for October 13, 2010 and 
would conclude with CWCapital buying the mezzanine debt from Winthrop and Pershing 
(CWCapital, 2010).  This event was important for Winthrop, for not only monetary reasons, 
but to establish its reputation as an opportunistic investor. 
As an indicator of the market’s perception of Winthrop, on June 7, 2011, Zachs 
Investment Research upgraded the company from a neutral rating to an outperform rating.  The 
rating change came after Winthrop announced its first quarter results for 2011.  Winthrop 
reported $.44 EPS compared to $.37 for the prior year, with company revenues up 65.6% on a 
year-to-year basis.  Zachs stated that as of December 31, 2009, Winthrop held an interest in 
properties with 8.5 million square feet of rentable space, owned directly or in a joint venture.  
Zachs also mentioned that Winthrop owned investment/operating properties, originated and 
purchased senior and mezzanine loans and debt secured by commercial property, and owned 
equity and debt securities in other REITs (First Union Real Est, 2011). 
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Interview with Michael Ashner 
 
Michael Ashner has been Chief Executive Officer (CE0) and Chairman of Winthrop 
since 2004.  Ashner also served as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer at Winthrop 
Realty Partners, L.P., a property management firm, since 1996.  Through his experience at the 
partnership, Ashner was active in acquisitions of over $12 billion of real estate, including 
85,000 apartments, 50 million square feet of office, retail, and industrial property, and 1,000 
hotel rooms.  In addition, Ashner was involved in over 500 limited partnerships, including over 
50 that were publicly reported with over 100,000 investors and 5 publicly-traded REITs.  Prior 
to 1996, he served as President and Chief Executive Officer of National Property Investors.  
Ashner also served as Director and Chief Executive Officer of Shelbourne Properties from 
2002 through 2004, until it was liquidated in 2004.  Shelbourne consisted of three publicly-
traded REITs.  In addition, Ashner was the Chairman and CEO of Newkirk Realty Trust, a 
publicly-traded REIT on the NYSE, until it merged with Lexington Realty Trust in 2007.  He 
served for one-year at Lexington Realty Trust as Executive Chairman, to ensure a smooth 
transition with the merger (Board of Trustees, Winthrop, 2011).  Ashner has been part of the 
REIT industry since the 1980s and has been involved in some of its biggest changes.  Prior to 
his involvement in the REIT industry, Ashner served as a lawyer who represented real estate 
syndicates (Flynn, 2010).   
Prior to the interview specifically conducted for this research, Ashner was interviewed 
by REIT.com on October 6, 2010 in connection with the 50
th
 Anniversary Celebration of the 
REIT industry.  In the write-up of the interview, it was noted that Winthrop had morphed from 
its original creation with just two major properties into a portfolio including retail, office, and 
service properties.  Asher stated in his interview that he has seen REITs change from a group 
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of small real estate companies just moving along without direction into major capital providers 
for real estate in the United States.  Their value comes from the ability they possess to raise 
capital through institutional and private investors.  He noted that more real estate is owned 
privately than through public REITs, but public REITs have established their place in the real 
estate world.  Market conditions, Ashner notes, have been important determinants in the 
growth of REITs.  The real estate crisis of the early 1990s, he purports, was a defining moment 
for REITs.  During this time, many REITs were formed from levered private real estate 
entities, with equity REITs becoming a dominant form of real estate investing.  Ashner stated 
that how much diversification a REIT has within its portfolio will impact its position in the 
market.  Even though the traditional specialized equity REIT will be a large determinant in the 
market, he also feels diversified opportunistic REITs, like Winthrop, will have influence.  
Asher stated the diversified REIT that focuses on high return is a good offset to the specialized 
REIT (Flynn, 2010).  
In an interview conducted with Ashner in August 2011, he was asked about his primary 
duties at Winthrop.  Ashner stated his duties involve, “Strategic direction of the company, 
overseeing its investment activities, and being the face of the company for the market” 
(Ashner, 2011).   
In terms of the strengths of Winthrop, Ashner mainly attributed the company’s 
strengths to its personnel.  As he stated: 
People who work for us are very smart.  They are very dedicated and because of 
our relatively small size, we are very nimble.  Because of what we do, we can 
think outside the box and move very quickly from investment category to 
investment category.  I think that is really the strength of the organization 
(Ashner, 2011). 
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   With Ashner’s comment about Winthrop being smaller and more nimble, the question 
arose concerning any limits on the size he wanted the company to become in order to maintain 
its quickness in response.  Ashner stated he would grow the company and did not want to 
imply he wanted it to remain stagnant.  He expressed his desire to grow the company to the $1 
billion mark, because at some point he felt the company starts recycling capital.  In Ashner’s 
opinion: 
The optimal point is where as you recycle, you are not over-weighted with cash, 
and as you recycle capital there are new opportunities.   If you get too large you 
start getting burdened with cash or make too many bad decisions on the 
investment side.  If you are too small, you miss out on opportunities.  You want 
to find the optimal size and I expect it is around the $1 billion mark and our 
current status is at $400 million (Ashner, 2011).      
 
The interview with Ashner continued as the organization’s goals and strategy were 
discussed.  He commented that he did not see Winthrop changing its strategy much from its 
present position.  Ashner stated: 
When I look at the landscape, I see very quality people in every sector of the 
REIT market.  There are a lot of quality companies and I don’t know that it adds 
that much to throw another company in the mix to deal with southern 
apartments or trophy office buildings.  I am not sure the returns are justified for 
the risk the shareholders would have to accept so I really don’t see us doing that 
at any point” (Ashner, 2011).   
 
Ashner seemed very conscientious of the impact on the shareholders from any of his actions, 
thus wanted to be sure the company’s strategy made sense and would increase value for its 
shareholders. 
In discussing the manner in which Winthrop is striving to meet its goals, Ashner 
emphasized the daily grind he faces in trying to identify new investment niches.  He noted that 
every day as the market changes, Winthrop has to rethink where the opportunities reside.  As 
Ashner put it, “One of the difficulties we face in being an opportunistic REIT is the ability to 
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sell common stock when we believe our NAV is greater than the market value, and we have to 
find other ways to grow the company” (Ashner, 2011).  To deal with the challenge, he 
considers joint venture opportunities and selling senior securities, such as preferred stocks. 
During 2011, Winthrop sold 5.2 million shares of stock and Ashner commented that he was not 
particularly happy with the sale, as it was somewhat dilutive.  Because of the stock sale in 
2011, he stated that if the company did anything else like that to raise capital it would have to 
be some sort of senior preferred or some sort of debt instrument.  In addition, he noted that 
Winthrop was not very levered as a company, so there were options there.  He also discussed 
there were worse times in 2011 to have issued stock, so he was glad his stock sale did not 
occur during those times or the funds from the sale could have been lower (Ashner, 2011).   
In discussing Winthrop over the years, Ashner notes that the company was not 
particularly successful before his management team took it over.  Since 2004, he correlates any 
success the company has experienced to the success of its investments.  Ashner sums up the 
situation by stating: 
Before 2004, and this is a matter of historical record, the company was a Paired 
Share REIT.  Any interest in the company was due to the unique tax 
characteristics of the Paired Share REIT, which would allow the company to 
invest in operating companies that had real estate assets or real estate companies 
that had operating assets.  More money was lost by investors fighting over this 
company, than were made by investors from investments in this company 
during the period 1978 to 2002. All I can speak about is the investments made 
since 2004, and that is where our losses are taken.  We took our lumps like 
everyone else (Ashner, 2011).  
 
Ashner, in discussing the big swings evident in historical earnings, states that most people that 
looked at investing in this company from 1998 to 2004 were interested in the unique 
characteristics of the company as a Paired Share REIT.  In his opinion, investors saw Winthrop 
more as a platform, than for its investments. Upon being questioned about his interest in this 
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company, Ashner stated that at the time he just wanted a platform. He discussed that the value 
as a Paired Share REIT was gone, as Congress had re-legislated the benefit of a Paired Share 
REIT.  After the benefit was gone, Winthrop became more of a company with some cash and 
assets, but in Ashner’s opinion, no real direction on where it was going.  Ashner’s interest was 
just to have a public company in which he could buy assets through the issuance of perpetual 
securities.  Ashner states: 
The problem for me with opportunistic investing is that there are three flaws:  
You have to invest when they give you the money, you have to sell when the 
time period is over, and in the middle if you run into problems and don’t have 
cash, then you don’t have easy access to fresh capital.  What I like about the 
public company is that you invest when you think it is wise to, you sell when 
you think it is wise to, and you always have access to capital to deal with your 
issues.  I like that and think it is a better business model for opportunistic 
investing (Ashner, 2011).    
 
Thus, the former First Union Real Estate Equity and Mortgage Investments gave Ashner the 
ability to have that platform, and with the purchase he got one of the oldest REITs that had 
existed since the early 1960s.  Thus, Winthrop provided a legacy too.   Ashner was quick to 
note that as one looks around his office, no mementos of its prior age can be seen.  He stated 
there were probably some old First Union items lingering somewhere in a warehouse, but he 
was not aware of them (Ashner, 2011). 
  In discussing Winthrop as a survivor over the fifty-year history of REITs, the other 
survivors, Washington REIT and Pennsylvania REIT (PREIT), were mentioned.  Ashner stated 
that the Rubins did the same thing with Pennsylvania REIT that he had done at Winthrop, by 
taking control of the existing company through a reverse merger.  Just as he could talk more 
about the existing company of Winthrop and not so much about the history of First Union, he 
felt the Rubins would be in that same position with PREIT.  They would be able to discuss the 
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last four or five years of the company, but would not be as aware of the history of PREIT.  
When asked to what he attributed his organization’s success over the last 50 years, Ashner 
mentions once again First Union’s platform as a Paired Share REIT.  Other than that, he could 
not really discuss much about the history of the company since he had only been involved with 
it since 2004 (Ashner, 2011). 
As the interview was winding down, Ashner was asked about the unique characteristics 
of Winthrop.  Ashner responded, “Investment strategies are really what is unique in my 
opinion.  We are a dedicated opportunistic investor and not interested in any single investment 
strategy.” (Ashner, 2011)  In terms of how that differs from other REITs that may hold long-
term successful operating properties, Ashner states it comes down to the returns your investors 
expect.  He states: 
Look at it this way, when the compound growth falls to the market rate of 
growth, then that is probably the time to exit.  That is what people invest with us 
for.  They are looking for a higher return.  Every day you are looking at either 
buying or selling something.  If you make a buy decision in any given day, you 
are thinking the properties are going up in value.  You buy something for $10 
million and by the third year, if it has gone up to $20 million, then you are 
achieving a good return.  However, if you continue to hold on to that property 
and it isn’t going up in value much anymore, you are diluting your return.  At 
some point you let them go, just like your children (Ashner, 2011).   
 
To further highlight Ashner’s emphasis on returns, the situation with the Churchill 
property during 2011 and its drag on earnings was discussed. Ashner mentioned that property 
involved some litigation issues and that by pursuing litigation, the company was making an 
investment decision.  He stated that as long as the cost of the litigation was less than the 
expected benefit from the conclusion of the litigation, the company will continue to pursue the 
litigation.  In Ashner’s opinion, “You are investing your time and your money and you have to 
determine at what point is it no longer worth it to continue. All litigation, on both sides, is 
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ultimately an investment decision” (Ashner, 2011).  Ashner basically felt one either pursues 
litigation or does not, but one should never make the mistake of not thinking he is investing his 
company’s cash and resources in litigation.       
In concluding the interview, Asher offered some final comments about Winthrop: 
I will tell you what I think is interesting as a final comment on the company.  
The investment basis of Winthrop as a publicly traded vehicle is unproven, it 
just is.  The question is will the market come to accept an investment vehicle 
that is dedicated to opportunities or not.  If it does, than the company’s share 
price will reflect its underlying value better.   If it does not, then in respect to 
shareholder value, we will have to find a new direction.  I like to think of myself 
as a disciplined detached investor who is interested in finding the best 
opportunities and value for the shareholder.  We are the largest shareholders in 
the company, so we are aligned with our shareholders.  No matter how good 
your investment strategy is, if the world does not like what you are doing, then 
you shouldn’t be doing it and you have to find another investment vehicle to 
pursue your strategy (Ashner, 2011). 
 
In terms of its investment focus, one could say Winthrop’s management was forging a new 
direction for how others administer their REITs.  Winthrop’s success will determine if other 
companies will be interested in following that path.  What is interesting about this situation is 
that Ashner is taking a company that has been around a long time and making it a totally 
different company since 2004.  Even though the symbol FUR has represented the company on 
the stock exchange for decades, what that symbol represents in terms of the underlying 
company is different today from what it was in 1960.  Winthrop’s emphasis on value may be 
setting the stage for a new era in the development of REITs (Ashner, 2011). 
In addressing how Ashner thinks the investment community has viewed what he has 
done so far, he felt the perception was slowly changing. From 2004 to 2010, he stated 
Winthrop was not as successful in getting its story out, which he felt was management’s fault.  
Since 2010 and 2011, he felt they have been doing a lot better in communicating with the 
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investment community.  He mentioned that Winthrop now has three analysts that follow the 
company and they are much more involved in what the company is doing.   Thus, he thinks 
management is doing a better job of defining who the company is.  However, Ashner noted it 
takes time and it is a process.  In his words, “It takes a long time to change the perception of a 
company” (Ashner, 2011).  
  In 2011, NAREIT posted an article on its website about Michael Ashner and 
Winthrop.  In the brief article, Ashner stated that one of the most important events in the REIT 
industry, other than its establishment, was the real estate downturn in the early 1990s 
(NAREIT, Ashner, 2011).  With the decline in 2007 and 2008, and the rebound that has 
occurred since then, Ashner was asked if he thought when people look back at this time period, 
it would likewise be viewed as a significant time in the industry.  In addition, the question was 
asked of Ashner about whether commercial properties were priced correctly or if they could be 
overpriced.  Ashner responded: 
I think real estate markets are not priced efficiently right now and to the extent 
we can take advantage of that, it could change the direction of the industry.  If 
we are right, then others will want to follow.  I think you have 4 key real estate 
markets:  New York and Washington (cap rate compression and supply and 
demand increasing), LA, San Francisco, and Boston (cap rate compression also, 
but no real growth in the markets or no increase in tenant demand), apartments 
(cap rate compression also, but it is a question if the real demand has increased 
as much as people think in a meaningful, long-term sense), and the rest of 
America which hasn’t really done anything and prices are low and cap rates are 
high (Ashner, 2011).   
 
Ashner was asked about the increase in apartment demand since the loan crisis in  
2008.  In his opinion, he stated this increased demand was a temporary thing and he went 
further to state the apartment business can be treacherous. He has been around the apartment 
business for a long time and he feels timing is everything.  In his opinion, if a company can 
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time it well, it can do well.  Asked if this sector is one he could see Winthrop becoming more 
focused on, Ashner responded by saying: 
I like the markets, since it is one asset class that you can always keep full at 
some price.  It is not the same thing with office buildings.  You can lower your 
rents, but if people do not need the space, then they won’t rent.  People always 
need a place to live.   They may not need a warehouse or place to shop, but they 
always need somewhere to live (Ashner, 2011).   
 
Ashner said he could understand why some REITs chose to specialize in that sector.  He 
further stated that in the current environment, those REITs were performing the best (Ashner, 
2011). 
 In conclusion, Winthrop is a unique company, in that it is has organizationally been in 
existence for fifty years, but is a different company today than it was in the 1960s.  Winthrop 
began as First Union, but with the name change not only changed its management team, but 
also its focus.  Present management took over First Union due to its platform, rather than its 
strong tradition of earnings or dividends.  In addition, the properties owned by First Union 
were not of particular interest to Winthrop management.  Winthrop has become an 
opportunistic REIT, searching out properties that offer the greatest return.  Because it does not 
carry the same historic tradition of WRIT or PREIT, patterns of financial behavior will be 
harder to identify. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 In evaluating the 50-year history of the REIT industry, along with the three surviving 
companies, both qualitative and quantitative information was considered.  To quantitatively 
evaluate the REIT industry and the three specific companies, data was obtained from two 
nationally recognized databases, SEC filings, and company records.  All of the information 
obtained was used to try to identify success factors and similarities among the three companies, 
Washington Real Estate Investment Trust (WRIT), Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust 
(PREIT), and Winthrop Realty Trust (Winthrop).  In addition, patterns and differences between 
these three companies and other companies in the industry that have either not survived or 
came into the industry at a later date are also examined. 
 Two nationally recognized databases were used to get the quantitative information, 
Compustat North America data (Compustat) and SNL Financial data (SNL).  While Compustat 
has been used in financial research for many years, SNL has not been around as long and is not 
as well known in financial research.  Some research in the finance and real estate areas has 
begun to use SNL more often, primarily for its industry-specific content.  Both databases were 
utilized because of the different contributions they could provide to this research.   
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 Compustat provided information on the REIT industry for most of its fifty years.  
However, Compustat provides more generic information across all industry types, thus REIT 
industry-specific measures were not widely available.  SNL serves users by providing more 
industry specific information, but only provides information on the REIT industry going back 
to 1990.  However, specific measures, in particular FFO, AFFO and SNL FFO, are provided 
from SNL that are not available in Compustat.  Thus, both databases are useful in this research 
and can be utilized to evaluate financial information and draw conclusions.  Since the 
companies were not listed on stock exchanges until the early 1970s, financial information for 
the years prior to that could not be obtained from either of the two databases.  Thus, the 
individual companies were contacted to see what old information could be provided.  Both 
WRIT and PREIT were able to provide financial information going back to their first 
prospectus.  However, since Winthrop has had major ownership changes, along with a name 
change, the location of old information on the company was unknown.  The earliest 
information for Winthrop coincided with data that could be obtained with Compustat, whereas 
information from the 1960s and early 1970s was obtained from historical documentation 
obtained from WRIT and PREIT.   
   In Appendix E, analysis is provided based on the Compustat data.  As the mean ratios 
were calculated, the ratios relating to all the other companies (excluding WRIT, PREIT and 
Winthrop) were winsorized
31
 to eliminate extreme outliers that could distort the values and 
lead to misleading inferences.  Table E-1 provides a description of the ratios calculated based 
                                                          
31
 Winsorization involves the process by which extreme values are replaced to eliminate the impact on statistical 
inferences drawn from the data.  Utilizing a 90% Winsorization, ratios above the top 95% and below the bottom 
5% of the extreme values are replaced by the ratios at the 95% and 5% levels, respectively.  
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winsorising) 
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on this data.  FFO per share was calculated, as FFO is one of the industry measures widely 
used to evaluate operations.  Per research specialists and analysts, FFO Multiple is one of the 
most regarded measures of operating performance, thus it was also evaluated.  The last ratio 
evaluated here that uses FFO is the FFO Payout, which compares FFO to net income.  The 
FFO Payout is inspired from the Dividend Payout ratio that compares dividends to net income 
to determine what percentage of earnings is paid out in dividends.  Through review of the 
Pearson correlation coefficients, the FFO Payout and Dividend Payout ratios were highly 
correlated.  Therefore, using both ratios in the analysis did not provide much added 
information.  The Dividend Payout ratio is probably more meaningful, as it is more well-
known across industries.  Lastly, utilizing dividend information, the Dividends per share and 
Dividend yield were calculated.  Both of those ratios are commonly used by publicly traded 
companies and are especially important for REITs, since they must pay out at least 90% of 
their earnings in dividends.   
 Utilizing balance sheet information, the Debt and Leverage ratios were calculated.  
Real estate companies are historically associated with higher debt, but with access to public 
markets, REITs tend to balance their use of equity with debt.  Through review of the Pearson 
correlation coefficients, the Debt and Leverage ratios were highly correlated.  Therefore, using 
both ratios in the analysis did not provide much added information, and either ratio was 
sufficient to tell the debt story.  In addition, the growth in total assets and growth in revenue 
were analyzed.  Lastly, as liquidity and cash flow are necessary for REITs due to their 
distribution requirements, Cash to Total Assets was analyzed.  These ratios were computed 
with the means derived for each of the three individual companies, for the average of the three 
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companies combined, and for all the other companies in the industry, excluding the three 
surviving companies. 
 In Table E-2, the means are presented for all eleven ratios computed from the 
Compustat data.  The ratios are presented horizontally with the five entity types discussed 
above presented vertically.  In looking at FFO per share, the mean for all other companies is 
1.472, whereas for the three companies combined it is 1.661.  Both WRIT and PREIT have 
values above 1.472, with the values of 1.632 and 1.994, respectively.  Winthrop has a value of 
1.201, which is below that of the all other companies.  For FFO Multiple, once again WRIT 
and PREIT have values greater than all other companies, with values of 13.122 and 16.795, 
respectively.  The value of 8.496 for the FFO Multiple for all other companies is higher than 
the value for Winthrop of 2.799.  Interestingly, the FFO Payout is higher for all the other 
companies, except for WRIT’s value which is quite a bit higher at 1.670.  In terms of the 
Dividend Payout, the three companies’ average is higher than the all other companies at .407 
and .173, respectively.  However, WRIT’s value is much larger at .876, with PREIT’s value 
closer to the other companies’ average and Winthrop’s value lower at .103.  For Dividends per 
share, Winthrop is again lower than all the other companies.  Dividend Yield shows similar 
values for all five categories of entities, with Winthrop closest to the value of all other 
companies and higher than WRIT or PREIT.   
 For the balance sheet, in terms of the Debt-to-Assets ratio, the all-other companies’ line 
shows a value of .478.  WRIT has a similar value of .462, but both PREIT and Winthrop shows 
higher Debt ratios of .594 and .629.  For the Leverage ratio, the all-other companies show a 
ratio of 2.044, with PREIT showing a value of 2.445 and Winthrop showing a value of 2.309.  
WRIT shows a much lower leverage ratio of 1.499.  In terms of Asset growth, the all-other 
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companies and WRIT show similar values, while Winthrop is lower and PREIT is almost 
double the value of the other companies.  For Cash-to-Assets, PREIT is .100, whereas WRIT is 
.066 and Winthrop is .057.  All other companies show a lower liquidity value than all the three 
surviving companies of .050.  Lastly, Revenue growth is highest for WRIT at .829, with 
PREIT showing .533 and Winthrop much lower at .144.  All other companies show a revenue 
growth of .188.  Additional detail of these eleven ratios are shown in Table E-3, providing the 
N, Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum for the three surviving companies of 
WRIT, PREIT and Winthrop. 
 A One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test was run for the eleven ratios with 
entity type as the factor to identify any significant statistical differences in the ratios among 
each of the individual three companies’ averages, the average of the three companies 
combined, and the average of all other companies.  At a significance level of α = .01, seven of 
the eleven ratios showed statistically different means as shown in Table E-4.  Since statistical 
significance was shown for some of the ratios, additional Post-hoc testing was performed 
utilizing the Tukey HSD
32
 test.  The results of the Tukey HSD test are shown in Table E-6. 
 FFO per share identified significant differences between PREIT and Winthrop (ρ = 
.003) and PREIT and all other companies (ρ = .040).  FFO Multiple identified significant 
differences between PREIT and all other companies (ρ = .026), PREIT and Winthrop (ρ = 
.000), and WRIT and Winthrop (ρ = .017).  FFO Payout identified significant differences 
between WRIT and PREIT (ρ = .008) and WRIT and Winthrop (ρ = .008).  These differences 
                                                          
32
 Tukey HSD is used after ANOVA testing is performed to identify the groups that account for the differences.  
http://www.ehow.com/info_8766337_tukey-hsd-test.html 
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reveal that PREIT has higher FFO ratios overall, except for FFO Payout, than all other 
companies or even the other two surviving companies. 
 Dividend Payout identified significant differences between WRIT and all other 
companies (ρ = .001), WRIT and Winthrop (ρ = .000), and WRIT and PREIT (ρ = .001).  
Dividends per share identified significant differences between PREIT and all other companies 
(ρ = .000) and PREIT and Winthrop (ρ = .000).  Dividend Yield did not show significant 
differences in any of the individual groups, as identified by the Tukey HSD test, which was 
expected since the ANOVA did not show significance for this ratio. 
 For the Debt ratio, significant differences were noted amongst WRIT and Winthrop (ρ 
= .000), WRIT and PREIT (ρ = .003), Winthrop and all other companies (ρ = .001), and PREIT 
and all other companies (ρ = .006).  Interestingly, WRIT and all other companies did not show 
statistically significant differences in their Debt ratio.  For the Leverage ratio, WRIT showed 
significant differences between itself and PREIT (ρ = .007), with only marginally significant 
differences between itself and Winthrop (ρ = .060) and itself and all other companies (ρ = 
.065).   By looking at either the Debt or Leverage ratio, WRIT displayed significant differences 
in its levels of debt when compared to the other entities under study, which emphasizes the 
importance of this balance sheet item for WRIT. 
 For Asset growth and Revenue growth, significant differences were not noted amongst 
any groups according to the Tukey HSD test, which was expected due to the lack of 
significance found in the ANOVA.  The Cash-to-Assets ratio, likewise, did not show any 
significant differences amongst the groups.  Thus, these ratios did not disclose any significant 
differences or offer any new insight into WRIT, PREIT, and Winthrop. 
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 An ANOVA test was run for the eleven ratios with year as the factor to identify any 
significant statistical difference in the ratios by the years under analysis.  At a significance 
level of α = .01, all eleven ratios showed statistically different means as shown in Table E-5.  
Since fifty years of data were utilized, additional Post-Hoc testing was not performed to 
identify the groups that showed differences.  Significant differences in the means amongst the 
years were an expected result due to the cyclicality of real estate, so no further examination 
was warranted. 
 After the initial ANOVA testing by entity, additional ANOVA testing was performed 
by trimming the dataset of items dated earlier than 1971.  This trimming was done since 
information prior to 1971 was not available for Winthrop.  Detail information on the mean is 
found in Table E-7, with the ANOVA results in Table E-8.  The only differences noted 
between the testing for all years and the trimmed dataset including only years after 1970 
related to the Dividends Payout and Dividend Yield ratio.  The statistical significance of the 
differences in the Dividends Payout ratio declined slightly, while the differences in the 
Dividend Yield ratios indicated significance with the trimmed dataset.  Post-Hoc testing was 
performed to identify which companies caused these differences.  For the Dividends Payout 
ratio, Winthrop’s ratio was lower and significantly different than all the other companies.  
However, WRIT’s ratio was not significantly different than all the other companies when the 
dataset was trimmed.  In addition, Winthrop’s Dividends Payout ratio indicated statistically 
significant differences between itself and PREIT, which was a different result from using the 
full dataset.  Regarding the Dividend Yield, PREIT and WRIT’s ratios indicated statistically 
significant differences, with PREIT’s Dividend Yield showing a higher yield.  For the other 
ratios analyzed, the post hoc testing indicated differences between entities that changed when 
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the dataset was trimmed, but the overall conclusion on the statistical differences noted with the 
ratios did not change for any of them, but the Dividend Yield and Dividends Payout.   
 Table E-9 displays the eleven financial ratios for Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment 
Trust from 1961 – 2010.  Table E-10 displays the eleven ratios for Washington Real Estate 
Investment Trust from 1961 – 2010.  Table E-11 displays the eleven ratios for Winthrop Realty 
Trust for 1970 – 2010, since historical information prior to 1970 could not be obtained.  These 
tables represent the numerical values used in the testing for this research.  
 In Table F-1, the thirteen ratios used in the analysis with the SNL data are listed and 
described.  This analysis provides two additional ratios due to metrics available in SNL that are 
not available in Compustat.  The two additional metrics are AFFO per share and SNL FFO per 
share.  AFFO per share is adjusted FFO which further subtracts from FFO straight-line rents 
and normal expenses capitalized by REITs.  SNL FFO per share is a data item specific to SNL 
that provides a systematic calculation of FFO per NAREIT guidelines.  The other eleven ratios 
are similar to the ratios computed using the Compustat data, but are calculated from the twenty 
years from 1990 to 2009, during which time the SNL data has been in existence. 
 In Table F-2, the means are presented for all thirteen ratios computed from the SNL 
data.  The ratios are presented horizontally with the five entity types discussed above presented 
vertically.  Once again, the ratios for all other companies were winsorized to eliminate extreme 
outliers that could distort the data.  For FFO per share, all other companies showed 2.082, 
whereas PREIT showed 3.252 and WRIT showed 1.925.  Winthrop showed a value 
significantly lower at .869, which caused the average of the three companies to be 1.664.  The 
FFO Multiplier showed once again that all other companies had a higher value than the three 
companies’ average, but lower than WRIT at 14.040.  PREIT showed 8.204 and Winthrop 
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actually showed -.323, due to some large net losses in some years.  The FFO Payout showed 
WRIT at the highest value of 81.693, with PREIT at 75.041 and Winthrop 63.234.  The all 
other companies’ average is 76.099. 
 Two FFO-related ratios that are unique to the SNL database were computed.  AFFO per 
share was not available for Winthrop, due to the lack of information available to SNL to 
compute AFFO.  This situation also occurred for some of the other companies, even though 
there were still plenty of companies that did provide AFFO information.  PREIT had a value of 
2.398, whereas WRIT had a value of 1.124.  All other companies had a value of 1.642, which 
was higher than WRIT, but lower than PREIT.  AFFO backs out straight-line rents and 
expenses that are normally capitalized by REITs.  FFO per share was also higher for PREIT 
than WRIT, so this pattern with AFFO is consistent with the relationships revealed with FFO 
per share.  SNL FFO per share, which provides a systematic calculation of FFO, likewise 
shows PREIT the highest at 2.926, with WRIT at 1.751.  The all other companies’ average was 
2.056, with Winthrop at the lowest value of 1.106.  The means for FFO per share and SNL 
FFO per share revealed some differences in the systematic calculation versus company-
provided information, but the pattern of relationships amongst companies was consistent 
between the two ratios.   
 In evaluating the impact of dividends, the three dividend ratios were likewise computed 
with the SNL data.  PREIT showed the highest values for both Dividends per share and 
Dividend Payout of 1.878 and 1.455, respectively.  WRIT revealed 1.189 and 1.160 for 
Dividends per share and Dividend Payout, respectively.  Winthrop showed .562 and .944 for 
the two ratios.  All other companies came in lower than PREIT, but higher than the other two 
companies.  The Dividend Yield was highest for Winthrop at .081, with PREIT second at .077, 
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and WRIT third at .054.  All other companies showed a value of .076, which was lower than 
Winthrop and PREIT.  Since PREIT was highest in both Dividends per share and Dividend 
Payout, its lower value related to Dividend yield is related to its relative higher price. 
 When evaluating the issue of debt service, both the Debt ratio and Leverage ratio were 
computed.  Of the three companies, PREIT had the highest ratios, while WRIT revealed the 
lowest ratios.  PREIT’s Debt ratio was .545, Winthrop was .495, and WRIT was .436.  The all 
other companies showed a lower Debt ratio than all three of the companies at .426.  In terms of 
the Leverage ratio, all other companies showed a higher value than any of the individual three 
companies at 2.574, whereas PREIT showed 1.852, Winthrop showed 1.493, and WRIT 
showed 1.117.  As Leverage divides by Total Equity, the difference in these two debt service 
ratios reveals that the three surviving companies had larger equity bases than all other 
companies that either came into the industry later or did not survive.  
 In terms of growth, the Asset growth and Revenue growth were computed, as both 
ratios revealed PREIT to have the largest growth.  In terms of Asset growth, PREIT showed 
.343, WRIT showed .176, and Winthrop showed .092, while all other companies showed .154.  
Both PREIT and WRIT grew faster than all other companies during the period from 1990 to 
2009.  For Revenue growth, PREIT showed .322, Winthrop showed .265, and WRIT showed 
.132, while all other companies showed .111.  In this case, all of the individual three companies 
experienced larger growth in total revenue than all other companies.  Winthrop showed larger 
growth in total revenue than WRIT, even though the company experienced lower asset growth 
during this period. 
 Lastly, the Cash-to-Assets ratio was highest for Winthrop at .032, compared to .018 for 
WRIT and .015 for PREIT.  All other companies showed a ratio of .029, which was higher than 
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WRIT and PREIT, but lower than Winthrop.  In terms of liquidity, Winthrop revealed a larger 
amount of cash available during the period 1990 – 2009.   
 Table F-3 provides detail information on the N, Mean, Standard Deviation, Minimum 
and Maximum for the PREIT, WRIT, and Winthrop.  This information is interesting since it 
shows the variability in the data.  For the majority of the ratios, this table shows that Winthrop 
tends to have the largest standard deviations. This fact is not surprising since PREIT and WRIT 
have experienced more consistency with management and strategic direction than Winthrop.  
With significant changes in Winthrop’s structure, the financials have experienced wider 
swings. 
 An ANOVA test was run for the thirteen ratios with entity as the factor to identify any 
significant statistical difference in the ratios by the years under analysis.  At a significance 
level of α = .01, some of the thirteen ratios showed statistically different means as shown in 
Table F-4.  The results are somewhat dissimilar from the statistical differences found in some 
of the eleven ratios computed with the Compustat data.  Some of this result could be attributed 
to the shorter and more stable time frame utilized with the SNL data, since the period from 
1990 – 2009 is considered part of the Modern REIT era.  The dynamics of the industry 
changed with the new REIT rules that were in effect during this time, causing the financial 
makeup of the companies to change.  
 In terms of the ratios related to aspects of FFO, which is emphasized more in the SNL 
database due to its industry-specific nature, FFO per share, AFFO per share, and FFO Payout 
all showed significant differences by entity type at a significance level of α = .01.  In addition, 
SNL FFO per share showed marginally significant statistical differences at a significance level 
of α = .05.  However, FFO Multiple did not show a significant result. 
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 For the Dividend ratios, only Dividends per share showed a significant difference by 
entity type at a significance level of α = .01.  Dividend Payout and Dividend Yield did not 
show significant differences during the period utilized with the SNL data.  However, these 
ratios had shown statistical differences by entity type utilizing the Compustat data for the forty-
to-fifty-year-time period.   
 For the debt ratios, the Leverage ratio showed significant differences by entity at a 
significance level of α = .01.  However, the Debt ratio did not show significant differences by 
entity type.  In terms of both Asset growth and Revenue growth, neither ratio showed 
significant differences by entity type.  But, the Cash-to-Assets ratio did show statistically 
significant differences at a significance level of α = .01.   
 To evaluate further the results obtained from the ANOVA testing, additional Post-hoc 
testing was performed utilizing the Tukey HSD test, for the ratios demonstrating statistically 
significantly differences.  The results of the Tukey HSD test are shown in Table F-6 and 
provide details of the differences by group.  For FFO per share, PREIT and Winthrop were the 
only two groups that showed significant differences (ρ = .001).  Likewise, for SNL per share, 
PREIT and Winthrop were the only two groups that showed significant differences (ρ = .011).  
For FFO Payout, WRIT and Winthrop were the only two groups that showed significant 
differences (ρ = .004).  For Dividends per share, PREIT, WRIT, and Winthrop were shown to 
exhibit significant differences (ρ = .000) amongst each other.  In addition, all the other 
companies were shown to exhibit significant differences with PREIT (ρ = .000) and Winthrop 
(ρ = .000).  Interestingly, WRIT did not exhibit significant differences from all other 
companies for Dividends per share.  For the Leverage ratio, both WRIT (ρ = .000) and 
Winthrop (ρ = .010) exhibited significant differences from all other companies, but not from 
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each other or PREIT.  PREIT was not shown to exhibit significant differences, however, from 
all other companies in terms of the Leverage ratio.  Lastly, for the Cash-to-Assets ratio that 
was shown to have statistically significant differences across entity type, both PREIT (ρ = 
.002) and WRIT (ρ = .003) were shown to have significant differences from Winthrop.  
However, Winthrop showed only marginally significant differences from all the other 
companies (ρ = .058).  PREIT and WRIT did not show significant differences among each 
other in the Cash ratio.  The benefit of the Post-hoc testing is to identify the groups in which 
the statistically significant differences result, and in this case provided interesting results for 
the three surviving companies in relation to other companies in the industry. 
 Next, an ANOVA test was run for the thirteen ratios with year as the factor to identify 
any significant statistical difference in the ratios by the years under analysis.  At a significance 
level of α = .01, some of the thirteen ratios showed statistically different means as shown in 
Table F-5.  FFO per share and SNL FFO per share were both shown to be significantly 
different across the years at a significance level of α = .01.  AFFO per share and FFO Payout 
were shown to have only marginally significant differences across the years at a significance 
level of α = .05.  FFO Multiple was not shown to be statistically different across the years at ρ 
= .086.  Both Dividend Payout and Dividend Yield were shown to be significantly different 
across the years at a significance level of α = .01, whereas Dividends per share did not show 
significant differences.  Both Debt and Leverage were shown to be significantly different 
across the years at a significance level of α = .01.  Both Asset growth and Revenue growth 
were shown to exhibit differences that were only marginally significant across the years at a 
significance level of α = .05.  Cash-to-Assets was not shown to be significantly different across 
the years at a significance level of α = .01.   
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 For the quantitative analysis, ANOVA testing revealed differences across entity type 
and year.  Since real estate is known to be cyclical, differences across years was expected.  The 
focus in this research was more on the differences amongst the three companies and/or other 
companies in the industry.  The results indicated significant differences do exist for some, if 
not most, of the metrics according to the particular entity.  These quantitative differences will 
be evaluated with the qualitative differences in the next chapter to offer some summary and 
conclusions on the REIT industry and the surviving companies. 
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CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
 On September 14
th
, 2010, the REIT industry celebrated its 50
th
 Anniversary, which was 
a milestone event for an industry established by law.  Only three companies have survived 
throughout the fifty years; Washington Real Estate Investment Trust (WRIT), Pennsylvania 
Real Estate Investment Trust (PREIT), and Winthrop Realty Trust (Winthrop).  These three 
companies have been evaluated in a triple case study to discover success factors and trends that 
mark the development and growth of the industry. Throughout the study, the answers to two 
research questions were sought based on an analysis of quantitative and qualitative 
information.  Through review of the quantitative data the question was asked, “Based on 
specific metrics that form a foundation for valuing REITs, do the three surviving companies 
reveal any quantitative differences from other REITs that have entered and left the market?”  
Through review of the qualitative data the question was asked, “Based on qualitative factors, 
do the three surviving companies reveal any common characteristics that can be indicators of 
their success and longevity throughout the fifty-year history of the REIT industry?”  The 
paragraphs below provide answers to these questions and other pertinent information related to 
the REIT industry. 
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 Due to the tax preferential status of REITs, which is one of the primary attractions to 
investors, emphasis was placed on outlining the history of tax legislation as it relates to the 
REIT industry.  In addition, a detailed discussion of the REIT rules was provided, since non-
compliance in the past has led to some companies losing their REIT status and tax preferential 
structure.  In addition, historical developments in the industry were highlighted, as these 
developments drove some companies to great success or monumental failure.   
 Throughout the industry’s growth and development, NAREIT has led the way in 
addressing issues that affect the real estate investment community.  The REIT industry has 
been fortunate to have the backing of such a strong organization, with the background and 
experience to put forth such a strong research and lobbying effort to promote its well-being. 
 Being a triple case study, each of the individual companies (WRIT, PREIT, and 
Winthrop) had their own chapter with detailed information obtained from many recorded 
sources, both written and oral.  These chapters provided information on the companies’ 
strategies and structure as it navigated throughout the last fifty years.  This information, along 
with the quantitative information provided from either databases or other historical sources, 
was used to draw conclusions on the companies’ abilities to persevere throughout several real 
estate cycles.  
 In Appendix G, Table G-1 is presented that shows the 3-month Treasury Bill (T-Bill) 
rates from 1960 through 2010.  Since real estate historically has been tied to interest rates, in 
particular the 3-month T-Bill, these rates reveal economic conditions that have occurred 
throughout the last fifty years.  Interest rates were very low in the early 1960s and gradually 
climbed until the late 1960s and early 1970s when they showed the first peak.  With the 
Federal Reserve tightening the money supply, a mild recession occurred during the 1969 – 
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1970 period, with a slight drop in rates directly thereafter.  In 1969, both WRIT and PREIT 
commenced a public offering of stock, probably to offset the reduction in availability of debt 
financing.  The 3-month T-Bill rate peaked at 6.67 in 1969 and had dropped to 4.33 by 1971.  
Inflation rose and interest rates climbed throughout the 1970s for the most part, with high rates 
experienced from the late 1970s through early 1980s.  The 3-month T-Bill rate climbed to its 
highest point since the official start of the REIT industry with a rate of 7.85 in 1974.    In 1974, 
First Union (Winthrop) paid a dividend, while most other REITs in the industry chose to either 
not pay a dividend or decrease their dividend in accordance with IRS guidelines.  In 1976, the 
3-month T-Bill rate was down to 4.98, and First Union had its first public offering in 20 years.   
 A more severe recession occurred in the early 1980s, as the Federal Reserve tightened 
the money supply to control inflation due to previous concerns with oil and energy costs.  
Interest rates skyrocketed from 1979 -1981 and remained relatively high throughout the 1980s.  
With a 3-month T-Bill rate of 14.04 in 1981, WRIT initiated a public offering rather than 
accessing the debt market.  In 1986, the Tax Reform Act was passed, as T-Bill rates fell to 
5.97.  Winthrop had a 3-for-2 stock split in 1986, and PREIT had a 3-for-2 stock split in 1987.  
In 1989, with the 3-month T-Bill rate at 8.11, WRIT initiated another public offering.  A mild 
recession occurred in the early 1990s.  As discussed earlier this period was the beginning of the 
Modern REIT era, as REITs began to capitalize on the real estate downturn due to the S & L 
crisis, the passive loss rules, and declining real estate values.  The 3-month T-Bill rate fell to 
3.00 in 1993, which was its lowest rate since 1963.  By 1995, T-Bill rates were back over 5.00, 
and stayed that way through 1997.  Winthrop initiated its first public offering in 20 years in 
1996.  WRIT initiated a public offering in 1997, and PREIT chose to grow through a merger 
with the Robin Organization that same year.  Overall, the 1990s was a steady growth period, 
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until another recession occurred in the early 2000s and interest rates dropped again.  In 2003, 
the 3-month T-Bill rates had fallen to 1.01, the lowest rate since 1960.  WRIT started its 
medical office sector and PREIT grew through its merger with Crown American.  In 2004, 
PREIT initiated another public offering, with Winthrop initiating a public offering in 2006 and 
WRIT in 2007.  The 3-month T-Bill rates were over 4.00 in 2006 and 2007, which was a big 
increase from 1.01 experienced in 2003.  Rates would drop again with the financial market 
crisis of 2008, falling to a low of .14 in 2010 (Federal Reserve 3-month, 2011).      
 In Appendix G, Table G-2 displays the real estate cycles throughout U. S. history.  Real 
estate peaked in value in 1973, after a 48-year climb.  The 3-month T-Bill rate increased from 
4.06 in 1972 to 7.04 in 1973, which contributed to the end of the peak period. Real estate 
would peak again in 1979 with inflation and high interest rates.  In 1978, the 3-month T-Bill 
was at 7.18, but increased to 10.05 in 1979.  Subsequently, a downturn in the market would 
occur in 1980 and the market would not peak again until 1989, with a subsequent downturn in 
1990.  In 1988, the 3-month T-Bill rate was at 6.67 and it climbed to 8.11 in 1989. This 
downturn enabled REITs to access public markets to obtain capital to purchase real estate at 
depressed prices with corresponding lower interest rates (3-month T-Bill rate of 5.38 in 1991), 
and helped spur on what is known as the Modern REIT era.  Real estate would peak again in 
2006, with increases in value combined with lower interest rates during 2002 – 2004.  Another 
downturn in 2008 followed, which was connected to the financial and liquidity crisis.  This 
downturn occurred 18 years after the last downturn in 1990 and resulted in many REITs 
deferring cash dividends and utilizing stock dividends to meet their distribution requirements 
(Foldvary, 2008).   
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 In Table G-3, the rate of return on assets was computed for WRIT, PREIT, and 
Winthrop for the years 1972 through 2010.  The rate of return on the three companies is shown, 
along with the historical 3-month T-Bill rates.  In addition, the years the real estate cycles 
reflected either a peak in construction (C) or the beginning of a depression (D,) are also noted 
with a C or D, respectively.  On average, WRIT has the highest rate of return (9.41%) and 
Winthrop the lowest return (2.45%) revealing a rate of return below the average T-Bill rate of 
5.54%.  PREIT’s average rate of return over the period was 6.76%.  In reviewing the returns in 
conjunction with the real estate cycles, the T-Bill rates were higher than the rates of return at 
the start of each real estate depression period, other than the real estate depression in 1990.  
WRIT showed the most consistent pattern in returns by showing rates higher than the T-Bill 
rates for the years leading up to and including the peaks in construction.  Once the 
depressionary periods began, the trend reversed for a year or two and WRIT’s returns were 
lower than the T-Bill rates, until the cycle stabilized again.  During the 1990s and 2000s, both 
WRIT and PREIT showed consistently higher rates than T-Bill rates, while Winthrop’s return 
was consistently more erratic and lower, sometimes higher, but mostly lower. 
 The economic factors related to interest rates and real estate cycles are important 
determinants in decisions made by REIT management.  Looking at the quantitative data and 
talking with REIT management, the ability to manage the downturns and time market 
financing needs are important contributors to a REIT’s financial success over the long-term.  
All three of the companies have management that have been in the industry a long time and 
understand the dynamics of real estate and financing.  Thus, a common characteristic leading 
to the companies’ success and longevity would have to be strong, experienced, senior 
management.  The consistency in management at WRIT and PREIT is reflected in the 
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consistency of their rates of return throughout the real estate cycles.  The fluctuation in 
Winthrop’s returns can be related to the fluctuation in management styles and strategies that 
has marked Winthrop’s history. 
 In further evaluating qualitative considerations, WRIT and PREIT are more similarly 
situated than Winthrop.  Both companies have experienced great stability over the fifty years.  
Even though the executives that started the companies may have passed on, many of the former 
senior management teams are still involved with the company in some respect.  The strategies 
they initially implemented for the most part are still in effect.  While PREIT may have shifted 
its focus from a more diversified platform to primarily retail, it has still stayed in the same 
general market area to build upon the relationships it has established throughout the years.  The 
purchases it makes outside its area are generally tied to relationships built in the mid-Atlantic 
area.  Even with a couple of mergers, PREIT continues to operate with many of their original 
tenants.  WRIT has not wavered much in terms of its platform or location throughout the fifty 
years.  The decision in 2011 to sell off the industrial platform has been the only major change 
to its strategy in fifty years.  This decision could be viewed as not really a change in platform 
anyway, as the emphasis has always been on maximizing returns and the decision was based 
on the historically lower returns of the industrial portfolio.  Thus, another common 
characteristic would be sticking with a strategy for the long term. 
 Winthrop is unique in regards to strategy because it has morphed from a relatively 
inactive smaller REIT to an aggressive return-driven REIT.  Winthrop has survived in large 
part due to its stapled-REIT structure, which allowed it to have an operating component when 
other REITs could only own real estate.  When these REIT structures were no longer 
permissible, Winthrop was one of four REITs to be grandfathered in and allowed to keep its 
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structure.  Even Ashner noted in the interview that a lot of interest in Winthrop or First Union, 
as it was previously named, came from its stapled-REIT status.  He mentioned that when his 
group took over and changed the name to Winthrop in 2005, they were mainly looking for the 
platform to generate real estate deals through access to public markets.  However, Winthrop 
has continued to be headquartered out of its basic market area, with offices also in New York, 
but acquisitions across the U. S.   So, another common characteristic would be having a niche 
aspect of the company that allows it to operate successfully in a manner that provides an 
advantage. 
 One final qualitative characteristic that stands out on all three companies is keeping the 
size of the company to a manageable level.  All three of these companies are not the biggest 
players in the REIT industry.  In some ways, they could be considered some of the smaller 
players.  However, management at each of the companies knows where its size needs to be and 
how much growth will allow the company to maximize on its assets, without lowering the 
benefit to the shareholders.  None of the companies desired to grow to some unbelievable level, 
only to the extent that it could continue to operate at a more profitable level.  The ability to 
clearly identify who you are as a company is another common characteristic shared by these 
three successful companies. 
 On a quantitative basis, specific details were provided in the preceding chapters.  
However, as an overview on the Compustat data, FFO per share was significantly higher for 
PREIT than it was for WRIT, Winthrop or all the other companies operating in the market.  
The FFO Multiple was greatest for PREIT and significantly higher than all other companies 
and Winthrop, as the price of PREIT stock reached higher levels and responded more favorably 
to increases in FFO.  FFO Payout was higher for WRIT than PREIT or Winthrop, but not 
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significantly higher than all other companies.  WRIT’s net income per share, which is the 
denominator for FFO Payout, did not show as much variability and higher values, to drive 
down the ratio.  As primarily an asset management company, WRIT has higher relative 
depreciation expense than either PREIT or Winthrop, which have more an opportunistic 
investing style.  Similarly, the Dividend Payout was highest for WRIT, and significantly 
different than the two companies and all the other companies. On a per share basis, dividends 
were highest for PREIT, but it was only significantly different from Winthrop and all the other 
companies.  Winthrop had the highest Debt ratio and was significantly different from WRIT 
and all other companies. Likewise, PREIT also had a higher Debt ratio and showed significant 
differences among itself and WRIT and all other companies.  Leverage yielded similar results 
with PREIT and Winthrop having the highest ratios, but not demonstrating significant 
differences except for PREIT and WRIT. WRIT had both the lowest Debt and Leverage ratios, 
which is consistent with their conservative debt policy.  WRIT approaches the use of debt in a 
more cautious manner, maintaining lower comparative levels of debt than many other REITs.         
 As an overview of the SNL data, FFO share for PREIT was higher and significantly 
different from only Winthrop.  SNL FFO per share showed the same relationship with PREIT 
demonstrating significantly higher values than Winthrop.  AFFO per share was also highest for 
PREIT.  FFO Payout was highest for WRIT, which showed significant differences from 
Winthrop.  All other companies also showed some significant differences with Winthrop also 
for FFO Payout. Dividends per share were highest for PREIT, which showed significant 
differences between all other entities.  WRIT showed significant differences between PREIT 
and Winthrop, with a figure higher than Winthrop, but lower than PREIT.  All-other companies 
was similar to the WRIT’s value of dividends per share, but significantly different than PREIT 
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or Winthrop.  As noted in the previous paragraph, WRIT had the lowest Leverage ratio and 
showed significant differences from all other companies, but did not demonstrate significance 
when compared to PREIT or Winthrop.  Winthrop demonstrated significant differences, 
however, with all other companies on the Leverage ratio with a value lower than PREIT, but 
higher than WRIT.  Lastly, Winthrop appeared to have the most cash, as it had the highest ratio 
and was significantly different than PREIT and WRIT and showed marginally significant 
differences with all other companies. 
 As noted in the Analysis section, significant differences were noted in the ratios 
throughout the years, but that finding was not a surprise and is not as relevant in this research.  
The quantitative analysis was meant to provide financial ratio analysis of the companies with 
statistical testing to determine if significant differences in the ratios existed across entities.  In 
that regard, the quantitative analysis was successful and provided some insights into the 
companies.  Additionally, it helped answer the research question on whether there were 
quantitative differences that existed between these three companies and other companies that 
had entered and left the market.  PREIT seemed to generate higher FFO per share, and 
subsequently paid out higher dividends per share.  WRIT tended to be the most conservative 
with its debt management and paid out a reasonable amount in dividends, but not as high as 
PREIT on a per share basis.  Winthrop seemed to be more variable and lower in its earnings 
measures in some years, such as FFO, which could be related to its emphasis on opportunistic 
investing.  All three of the companies showed some variability with all the other companies in 
the industry, but the variability depended on which specific measures were being analyzed.  
Thus, not one specific metric showed consistent significant differences across all three of these 
surviving companies.  For FFO per share and FFO Multiple, both WRIT and PREIT showed 
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higher values than the average of the other REITs in the industry.  Likewise, the Dividend 
Payout and Dividends per share were higher for WRIT and PREIT than the average of the 
other REITs.  The Dividend Yield for WRIT and PREIT was close to the value for the other 
REITs, but not higher, since WRIT and PREIT seemed to have higher comparative stock 
prices.  Only with WRIT were the Leverage and Debt ratios lower than the other REITs.  Thus, 
not one metric seemed to hold the key to successful navigation throughout the years.  Instead, 
it seemed to suggest that a REIT must be careful to align its resources and abilities to its 
particular business strategy.  In addition, external growth, if and when undertaken, should be 
done only after reviewing the composition and strength of the internal assets and financing 
structures already in place.   
 
Research Contributions 
 In conclusion, this study provides a historical recap of the first fifty years of the REIT 
industry with a review of its rules and underlying tax legislation.  In addition, it provides a 
historical review of the three successful companies that have been in the industry throughout 
its entire existence.  Some background and information on NAREIT is also provided.  How this 
study contributes the most is through its qualitative and quantitative analysis of the three 
companies and the industry.  Specific qualitative factors were identified that have contributed 
to these three companies’ ability to successfully navigate the real estate and economic 
environment.  In addition, specific quantitative factors were identified as contributing to each 
company’s success, even though those quantitative factors may not have been all the same for 
all companies.   
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 The main finding from this research is that a company that can establish its identity, 
hire strong management, know its market, and concentrate its focus on particular financial 
measures and goals will be the company that will survive while other companies fail.  
Identifying its business strategy and working within its constraints seems to provide the best 
road map.  Washington Real Estate Investment Trust, Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment 
Trust, and Winthrop Realty Trust have all found ways to capitalize on their unique strengths 
and remain in the real estate business throughout turbulent times.  While each company may 
not stand out in all financial areas, each company has discovered how it can utilize its own 
niche to capitalize in those areas it deems most important to its long-term success.  External 
growth has occurred, but management seems to have approached it with an understanding of its 
internal structure and market conditions.  In addition, these companies have been run by 
management that are invested in the real estate industry and their particular business for the 
long haul, thus they have viewed their companies as a long-term commitment.   
 This research is relevant due to its combination of qualitative and quantitative factors, 
with statistical analysis utilized to support significant differences between financial ratios for 
the three specific companies analyzed and all other REITs.  In addition, it provides a unique 
historical perspective on an industry heavily influenced by legal and tax mandates throughout 
its entire fifty-year history. 
 
Limitations 
 One limitation of this research is that financial data for Winthrop could not be located 
for the years prior to 1971.  Since management and ownership had changed so many times, 
present management at Winthrop could not locate the old company information.  For WRIT 
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and PREIT, the original prospectus, along with financial statements, was available for the early 
years of 1960 – 1970.  Since all three companies did not have similar information available, the 
statistical analysis portion had to be tested both with and without the years prior to 1971.  
Fortunately, the overall conclusions of the research were basically the same whether or not the 
early years were left in or out of the analysis.  
 Another limitation of this research is that qualitative factors were utilized, which cannot 
be tested through statistical procedures.  Interviews can contain some biases, due to the 
background and experiences of the interviewer that are brought into the interview process.  
Internal validity is harder to prove with qualitative factors. 
 
Future Research Opportunities 
 Further research could be conducted by examining some of the larger REITs that have 
come into the industry since its beginning, both in terms of those that have come and gone and 
those that may have come into the industry since it had matured.  Since this research 
highlighted three small to mid-size REITs that survived for fifty years, larger REITs could be 
examined to identify areas leading to possible company failures, such as companies that 
incurred too much debt, or paid out too much in dividends, or grew too fast.  
 In addition, further research could be performed comparing the financial results of 
REITs to other economic factors, such as new housing starts or unemployment rates.   The 
analysis could be extended even further to analyze REITs by sector, such as multifamily, retail, 
office, hotel, industrial, and healthcare.  Interesting relationships could be identified through 
this research leading to predictions concerning future performance.  
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Appendix A-1  Interview Document 
THE 50
th
 ANNIVERSARY OF REITS: A TRIPLE CASE STUDY 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
 
1 What is your name?   
2 What is your position?  
3 How long have you been with the organization?  
4 What are your primary duties?   
5   In your opinion, what are the strengths of your organization?    
6   What are your organization’s goals and strategy?   
7   How do you see your organization striving to meet its goals?        
8   To what do you attribute your organization’s success over the last 50 years?   
9   What, if any, are the unique characteristics of your organization?       
10 Would you like to make any final comments about your organization?   
 
*I consent to the use of this information in the research conducted by Barbara White. 
 
Name_______________________________________  Date_______________________ 
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Appendix A-2  Glossary Terms 
 
Adjusted Funds From Operations (AFFO) 
A term referring to a calculation made by analysts and investors to assess a real estate 
company's cash flow produced from operations. AFFO is computed by deducting from 
Funds from Operations (FFO) both (1) normalized recurring expenditures capitalized 
by the REIT and then amortized, but essential to sustain a REIT's properties and its 
revenue (carpeting in apartments, leasing expenses, etc.) and (2) straight-line rents. 
The calculation also is known as Cash Available for Distribution (CAD) or Funds 
Available for Distribution (FAD). 
Capitalization Rate 
The cap rate for a property is calculated by dividing the property's net operating 
income by its purchase price. High cap rates usually indicate higher returns and greater 
risk. 
Cash (or Funds) Available for Distribution 
Cash (or Funds) available for distribution (CAD or FAD) measures a REIT's’ 
capability to produce cash and distribute dividends. In addition to deducting from FFO 
normal operating real estate expenses and other non-cash items to acquire AFFO, 
CAD (or FAD) is computed by also deducting nonrecurring expenses. 
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS) 
 A mortgage backed security secured by debt on commercial property.  Multiple secured 
loans backed by commercial real estate are aggregated in a trust that issues bonds  
assigned ratings by various agencies.  Investors select these bonds based on risk, yield, 
and term.   
DownREIT 
A DownREIT is established similar to an UPREIT, but the REIT owns and operates 
properties other than its interest in a controlled partnership that owns and operates 
individual properties. 
EBITDA 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. This calculation is also 
referred to as Net Operating Income (NOI).  
Equity REIT 
A REIT which owns rental real estate, rather than making secured loans by real estate. 
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Funds From Operations (FFO) 
A commonly reported measure of a REIT’s operating performance. It is calculated by 
taking a REIT's net income, excluding gains or losses from sales of  real estate, and 
adding back real estate depreciation. 
GAAP 
 Generally accepted accounting principles. 
Hybrid REIT 
A REIT that has investments in both equity REITs and mortgage REITs. 
Mezzanine debt 
Subordinated debt that has embedded equity instruments, such as warrants attached, 
giving it more flexibility and value than straight debt or bonds.  Mezzanine debt is often 
associated with stock more than debt, due to the embedded instruments that make the 
conversion to stock likely.  Mezzanine debt is frequently used in buyout situations. 
Mortgage REIT 
A REIT that owns or makes loans secured by real estate. 
Net Asset Value (NAV) 
The net market value of a company's assets after deducting all its liabilities. 
Net Operating Income (NOI) 
A REIT’s NOI is also known as EBITDA, which is earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization. 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
 The New York Stock Exchange is the largest U. S. stock exchange located in New 
York City. 
Straight-line rents 
REITs straight line rents to comply with GAAP. Straight line rents average the tenant's 
rent over the life of the lease.  
Total Market Cap 
The total market value of a REIT's outstanding common stock and debt.  
UPREIT 
An UPREIT is formed when the partners of existing partnerships and a newly-
established REIT become partners in a new operating partnership. For each person’s 
interests in the operating partnership ("Units"), the partners contribute properties from 
existing partnerships, while the REIT contributes cash received during its public 
offering. The REIT is the general partner and owns the majority interest of the 
operating partnership. After one year, the partners have the same liquidity of the REIT 
shareholders by giving up their units for either cash or REIT shares. Converting to cash 
or units could result in the partners incurring the tax deferred when the UPREIT was 
formed. The holders of units may give them up over time to spread out any tax.  
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MARKET CAPITALIZATION OUTSTANDING – Table B-1 
 
      
(millions)  
 
Composite 
 
Equity 
 
Mortgage 
 
Hybrid 
End of Yr #REITs       Mk Cap #REITs        Cap #REITs       Cap #REITs      Cap 
1971 34 1494.3 12 332 12 570.8 10 591.6 
1972 46 1880.9 17 377.3 18 774.7 11 728.9 
1973 53 1393.5 20 336 22 517.3 11 540.2 
1974 53 712.4 19 241.9 22 238.8 12 231.7 
1975 46 899.7 12 275.7 22 312 12 312 
1976 62 1308 27 409.6 22 415.6 13 482.8 
1977 69 1528.1 32 538.1 19 398.3 18 591.6 
1978 71 1412.4 33 575.7 19 340.3 19 496.4 
1979 71 1754 32 743.6 19 377.1 20 633.3 
1980 75 2298.6 35 942.2 21 509.5 19 846.8 
1981 76 2438.9 36 977.5 21 541.3 19 920.1 
1982 66 3298.6 30 1071.4 20 1133.4 16 1093.8 
1983 59 4257.2 26 1468.6 19 1460 14 1328.7 
1984 59 5085.3 25 1794.5 20 1801.3 14 1489.4 
1985 82 7674 37 3270.3 32 3162.4 13 1241.2 
1986 96 9923.6 45 4336.1 35 3625.8 16 1961.7 
1987 110 9702.4 53 4758.5 38 3161.4 19 1782.4 
1988 117 11435.2 56 6141.7 40 3620.8 21 1672.6 
1989 120 11662.2 56 6769.6 43 3536.3 21 1356.3 
1990 119 8737.1 58 5551.6 43 2549.2 18 636.3 
1991 138 12968.2 86 8785.5 28 2586.3 24 1596.4 
1992 142 15912 89 11171.1 30 2772.8 23 1968.1 
1993 189 32158.7 135 26081.9 32 3398.5 22 2678.2 
1994 226 44306 175 38812 29 2502.7 22 2991.3 
1995 219 57541.3 178 49913 24 3395.4 17 4232.9 
1996 199 88776.3 166 78302 20 4778.6 13 5695.8 
1997 211 140533.8 176 127825.3 26 7370.3 9 5338.2 
1998 210 138301.4 173 126904.5 28 6480.7 9 4916.2 
1999 203 124261.9 167 118232.7 26 4441.7 10 1587.5 
2000 189 138715.4 158 134431 22 1632 9 2652.4 
2001 182 154898.6 151 147092.1 22 3990.5 9 3816 
2002 176 161937.3 149 151271.5 20 7146.4 7 3519.4 
2003 171 224211.9 144 204800.4 20 14186.5 7 5225 
2004 193 307894.7 153 275291 33 25964.3 7 6639.4 
2005 197 330691.3 152 301491 37 23393.7 8 5806.6 
2006 183 438071.1 138 400741.4 38 29195.3 7 8134.3 
2007 152 312009 118 288694.6 29 19054.1 5 4260.3 
2008 136 191651 113 176237.7 20 14280.5 3 1132.9 
2009 142 271199.2 115 248355.2 23 22103.2 4 740.8 
2010 153 389295.4 126 358908.2 27 30387.2 -- -- 
2011 160 450500.6 130 407528.9 30 42971.7 -- -- 
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Table B-2 Historical REIT Price and Return  
FTSE NAREIT US Real Estate Index Series
Annual Price and Total Returns by Investment Sector
1972 - 2011
FTSE NAREIT Equity REITs FTSE NAREIT Mortgage REITs
Total Price Total Price Total Price
Return (%) Index Return (%) Index Return (%) Index Return (%) Index Return (%) Index Return (%) Index
1971 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1972 11.19 111.19 3.84 103.84 8.01 108.01 1.08 101.08 12.17 112.17 4.34 104.34
1973 -27.22 80.93 -33.11 69.46 -15.52 91.25 -21.78 79.07 -36.26 71.50 -42.05 60.47
1974 -42.23 46.75 -49.55 35.04 -21.40 71.72 -29.33 55.88 -45.32 39.09 -53.96 27.84
1975 36.34 63.74 22.20 42.82 19.30 85.56 8.34 60.54 40.79 55.04 24.51 34.66
1976 48.97 94.96 36.53 58.47 47.59 126.28 36.21 82.46 51.71 83.50 38.41 47.97
1977 19.08 113.07 10.10 64.37 22.42 154.59 13.97 93.98 17.82 98.38 8.16 51.89
1978 -1.64 111.21 -9.42 58.31 10.34 170.57 2.66 96.48 -9.97 88.57 -17.86 42.62
1979 30.53 145.16 19.35 69.59 35.86 231.73 25.49 121.07 16.56 103.24 4.26 44.44
1980 28.02 185.84 11.07 77.30 24.37 288.20 1.95 123.42 16.80 120.58 3.29 45.90
1981 8.58 201.78 -1.02 76.51 6.00 305.50 -2.03 120.92 7.07 129.11 -5.54 43.36
1982 31.64 265.62 19.19 91.19 21.60 371.49 11.49 134.81 48.64 191.91 31.27 56.91
1983 25.47 333.28 15.11 104.97 30.64 485.30 21.01 163.13 16.90 224.34 5.56 60.08
1984 14.82 382.65 3.53 108.67 20.93 586.86 9.30 178.30 7.26 240.64 -4.54 57.35
1985 5.92 405.30 -3.52 104.84 19.10 698.93 9.62 195.45 -5.20 228.11 -15.33 48.55
1986 19.18 483.03 9.24 114.53 19.16 832.83 10.56 216.10 19.21 271.95 7.64 52.26
1987 -10.67 431.49 -19.01 92.76 -3.64 802.51 -10.31 193.82 -15.67 229.34 -25.70 38.83
1988 11.36 480.49 1.24 93.92 13.49 910.74 4.77 203.07 7.30 246.09 -5.12 36.84
1989 -1.81 471.78 -12.06 82.59 8.84 991.26 0.58 204.24 -15.90 206.95 -26.19 27.20
1990 -17.35 389.95 -28.49 59.05 -15.35 839.09 -26.45 150.21 -18.37 168.94 -29.18 19.26
1991 35.68 529.08 23.10 72.69 35.70 1,138.61 25.47 188.47 31.83 222.72 13.93 21.94
1992 12.18 593.49 2.87 74.78 14.59 1,304.73 6.40 200.54 1.92 226.99 -10.80 19.57
1993 18.55 703.57 10.58 82.69 19.65 1,561.17 12.95 226.51 14.55 260.01 -0.40 19.49
1994 0.81 709.24 -6.41 77.39 3.17 1,610.67 -3.52 218.55 -24.30 196.82 -33.83 12.90
1995 18.31 839.09 9.12 84.45 15.27 1,856.57 6.56 232.88 63.42 321.65 46.80 18.94
1996 35.75 1,139.10 26.52 106.84 35.27 2,511.32 26.35 294.24 50.86 485.25 37.21 25.98
1997 18.86 1,353.94 11.85 119.50 20.26 3,020.11 13.33 333.47 3.82 503.80 -3.57 25.05
1998 -18.82 1,099.09 -23.82 91.03 -17.50 2,491.53 -22.33 259.00 -29.22 356.60 -34.29 16.46
1999 -6.48 1,027.92 -14.06 78.23 -4.62 2,376.42 -12.21 227.37 -33.22 238.15 -40.12 9.86
2000 25.89 1,294.05 15.91 90.68 26.37 3,002.97 16.51 264.90 15.96 276.15 3.33 10.19
2001 15.50 1,494.65 7.05 97.07 13.93 3,421.37 5.85 280.40 77.34 489.74 46.37 14.91
2002 5.22 1,572.61 -2.15 94.98 3.82 3,552.10 -3.12 271.66 31.08 641.93 14.23 17.03
2003 38.47 2,177.53 29.34 122.85 37.13 4,871.12 28.48 349.02 57.39 1,010.33 38.19 23.54
2004 30.41 2,839.70 22.87 150.94 31.58 6,409.30 24.35 434.01 18.43 1,196.57 7.92 25.40
2005 8.29 3,075.06 2.51 154.73 12.16 7,188.85 6.67 462.98 -23.19 919.11 -30.88 17.56
2006 34.35 4,131.39 28.31 198.53 35.06 9,709.31 29.51 599.59 19.32 1,096.72 8.44 19.04
2007 -17.83 3,394.71 -21.39 156.07 -15.69 8,185.75 -19.05 485.36 -42.35 632.27 -47.69 9.96
2008 -37.34 2,127.27 -41.04 92.02 -37.73 5,097.46 -41.12 285.79 -31.31 434.31 -40.46 5.93
2009 27.45 2,711.15 19.90 110.33 27.99 6,524.25 21.28 346.60 24.63 541.28 8.26 6.42
2010 27.58 3,458.89 21.81 134.39 27.96 8,348.46 23.06 426.53 22.60 663.59 7.01 6.87
2011 7.28 3,710.61 2.37 137.57 8.29 9,040.81 4.32 444.95 -2.42 647.56 -15.14 5.83
FTSE NAREIT All REITs
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Table B-3 
 
 Investment Performance:
FTSE NAREIT US Real Estate Index Series
December 31, 2011
All REITs Equity REITs Mortgage REITs
Returns (%) Returns (%) Returns (%)
Period Total Price Total Price Total Price
Historical (compound annual rates at month-end)
1-Year 7.28 2.37 8.29 4.32 -2.42 -15.14
3-Year 20.38 14.34 21.05 15.90 14.24 -0.57
5-Year -2.13 -7.07 -1.42 -5.79 -10.00 -21.08
10-Year 9.52 3.55 10.20 4.73 2.83 -8.96
15-Year 8.19 1.70 8.91 2.80 1.94 -9.48
20-Year 10.23 3.24 10.92 4.39 5.48 -6.41
25-Year 8.50 0.74 10.01 2.93 3.53 -8.40
30-Year 10.19 1.97 11.95 4.44 5.52 -6.47
35-Year 11.04 2.47 12.98 4.93 6.03 -5.84
40-Year 9.46 0.80 11.92 3.80 4.78 -6.86  
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REITS IN THE S & P INDICES – Table B-4     
AS OF 1/12 
 
ENTRANCE 
REIT NAME TICKER DATE 
S&P 500   
AIMCO AIV 03/13/03 
Avalon Bay Communities AVB 01/09/07 
Boston Properties BXP 03/31/06 
Equity Residential EQR 11/01/01 
HCP, Inc. HCP 03/31/08 
Health Care REIT Inc. HCN 01/30/09 
Host Hotels & Resorts HST 03/19/07 
Kimco Realty Corporation KIM 04/03/06 
Plum Creek Timber Company, Inc. PCL 01/16/02 
Prologis PLD 07/16/03 
Public _GPLITA_0_GPLITA_0Storage, Inc. PSA 08/18/05 
Simon Property Group SPG 06/25/02 
Ventas, Inc. VTR 03/04/09 
Vornado VNO 08/11/05 
Weyerhaeuser         WY  Prior to REIT Status 
S&P 400   
Alexandria Real Estate Equities ARE 12/03/07 
BRE Properties, Inc. BRE 11/19/07 
Camden Property Trust CPT 11/19/07 
Corporate Office Properties Trust OFC 04/01/09 
Cousins Properties Incorporated CUZ 04/15/07 
Duke Realty Corporation DRE 09/28/07 
Equity One, Inc. EQY 05/31/07 
Essex Property Trust ESS 09/15/08 
Federal Realty Investment Trust FRT 12/20/07 
Highwoods Properties, Inc. HIW 10/07/03 
Hospitality Properties Trust HPT 10/01/01 
Liberty Property Trust LRY 12/11/02 
Macerich MAC 07/01/05 
Mack-Cali Realty Corporation CLI 03/19/03 
Nationwide Health Properties NHP 05/30/07 
Omega Healthcare Investors OHI 01/02/09 
Potlach Corporation PCH Prior to REIT Status 
Rayonier RYN Prior to REIT Status 
Realty Income Corporation O 11/13/07 
Regency Centers REG 04/25/05 
Senior Housing Properties Trust SNH 12/18/09 
SL Green Realty Corp. SLG 12/23/08 
Taubman Centers, Inc. TCO     01/13/11 
UDR UDR 01/27/03 
Weingarten Realty Investors WRI 11/10/04 
221 
 
 
REITS IN THE S & P INDICES – Table B-4 (cont.)     
AS OF 1/12 
 
ENTRANCE 
REIT NAME TICKER DATE 
  
 
  
S&P 600   
Acadia Realty Trust AKR 05/25/05 
BioMed Realty Trust BMR 11/06/07 
Cedar Shopping Centers CDR 08/05/08 
Colonial Properties Trust CLP 10/01/01 
Diamondrock Hospitality DRH 11/07/07 
EastGroup Properties, Inc. EGP 05/27/05 
Entertainment Properties Trust EPR 06/03/04 
Extra Space Storage EXR 12/31/07 
Franklin Street Properties Corp. FSP 01/02/09 
Getty Realty Corp. GTY 02/02/11 
Healthcare Realty Trust Inc. HR 07/16/09 
Home Properties HME 02/12/08 
Inland Real Estate Corporation IRC 10/02/06 
Kilroy Realty Corporation KRC 10/01/01 
Kite Realty Group Trust KRG 04/13/07 
LaSalle Hotel Properties LHO 07/15/08 
Lexington Realty Trust LXP 09/04/03 
LTC Properties, Inc. LTC 02/14/06 
Medical Properties Trust MPW 01/18/07 
MAA MAA 08/22/06 
National Retail Properties, Inc. NNN 02/01/04 
Parkway Properties PKY 10/29/04 
Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust PEI 03/05/08 
Post Properties PPS 10/16/08 
PS Business Parks, Inc. PSB 07/27/06 
Saul Centers BFS 12/17/10 
Sovran _GPLITA_1_GPLITA_1Self Storage SSS 07/08/04 
Tanger Factory Outlet Centers, Inc. SKT 04/16/07 
Universal Health Realty Income Trust UHT 09/27/10 
Urstadt Biddle Properties UBA 09/30/08 
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Exhibit B- 5 
 
 
Information provided by NAREIT. 
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Appendix:  C 
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Appendix C-1 
Domestic REIT Stock Cycles & Market Dynamics 
Comparison of Equity REIT Market Downturns 
 
 
The most recent downturn in the equity REIT market has been far more severe than any 
experienced previously. 
 
The downturn resulted from both softness in real estate operating fundamentals and the 
liquidity crisis. 
 
Information provided by Brad Case, NAREIT, 2011. 
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Appendix C-2 
Domestic REIT Stock Cycles & Market Dynamics 
Comparison of Equity REIT Market Expansions 
 
 
 
Expansion from the most recent downturn has been more rapid than historical expansions as it 
started from the liquidity crisis. 
 
Current expansion phase is far short of previous expansion cycles in terms of duration and 
ultimate return. 
 
Information provided by Brad Case, NAREIT, 2011. 
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Appendix C-3 
 
REITs Were Net Sellers During Peak Valuations  
Net Acquisitions 
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Information provided by Brad Case, NAREIT, 2011. 
 
 
 
 
227 
 
 
Appendix C-4 
 
Net Returns to Listed Equity REITs and Private Real Estate Investments over the 
Market Cycle 
 
 
Equity REIT returns exceed private equity real estate fund returns even over bull markets and 
relative to funds that use much greater leverage. 
 
 
Information provided by Brad Case, NAREIT, 2011. 
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Appendix C-5 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of Equity REIT Index Downturns 
 
 
 
 
 
Information provided by Brad Case, NAREIT, 2011. 
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Appendix C-6 
Historical Compound Annual Total Returns of REITs and Leading 
U.S. Benchmarks (%) 
 
 
 
 
Information provided by Brad Case, NAREIT, 2011. 
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Appendix C-7 
 
Long-Term Performance Distribution 
Distribution of Five-Year Average Annual Total Returns 
 
Data for 60-month periods ending from 12/31/1976 through 9/30/2011 
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Appendix C-8 
 
REITs Offer Strong Long-Term Net Returns 
Growth of $100 Million Invested on 12/31/1977 
Equity REITs 100 102.9199 105.9251 109.0181 112.2014 115.4776 118.8494 122.3198 125.8914
NCREIF NPI 100 101.8882 103.8121 105.7723 107.7695 109.8044 111.8778 113.9903 116.1426
NCREIF ODCE 100 101.7298 103.4895 105.2796 107.1007 108.9534 110.838 112.7553 114.7057
Townsend Value Added100 101.3239 102.6652 104.0244 105.4015 106.7969 108.2107 109.6433 111.0948
Townsend Opportunistic100 101.6801 103.3884 105.1255 106.8917 108.6876 110.5137 112.3704 114.2583
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Information provided by Brad Case, NAREIT, 2011. 
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Appendix C-9 
 
4
REIT Returns Have Little in Common with any Non-REIT 
Stocks
Correlation coefficients based on monthly data, January 1991 – September 2011
Note: Based on monthly returns
Source: NAREIT®
S&P 500/Citigroup Growth
(Large-Cap Growth)
43.6%
Standard & Poor’s 500
(Large-Cap)
54.8%
S&P 500/Citigroup Value
(Large-Cap Value)
62.3%
FTSE NAREIT Equity REIT
Russell Midcap/Growth
(Mid-Cap Growth)
46.7%
Wilshire Total Market
(formerly DJ Wilshire 5000)
57.4%
Russell Midcap/Value
(Mid-Cap Value)
73.6%
Russell 2000 Growth
(Small-Cap Growth)
51.4%
S&P Financials Sector
63.8%
Russell 2000 Value
(Small-Cap Value)
76.3%
 
Information provided by Brad Case, NAREIT, 2011. 
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Appendix C-10 
REIT Dividend Growth v. Consumer Price Index 
1992-2010 
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Note: cash dividends declined by 25.3% during 2009, and increased by 47.5% during 2010 
 
Information provided by Brad Case, NAREIT, 2011. 
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Appendix C-11 
 
6
Total and Price Return Index, January 1990 – September 2011
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Information provided by Brad Case, NAREIT, 2011. 
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Appendix C-12 
REITs Provide Much Greater Capital Appreciation than Most 
Other Real Estate Investments 
Capital Appreciation Component of Total Return
Through the Real Estate Market Cycle, 1989/1990 - 2007/2008
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Information provided by Brad Case, NAREIT, 2011. 
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Appendix D-1 
 
FDIC DIVISION OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS 
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Appendix D-2 
 
FDIC DIVISION OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS 
 
 
 
239 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D-3 
 
FDIC DIVISION OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS 
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Appendix:  E 
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Appendix E 
TABLE E -1  DESCRIPTION OF RATIOS FOR COMPUSTAT DATA 
  
 
  
RATIO DESCRIPTIONS CALCULATION 
FFOSH Funds from Operations (FFO) per 
share =FFO/Shares Outstanding 
  
 
  
FFOMUL Funds from Operations (FFO) 
Multiple =Price/FFO per share 
  
 
  
FFOPAY Funds from Operations (FFO) Payout =FFO per share/Net Income per share 
  
 
  
DIVSH Dividends per share =Annual Dividends/Shares Outstanding 
  
 
  
DIVYLD Dividend Yield =Annual Dividends per share/Price per share 
  
 
  
DIVPAY Dividend Payout =Annual Dividends per share/Net Income  per share 
  
 
  
DEBT Debt Ratio =Total Debt/Total Assets 
  
 
  
LEV Leverage Ratio =Total Debt/Total Equity 
  
 
  
ASSETGR Growth in Total Assets =End of Year Total Assets - Beginning of Year Total Assets 
  
 
   /Beginning of Year Total Assets 
  
 
  
REVGR 
Growth in Total Revenue 
=End of Year Total Revenue - Beginning of Year Total 
Revenue 
  
 
   /Beginning of Year Total Revenue 
  
 
  
CASH Cash to Assets Ratio =Total Cash & ST Investments/Total Assets 
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Table E-2  Mean Values for All Other Companies, 
3 Companies Combined, Winthrop, Penn. REIT & Wash. REIT 
 
ENTITY FFOSH FFOPAY FFOMUL DIVPAY DIVSH DIVYLD DEBT LEV ASSETGR REVGR CASH 
ALLCOS 1.472 1.189 8.496 0.173 1.108 0.076 0.478 2.044 0.162 0.188 0.050 
3COS 1.661 0.800 11.838 0.407 1.125 0.066 0.557 2.063 0.186 0.525 0.075 
FUR 1.201 0.196 2.799 0.103 0.849 0.072 0.629 2.309 0.099 0.144 0.057 
PEI 1.994 0.328 16.795 0.197 1.331 0.067 0.594 2.445 0.309 0.533 0.100 
WRE 1.632 1.670 13.122 0.876 1.145 0.060 0.462 1.499 0.131 0.829 0.066 
Table provides mean values for 11 select ratios for the 50-year period from 1960 – 2010. 
 
 
ALLCOS – All other REITs, not including Winthrop, Pennsylvania REIT, and Washington REIT 
3COS – The three companies of Winthrop, Pennsylvania REIT, and Washington REIT combined 
FUR – Ticker symbol for Winthrop Realty Trust 
PEI – Ticker symbol for Pennsylvania REIT 
WRE – Ticker symbol for Washington REIT 
 
Note:  Data is taken from Compustat, with manual input for Pennsylvania REIT and Washington REIT 
for years prior to 1971 when companies were not listed on an active stock exchange.  Data for this early 
period could not be obtained for Winthrop. 
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Table E-3 Detail Information for Mean  
Winthrop, Penn. REIT & Wash. REIT 
 
  
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
FFOSH FUR 33 1.201 1.680 -3.660 6.084 
PEI 50 1.994 1.227 0.000 4.173 
WRE 50 1.632 0.867 0.086 5.756 
FFOMUL FUR 33 2.799 22.472 -101.724 25.556 
PEI 48 16.795 17.232 2.004 77.725 
WRE 47 13.122 4.580 2.410 23.804 
FFOPAY FUR 33 0.196 0.189 -0.029 0.544 
PEI 50 0.328 0.312 -0.358 0.998 
WRE 50 1.670 3.522 0.027 16.829 
DIVSH FUR 41 0.849 0.511 0.059 1.991 
PEI 50 1.331 0.810 0.000 2.637 
WRE 50 1.145 0.478 0.000 2.520 
DIVYLD FUR 41 0.072 0.031 0.018 0.147 
PEI 50 0.067 0.050 0.000 0.305 
WRE 47 0.060 0.015 0.032 0.103 
DIVPAY FUR 41 0.103 0.120 -0.060 0.396 
PEI 50 0.197 0.186 -0.219 0.594 
WRE 49 0.876 1.652 0.021 7.301 
DEBT FUR 37 0.629 0.091 0.454 0.777 
PEI 50 0.594 0.210 0.146 0.855 
WRE 48 0.462 0.239 0.000 0.862 
LEV FUR 37 2.309 0.783 0.937 3.909 
PEI 50 2.445 1.658 0.178 6.945 
WRE 50 1.499 1.732 0.000 6.688 
ASSETGR FUR 40 0.099 0.331 -0.599 1.254 
PEI 49 0.309 0.856 -0.415 4.408 
WRE 46 0.131 0.171 -0.127 0.513 
REVGR FUR 40 0.144 0.937 -1.938 4.554 
PEI 49 0.533 2.284 -0.415 15.650 
WRE 49 0.829 2.682 -0.033 15.650 
CASH FUR 41 0.057 0.064 0.001 0.285 
PEI 50 0.100 0.149 0.003 0.485 
WRE 48 0.066 0.083 0.002 0.301 
 
FUR – Ticker symbol for Winthrop Realty Trust 
PEI – Ticker symbol for Pennsylvania REIT 
WRE – Ticker symbol for Washington REIT 
 
Note:  Data is taken from Compustat, with manual input for PREIT and WRIT for years prior to 1971 
when companies were not listed.  Data for this early period could not be obtained for Winthrop. 
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Table E-3A Pearson Correlation Statistics for Selected Ratios 
 FFOSH FFOPY FFOM DIVPA DIVSH DIVYD DEBT DTEQ ASGR RVGR CASH 
Stat, FFOSH 1.000                     
FFOPY -.077 1.000                   
FFOM -.130 .040 1.000                 
DIVPA -.096 .980** .040 1.000               
DIVSH .694** -0.279** -.212** -.218** 1.000             
DIVYD 268** -.135 -.356** -.087 .522** 1.000           
DEBT -.014 .363** .095 .356** -.218** .008 1.000         
LEV -.133 .566** .202** .496** -.429** -.198** .840** 1.000       
ASGR -.077 -.036 .448** -.032 -.161* -.232** .076 
0.007 
1.000     
RVGR -.097 .066 .332** .102 -.156' -.103 .089 .001 .645** 1.000   
CASH .012 -.127 .011 -.122 .089 -.086 -.551** -.414** -.027 -.049 1.000 
Sig. 
(1-
tail) 
FFOSH                       
FFOPY .268                     
FFOM .064 .565                   
DIVPA .162 .000 .567                 
DIVSH .000 .000 .002 .001               
DIVYD .000 .053 .000 .185 .000             
DEBT .834 .000 .180 .000 .001 .902           
LEV .051 .000 .004 .000 .000 .003 .000         
ASGR .266 .615 .000 .627 .014 .000 .252 0.922       
RVGR .153 .346 .000 .117 .017 .116 .177 .991 .000     
CASH .863 .070 .876 .061 .171 .189 .000 .000 .684 .459   
 
Ratio Key: 
 
FFOSH –FFO per share    DEBT – Debt to Assets 
FFOPY – FFO Payable    LEV – Debt to Equity 
FFOM – FFO Multiple    ASGR – Asset Growth 
DIVPA – Dividend Payout   RVGR – Revenue Growth 
DIVSH – Dividend per share   CASH – Cash to Assets 
DIVYLD – Dividend Yield 
 
Note:  FFOPY and DIVPA – showed high correlation of .98. 
           DEBT and LEV - showed high correlation of .84 
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TABLE E-4 ANOVA BY ENTITY 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
FFOSH Between 
Groups 
17.451 4 4.363 3.816 0.005 
Within 
Groups 
242.368 212 1.143     
Total 259.819 216       
FFOPAY Between 
Groups 
60.177 4 15.044 3.968 0.004 
Within 
Groups 
765.833 202 3.791     
Total 826.010 206       
FFOMUL Between 
Groups 
5093.190 4 1273.297 6.055 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
41845.293 199 210.278     
Total 46938.483 203       
DIVPAY Between 
Groups 
18.221 4 4.555 6.522 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
162.047 232 0.698     
Total 180.268 236       
DIVSH Between 
Groups 
8.670 4 2.168 7.275 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
69.421 233 0.298     
Total 78.091 237       
DIVYLD Between 
Groups 
0.006 4 0.002 1.360 0.249 
Within 
Groups 
0.262 230 0.001     
Total 0.268 234       
DEBT Between 
Groups 
0.995 4 0.249 7.840 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
7.267 229 0.032     
Total 8.263 233       
LEV Between 
Groups 
27.271 4 6.818 3.497 0.009 
Within 
Groups 
444.530 228 1.950     
Total 471.801 232       
ASSETGR Between 
Groups 
1.294 4 0.323 1.177 0.322 
Within 
Groups 
62.652 228 0.275     
Total 63.946 232       
REVGR Between 
Groups 
14.965 4 3.741 0.968 0.426 
Within 
Groups 
892.384 231 3.863     
Total 907.349 235       
CASH Between 
Groups 
0.055 4 0.014 1.636 0.166 
Within 
Groups 
1.958 233 0.008     
Total 2.013 237       
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TABLE E-5  ANOVA BY YEAR 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
FFOSH Between 
Groups 
95.937 49 1.958 1.995 0.001 
Within 
Groups 
163.882 167 0.981     
Total 259.819 216       
FFOPAY Between 
Groups 
467.046 49 9.532 4.169 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
358.964 157 2.286     
Total 826.010 206       
FFOMUL Between 
Groups 
26592.732 47 565.803 4.338 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
20345.751 156 130.421     
Total 46938.483 203       
DIVPAY Between 
Groups 
72.292 50 1.446 2.491 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
107.976 186 0.581     
Total 180.268 236       
DIVSH Between 
Groups 
37.096 50 0.742 3.384 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
40.995 187 0.219     
Total 78.091 237       
DIVYLD Between 
Groups 
0.171 50 0.003 6.481 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
0.097 184 0.001     
Total 0.268 234       
DEBT Between 
Groups 
4.703 50 0.094 4.835 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
3.560 183 0.019     
Total 8.263 233       
LEV Between 
Groups 
324.321 49 6.619 8.213 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
147.480 183 0.806     
Total 471.801 232       
ASSETGR Between 
Groups 
35.102 49 0.716 4.545 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
28.844 183 0.158     
Total 63.946 232       
REVGR Between 
Groups 
406.138 49 8.289 3.076 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
501.211 186 2.695     
Total 907.349 235       
CASH Between 
Groups 
0.920 50 0.018 3.144 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
1.094 187 0.006     
Total 2.013 237       
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TABLE E-6 ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY  
Tukey HSD 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
ENTITY 
(J) 
ENTITY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
FFOSH ALLCOS 3COS -.254451 .232170 .808 -.89324 .38434 
FUR .217737 .254419 .913 -.48227 .91775 
PEI -.658513
*
 .232170 .040 -1.29731 -.01972 
WRE -.214063 .230109 .885 -.84719 .41906 
3COS ALLCOS .254451 .232170 .808 -.38434 .89324 
FUR .472188 .241788 .293 -.19307 1.13744 
PEI -.404063 .218255 .347 -1.00457 .19644 
WRE .040388 .216062 1.000 -.55408 .63486 
FUR ALLCOS -.217737 .254419 .913 -.91775 .48227 
3COS -.472188 .241788 .293 -1.13744 .19307 
PEI -.876250
*
 .241788 .003 -1.54151 -.21099 
WRE -.431800 .239810 .376 -1.09161 .22801 
PEI ALLCOS .658513
*
 .232170 .040 .01972 1.29731 
3COS .404063 .218255 .347 -.19644 1.00457 
FUR .876250
*
 .241788 .003 .21099 1.54151 
WRE .444450 .216062 .243 -.15002 1.03892 
WRE ALLCOS .214063 .230109 .885 -.41906 .84719 
3COS -.040388 .216062 1.000 -.63486 .55408 
FUR .431800 .239810 .376 -.22801 1.09161 
PEI -.444450 .216062 .243 -1.03892 .15002 
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TABLE E-6 ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY 
Tukey HSD 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
ENTITY 
(J) 
ENTITY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 
FFOPAY ALLCOS 3COS -.072179 .463019 1.000 -1.34667 1.20232 
FUR .572617 .500288 .783 -.80446 1.94970 
PEI .427030 .463019 .888 -.84746 1.70152 
WRE -.902929 .459594 .287 -2.16800 .36214 
3COS ALLCOS .072179 .463019 1.000 -1.20232 1.34667 
FUR .644795 .440308 .587 -.56718 1.85678 
PEI .499208 .397453 .718 -.59481 1.59323 
WRE -.830750 .393458 .219 -1.91377 .25227 
FUR ALLCOS -.572617 .500288 .783 -1.94970 .80446 
3COS -.644795 .440308 .587 -1.85678 .56718 
PEI -.145587 .440308 .997 -1.35757 1.06639 
WRE -
1.475545
*
 
.436705 .008 -2.67761 -.27348 
PEI ALLCOS -.427030 .463019 .888 -1.70152 .84746 
3COS -.499208 .397453 .718 -1.59323 .59481 
FUR .145587 .440308 .997 -1.06639 1.35757 
WRE -
1.329958
*
 
.393458 .008 -2.41298 -.24693 
WRE ALLCOS .902929 .459594 .287 -.36214 2.16800 
3COS .830750 .393458 .219 -.25227 1.91377 
FUR 1.475545
*
 .436705 .008 .27348 2.67761 
PEI 1.329958
*
 .393458 .008 .24693 2.41298 
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TABLE E-6 ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY 
Tukey HSD 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
ENTITY 
(J) 
ENTITY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 
FFOMUL ALLCOS 3COS -8.014446 3.448291 .142 -
17.50743 
1.47853 
FUR 3.670535 3.725853 .862 -6.58656 13.92763 
PEI -
10.324863
*
 
3.448291 .026 -
19.81784 
-.83188 
WRE -6.652199 3.461780 .309 -
16.18231 
2.87791 
3COS ALLCOS 8.014446 3.448291 .142 -1.47853 17.50743 
FUR 11.684981
*
 3.279153 .004 2.65763 20.71233 
PEI -2.310417 2.959996 .936 -
10.45914 
5.83831 
WRE 1.362247 2.975699 .991 -6.82971 9.55420 
FUR ALLCOS -3.670535 3.725853 .862 -
13.92763 
6.58656 
3COS -
11.684981
*
 
3.279153 .004 -
20.71233 
-2.65763 
PEI -
13.995398
*
 
3.279153 .000 -
23.02275 
-4.96805 
WRE -
10.322734
*
 
3.293335 .017 -
19.38912 
-1.25634 
PEI ALLCOS 10.324863
*
 3.448291 .026 .83188 19.81784 
3COS 2.310417 2.959996 .936 -5.83831 10.45914 
FUR 13.995398
*
 3.279153 .000 4.96805 23.02275 
WRE 3.672664 2.975699 .731 -4.51929 11.86462 
WRE ALLCOS 6.652199 3.461780 .309 -2.87791 16.18231 
3COS -1.362247 2.975699 .991 -9.55420 6.82971 
FUR 10.322734
*
 3.293335 .017 1.25634 19.38912 
PEI -3.672664 2.975699 .731 -
11.86462 
4.51929 
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TABLE E-6 ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY 
Tukey HSD 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
ENTITY 
(J) 
ENTITY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 
DIVPAY ALLCOS 3COS -.211271 .168069 .718 -.67335 .25081 
FUR .104252 .175305 .976 -.37772 .58623 
PEI .003292 .168069 1.000 -.45879 .46537 
WRE -
.668048
*
 
.167184 .001 -1.12769 -.20840 
3COS ALLCOS .211271 .168069 .718 -.25081 .67335 
FUR .315523 .177729 .391 -.17312 .80416 
PEI .214563 .170597 .717 -.25447 .68359 
WRE -.456777 .169724 .058 -.92341 .00986 
FUR ALLCOS -.104252 .175305 .976 -.58623 .37772 
3COS -.315523 .177729 .391 -.80416 .17312 
PEI -.100960 .177729 .980 -.58960 .38768 
WRE -
.772300
*
 
.176892 .000 -1.25864 -.28596 
PEI ALLCOS -.003292 .168069 1.000 -.46537 .45879 
3COS -.214563 .170597 .717 -.68359 .25447 
FUR .100960 .177729 .980 -.38768 .58960 
WRE -
.671339
*
 
.169724 .001 -1.13797 -.20471 
WRE ALLCOS .668048
*
 .167184 .001 .20840 1.12769 
3COS .456777 .169724 .058 -.00986 .92341 
FUR .772300
*
 .176892 .000 .28596 1.25864 
PEI .671339
*
 .169724 .001 .20471 1.13797 
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TABLE E-6 ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY 
Tukey HSD 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
ENTITY 
(J) 
ENTITY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 
DIVSH ALLCOS 3COS -.249825 .109769 .156 -.55161 .05196 
FUR .056107 .114495 .988 -.25867 .37088 
PEI -
.480596
*
 
.109769 .000 -.78238 -.17881 
WRE -.239337 .108632 .182 -.53800 .05932 
3COS ALLCOS .249825 .109769 .156 -.05196 .55161 
FUR .305931 .116078 .067 -.01320 .62506 
PEI -.230771 .111420 .236 -.53709 .07555 
WRE .010488 .110300 1.000 -.29276 .31373 
FUR ALLCOS -.056107 .114495 .988 -.37088 .25867 
3COS -.305931 .116078 .067 -.62506 .01320 
PEI -
.536702
*
 
.116078 .000 -.85583 -.21757 
WRE -.295444 .115004 .080 -.61162 .02073 
PEI ALLCOS .480596
*
 .109769 .000 .17881 .78238 
3COS .230771 .111420 .236 -.07555 .53709 
FUR .536702
*
 .116078 .000 .21757 .85583 
WRE .241258 .110300 .188 -.06198 .54450 
WRE ALLCOS .239337 .108632 .182 -.05932 .53800 
3COS -.010488 .110300 1.000 -.31373 .29276 
FUR .295444 .115004 .080 -.02073 .61162 
PEI -.241258 .110300 .188 -.54450 .06198 
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TABLE E-6 ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY 
Tukey HSD 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
ENTITY 
(J) 
ENTITY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 
DIVYLD ALLCOS 3COS -.004522 .006787 .963 -.02318 .01414 
FUR -.011932 .007079 .445 -.03140 .00753 
PEI -.011439 .006787 .445 -.03010 .00722 
WRE -.000406 .006824 1.000 -.01917 .01836 
3COS ALLCOS .004522 .006787 .963 -.01414 .02318 
FUR -.007410 .007177 .840 -.02714 .01232 
PEI -.006917 .006889 .853 -.02586 .01203 
WRE .004116 .006926 .976 -.01493 .02316 
FUR ALLCOS .011932 .007079 .445 -.00753 .03140 
3COS .007410 .007177 .840 -.01232 .02714 
PEI .000493 .007177 1.000 -.01924 .02023 
WRE .011526 .007212 .500 -.00830 .03136 
PEI ALLCOS .011439 .006787 .445 -.00722 .03010 
3COS .006917 .006889 .853 -.01203 .02586 
FUR -.000493 .007177 1.000 -.02023 .01924 
WRE .011033 .006926 .503 -.00801 .03008 
WRE ALLCOS .000406 .006824 1.000 -.01836 .01917 
3COS -.004116 .006926 .976 -.02316 .01493 
FUR -.011526 .007212 .500 -.03136 .00830 
PEI -.011033 .006926 .503 -.03008 .00801 
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TABLE E-6 ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY 
Tukey HSD 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
ENTITY 
(J) 
ENTITY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 
DEBT ALLCOS 3COS -.094699 .035825 .066 -.19320 .00381 
FUR -
.156472
*
 
.038470 .001 -.26225 -.05069 
PEI -
.122024
*
 
.035454 .006 -.21951 -.02454 
WRE .009676 .035825 .999 -.08883 .10818 
3COS ALLCOS .094699 .035825 .066 -.00381 .19320 
FUR -.061774 .038973 .508 -.16893 .04539 
PEI -.027325 .035998 .942 -.12631 .07166 
WRE .104375
*
 .036363 .036 .00439 .20436 
FUR ALLCOS .156472
*
 .038470 .001 .05069 .26225 
3COS .061774 .038973 .508 -.04539 .16893 
PEI .034449 .038632 .900 -.07177 .14067 
WRE .166149
*
 .038973 .000 .05899 .27331 
PEI ALLCOS .122024
*
 .035454 .006 .02454 .21951 
3COS .027325 .035998 .942 -.07166 .12631 
FUR -.034449 .038632 .900 -.14067 .07177 
WRE .131700
*
 .035998 .003 .03272 .23068 
WRE ALLCOS -.009676 .035825 .999 -.10818 .08883 
3COS -
.104375
*
 
.036363 .036 -.20436 -.00439 
FUR -
.166149
*
 
.038973 .000 -.27331 -.05899 
PEI -
.131700
*
 
.035998 .003 -.23068 -.03272 
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TABLE E-6 ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY 
Tukey HSD 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
ENTITY 
(J) 
ENTITY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 
LEV ALLCOS 3COS .011646 .285022 1.000 -.77209 .79538 
FUR -.063938 .305472 1.000 -.90390 .77603 
PEI -.199608 .282157 .955 -.97546 .57625 
WRE .747392 .282157 .065 -.02846 1.52325 
3COS ALLCOS -.011646 .285022 1.000 -.79538 .77209 
FUR -.075584 .305472 .999 -.91555 .76438 
PEI -.211254 .282157 .945 -.98711 .56460 
WRE .735746 .282157 .072 -.04011 1.51160 
FUR ALLCOS .063938 .305472 1.000 -.77603 .90390 
3COS .075584 .305472 .999 -.76438 .91555 
PEI -.135670 .302801 .992 -.96829 .69695 
WRE .811330 .302801 .060 -.02129 1.64395 
PEI ALLCOS .199608 .282157 .955 -.57625 .97546 
3COS .211254 .282157 .945 -.56460 .98711 
FUR .135670 .302801 .992 -.69695 .96829 
WRE .947000
*
 .279263 .007 .17910 1.71490 
WRE ALLCOS -.747392 .282157 .065 -1.52325 .02846 
3COS -.735746 .282157 .072 -1.51160 .04011 
FUR -.811330 .302801 .060 -1.64395 .02129 
PEI -
.947000
*
 
.279263 .007 -1.71490 -.17910 
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TABLE E-6 ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY 
Tukey HSD 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
ENTITY 
(J) 
ENTITY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 
ASSETGR ALLCOS 3COS -.062229 .105927 .977 -.35350 .22904 
FUR .073100 .111201 .965 -.23267 .37887 
PEI -.136816 .105375 .692 -.42657 .15294 
WRE .041348 .107096 .995 -.25314 .33583 
3COS ALLCOS .062229 .105927 .977 -.22904 .35350 
FUR .135329 .112226 .748 -.17326 .44392 
PEI -.074587 .106456 .956 -.36731 .21814 
WRE .103577 .108160 .874 -.19383 .40099 
FUR ALLCOS -.073100 .111201 .965 -.37887 .23267 
3COS -.135329 .112226 .748 -.44392 .17326 
PEI -.209916 .111704 .331 -.51707 .09724 
WRE -.031752 .113329 .999 -.34338 .27987 
PEI ALLCOS .136816 .105375 .692 -.15294 .42657 
3COS .074587 .106456 .956 -.21814 .36731 
FUR .209916 .111704 .331 -.09724 .51707 
WRE .178164 .107618 .464 -.11776 .47409 
WRE ALLCOS -.041348 .107096 .995 -.33583 .25314 
3COS -.103577 .108160 .874 -.40099 .19383 
FUR .031752 .113329 .999 -.27987 .34338 
PEI -.178164 .107618 .464 -.47409 .11776 
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TABLE E-6 ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY 
Tukey HSD 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
ENTITY 
(J) 
ENTITY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 
REVGR ALLCOS 3COS -.380598 .397171 .873 -1.47260 .71140 
FUR .058590 .416942 1.000 -1.08777 1.20495 
PEI -.330368 .395098 .919 -1.41667 .75593 
WRE -.626821 .395098 .508 -1.71312 .45948 
3COS ALLCOS .380598 .397171 .873 -.71140 1.47260 
FUR .439188 .420785 .835 -.71774 1.59611 
PEI .050229 .399151 1.000 -1.04721 1.14767 
WRE -.246224 .399151 .972 -1.34367 .85122 
FUR ALLCOS -.058590 .416942 1.000 -1.20495 1.08777 
3COS -.439188 .420785 .835 -1.59611 .71774 
PEI -.388958 .418829 .886 -1.54051 .76259 
WRE -.685411 .418829 .476 -1.83696 .46614 
PEI ALLCOS .330368 .395098 .919 -.75593 1.41667 
3COS -.050229 .399151 1.000 -1.14767 1.04721 
FUR .388958 .418829 .886 -.76259 1.54051 
WRE -.296453 .397088 .945 -1.38823 .79532 
WRE ALLCOS .626821 .395098 .508 -.45948 1.71312 
3COS .246224 .399151 .972 -.85122 1.34367 
FUR .685411 .418829 .476 -.46614 1.83696 
PEI .296453 .397088 .945 -.79532 1.38823 
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TABLE E-6 ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY 
Tukey HSD 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
ENTITY 
(J) 
ENTITY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
 
CASH ALLCOS 3COS -.011457 .018437 .972 -.06214 .03923 
FUR .005728 .019230 .998 -.04714 .05860 
PEI -.037486 .018246 .244 -.08765 .01268 
WRE -.003728 .018437 1.000 -.05442 .04696 
3COS ALLCOS .011457 .018437 .972 -.03923 .06214 
FUR .017185 .019496 .904 -.03642 .07079 
PEI -.026029 .018526 .625 -.07696 .02490 
WRE .007729 .018714 .994 -.04372 .05918 
FUR ALLCOS -.005728 .019230 .998 -.05860 .04714 
3COS -.017185 .019496 .904 -.07079 .03642 
PEI -.043215 .019316 .170 -.09632 .00989 
WRE -.009456 .019496 .989 -.06306 .04414 
PEI ALLCOS .037486 .018246 .244 -.01268 .08765 
3COS .026029 .018526 .625 -.02490 .07696 
FUR .043215 .019316 .170 -.00989 .09632 
WRE .033758 .018526 .363 -.01717 .08469 
WRE ALLCOS .003728 .018437 1.000 -.04696 .05442 
3COS -.007729 .018714 .994 -.05918 .04372 
FUR .009456 .019496 .989 -.04414 .06306 
PEI -.033758 .018526 .363 -.08469 .01717 
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TABLE E-7 Detail Information for Mean 
 
Winthrop, Penn. REIT & Wash. REIT 1971 - 2010 
  
  
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum   
FFOSHARE FUR 33 1.20000 1.680400 -3.660 6.080 
  PEI 40 2.44775 .910124 .270 4.170 
  WRE 40 1.78675 .848360 .850 5.760 
FFOPAY FUR 33 .19545 .188565 -.030 .540 
  PEI 40 .33275 .337175 -.360 1.000 
  WRE 40 .32825 .516779 .030 2.410 
FFOMULT FUR 33 2.79939 22.471147 -101.720 25.560 
  PEI 40 9.97525 5.705032 2.000 38.680 
  WRE 40 13.65425 4.464771 2.410 23.800 
DIVPAY FUR 40 .09600 .111581 -.060 .350 
  PEI 40 .21675 .199851 -.220 .590 
  WRE 40 .19925 .257765 .020 .900 
DIVPERSH FUR 40 .85275 .516100 .060 1.990 
  PEI 40 1.64800 .556146 .080 2.640 
  WRE 40 1.30725 .366347 .800 2.520 
DIVYLD FUR 40 .07200 .030651 .020 .150 
  PEI 40 .08375 .044589 .010 .310 
  WRE 40 .06150 .014242 .040 .100 
DEBTASSET FUR 36 .63167 .090790 .450 .780 
  PEI 40 .55725 .209700 .150 .790 
  WRE 40 .39450 .199666 .000 .700 
DEBTEQ FUR 36 2.34278 .767689 .940 3.910 
  PEI 40 2.03400 1.268655 .180 4.430 
  WRE 40 .90650 .683320 .000 2.720 
ASSETGR FUR 40 .09890 .330809 -.599 1.254 
  PEI 40 .17278 .554885 -.415 2.816 
  WRE 40 .12420 .156190 -.127 .471 
REVGR FUR 40 .14375 .936887 -1.938 4.554 
  PEI 40 .12468 .227603 -.415 1.161 
  WRE 40 .61114 2.517567 -.033 15.650 
CASHASSET FUR 40 .05750 .064081 .000 .280 
  PEI 40 .11000 .162670 .000 .490 
  
WRE 40 .07425 .087703 .000 .300 
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TABLE E-8  ANOVA by Entity 1971 – 2010 
  Sum of Sq df Mean Sq F Sig. 
FFOSH Between 
Groups 
34.409 4 8.602 8.502 .000 
Within 
Groups 
188.185 186 1.012     
Total 222.594 190       
FFOPAY Between 
Groups 
5.846 4 1.461 8.455 .000 
Within 
Groups 
30.424 176 .173     
Total 36.269 180       
FFOMUL Between 
Groups 
2392.637 4 598.159 5.059 .001 
Within 
Groups 
20811.539 176 118.247     
Total 23204.175 180       
DIVPAY Between 
Groups 
.465 4 .116 3.290 .012 
Within 
Groups 
6.886 195 .035     
Total 7.351 199       
DIVSH Between 
Groups 
14.822 4 3.705 21.066 .000 
Within 
Groups 
34.300 195 .176     
Total 49.122 199       
DIVYLD Between 
Groups 
.010 4 .003 2.932 .022 
Within 
Groups 
.167 195 .001     
Total .178 199       
DEBT Between 
Groups 
1.193 4 .298 12.115 .000 
Within 
Groups 
4.701 191 .025     
Total 5.894 195       
LEV Between 
Groups 
46.471 4 11.618 17.384 .000 
Within 
Groups 
127.649 191 .668     
Total 174.120 195       
ASSETGR Between 
Groups 
.119 4 .030 .279 .891 
Within 
Groups 
20.724 195 .106     
Total 20.843 199       
REVGR Between 
Groups 
6.470 4 1.618 1.007 .405 
Within 
Groups 
313.203 195 1.606     
Total 319.673 199       
CASH Between 
Groups 
.083 4 .021 2.231 .067 
Within 
Groups 
1.812 195 .009     
Total 1.895 199   
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TABLE E-9  PENNSYLVANIA REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST RATIOS 1961 -2010 
            YEAR FFOSH FFOMUL FFOPAY DIVPAY DIVPERSH DIVYLD DEBT LEV ASSETGR REVGR CASH 
1961 
      
0.454 0.874 
  
0.171 
1962 
      
0.526 1.126 2.599 4.040 0.161 
1963 0.130 77.725 0.297 0.183 0.080 0.008 0.681 2.299 4.408 15.650 0.035 
1964 0.169 64.222 0.452 0.213 0.080 0.007 0.783 4.063 0.480 0.422 0.031 
1965 0.202 53.199 0.546 0.216 0.080 0.007 0.848 6.473 0.423 0.229 0.024 
1966 0.252 40.243 0.547 0.172 0.079 0.008 0.855 6.945 0.097 0.322 0.022 
1967 0.260 39.438 0.411 0.115 0.073 0.007 0.815 4.831 0.037 0.133 0.033 
1968 0.236 56.612 0.305 0.102 0.079 0.006 0.840 4.987 0.029 0.102 0.022 
1969 0.245 39.295 0.260 0.082 0.077 0.008 0.809 4.635 0.081 0.095 0.063 
1970 0.261 36.414 0.239 0.073 0.079 0.008 0.808 4.666 0.066 0.122 0.047 
1971 0.271 38.683 0.213 0.066 0.085 0.008 0.790 4.178 -0.036 0.060 0.029 
1972 1.412 9.298 0.941 0.594 0.892 0.068 0.784 4.035 0.080 0.064 0.012 
1973 1.479 8.116 0.803 0.557 1.026 0.086 0.752 3.337 0.143 0.133 0.010 
1974 2.265 3.257 0.998 0.507 1.150 0.156 0.740 3.217 0.013 0.101 0.009 
1975 1.760 5.541 0.842 0.550 1.150 0.118 0.738 3.162 0.006 -0.039 0.010 
1976 1.583 8.843 0.626 0.455 1.149 0.082 0.737 3.099 0.027 0.105 0.010 
1977 2.021 7.360 0.858 0.488 1.150 0.077 0.732 3.052 0.027 0.097 0.010 
1978 2.813 5.776 0.808 0.359 1.250 0.077 0.701 2.600 -0.034 0.113 0.102 
1979 2.665 8.865 0.789 0.458 1.547 0.066 0.693 2.486 0.051 0.095 0.094 
1980 2.874 8.567 0.792 0.523 1.900 0.077 0.485 0.988 -0.415 -0.415 0.116 
1981 2.776 8.779 0.802 0.578 2.000 0.082 0.416 0.747 -0.105 0.101 0.051 
1982 3.973 7.206 0.831 0.460 2.200 0.077 0.386 0.672 0.026 0.197 0.081 
1983 2.648 9.913 0.526 0.345 1.735 0.066 0.651 2.006 0.841 0.090 0.486 
1984 3.894 7.961 0.495 0.248 1.948 0.063 0.607 1.711 0.039 0.292 0.424 
1985 1.958 13.410 0.237 0.179 1.480 0.056 0.371 0.629 0.003 0.033 0.431 
1986 2.314 13.561 0.211 0.187 2.054 0.066 0.179 0.228 -0.052 0.006 0.423 
1987 1.538 14.057 0.133 0.129 1.494 0.069 0.165 0.204 -0.035 0.031 0.441 
1988 1.767 12.875 0.160 0.143 1.580 0.069 0.151 0.185 -0.039 0.059 0.441 
1989 1.872 14.490 0.174 0.154 1.659 0.061 0.146 0.178 -0.045 0.010 0.435 
1990 1.863 8.121 0.185 0.170 1.719 0.114 0.216 0.289 0.019 0.003 0.243 
1991 1.820 11.262 0.176 0.166 1.720 0.084 0.152 0.189 -0.160 -0.056 0.093 
1992 1.743 13.484 0.201 0.149 1.290 0.055 0.163 0.203 0.149 0.038 0.208 
1993 1.994 12.097 0.143 0.127 1.779 0.074 0.482 1.002 0.628 0.286 0.038 
1994 1.894 9.836 0.092 0.090 1.859 0.100 0.563 1.413 0.321 0.226 0.015 
1995 2.186 9.494 0.195 0.167 1.879 0.091 0.676 2.367 0.273 0.340 0.006 
1996 2.147 11.353 0.194 0.170 1.880 0.077 0.699 2.670 -0.020 0.048 0.006 
1997 2.264 10.851 0.221 0.184 1.879 0.077 0.709 2.871 -0.068 -0.013 0.008 
1998 2.600 7.477 0.112 0.081 1.880 0.097 0.628 2.205 1.907 0.510 0.013 
1999 2.917 4.992 0.141 0.091 1.877 0.129 0.666 2.733 0.137 0.366 0.006 
2000 3.364 5.685 0.104 0.058 1.883 0.098 0.663 2.657 0.053 0.113 0.011 
2001 2.816 8.240 0.142 0.095 1.880 0.081 0.598 1.999 0.045 0.167 0.017 
2002 3.064 8.484 0.129 0.084 1.987 0.076 0.640 2.396 0.168 0.114 0.019 
2003 1.887 19.237 0.010 0.006 1.215 0.034 0.518 1.359 2.816 0.425 0.018 
2004 4.058 10.546 0.075 0.047 2.540 0.059 0.539 1.466 0.017 1.161 0.015 
2005 4.173 8.954 0.072 0.046 2.627 0.070 0.599 1.852 0.105 0.061 0.007 
2006 4.013 9.814 0.143 0.094 2.637 0.067 0.614 2.080 0.042 0.076 0.005 
2007 4.106 7.229 0.177 0.104 2.413 0.081 0.697 3.002 0.038 0.002 0.009 
2008 3.717 2.004 -0.358 -0.219 2.274 0.305 0.747 4.053 0.055 0.021 0.003 
2009 1.638 5.164 -0.019 -0.008 0.692 0.082 0.767 4.433 -0.028 -0.017 0.022 
2010 1.790 8.119 -0.035 -0.011 0.570 0.039 0.723 3.402 -0.080 -0.018 0.014 
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TABLE E-10  WASHINGTON REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST RATIOS 1961 -
2010 
            YEAR FFOSH FFOMUL FFOPAY DIVPAY 
DIVPER
SH DIVYLD DEBT LEV ASSETGR REVGR CASH 
1961 0.086   0.917                 
1962 0.218  2.318 2.651 0.250     1.102   
1963 0.530  5.641 3.728 0.350  0.723 3.05
9 
 3.505 0.022 
1964 0.721 15.952 5.503 3.053 0.400 0.035 0.782 3.71
7 
 10.132 0.088 
1965 0.829 15.070 11.849 5.714 0.400 0.032 0.856 6.60
5 
0.509 0.515 0.025 
1966 0.850 12.349 9.448 4.424 0.398 0.038 0.858 6.51
9 
-0.033 0.126 0.011 
1967 1.834 6.815 16.829 7.301 0.795 0.064 0.862 6.68
8 
-0.025 0.018 0.011 
1968 1.791 7.538 11.408 4.836 0.759 0.056 0.849 5.94
5 
0.036 0.043 0.010 
1969 1.449 7.678 3.090 1.700 0.797 0.072 0.749 3.07
3 
0.513 0.396 0.015 
1970 1.812 5.173 3.406 1.541 0.820 0.087 0.744 3.06
5 
0.042 0.347 0.018 
1971 1.367 8.045 1.427 0.903 0.865 0.079 0.606 1.60
2 
0.166 0.080 0.137 
1972 5.756 2.410 2.412 0.410 0.979 0.071 0.506 1.2
0 
-0.010 0.087 0.193 
1973 1.704 8.655 1.111 0.700 1.073 0.073 0.518 1.1
5 
-0.047 -0.008 0.102 
1974 1.918 6.126 1.049 0.664 1.214 0.103 0.500 1.02
8 
-0.011 4.040 0.068 
1975 2.105 7.008 1.018 0.621 1.285 0.087 0.483 0.96
2 
-0.017 15.650 0.080 
1976 2.342 10.141 0.970 0.660 1.594 0.067 0.474 0.9
5 
-0.013 0.422 0.029 
1977 2.368 10.190 0.580 0.431 1.756 0.073 0.449 0.84
4 
0.086 0.229 0.002 
1978 2.475 8.485 0.958 0.704 1.819 0.087 0.470 0.91
3 
0.025 0.322 0.040 
1979 2.877 9.690 0.307 0.221 2.074 0.074 0.431 0.78
1 
0.270 0.133 0.020 
1980 3.270 11.888 0.939 0.723 2.520 0.065 0.419 0.75
4 
-0.024 0.102 0.008 
1981 1.251 10.489 0.276 0.218 0.986 0.075 0.372 0.61
4 
0.066 0.095 0.065 
1982 1.358 11.691 0.275 0.215 1.060 0.067 0.360 0.58
2 
-0.028 0.122 0.037 
1983 1.491 11.824 0.105 0.083 1.173 0.067 0.215 0.30
5 
0.433 0.060 0.199 
1984 1.842 12.825 0.219 0.179 1.500 0.063 0.218 0.30
8 
0.004 0.133 0.042 
1985 1.189 15.662 0.092 0.083 1.069 0.057 0.170 0.21
0 
0.307 0.083 0.256 
1986 1.341 16.681 0.131 0.125 1.280 0.057 0.168 0.2
6 
-0.031 0.122 0.176 
1987 1.413 16.185 0.134 0.124 1.310 0.057 0.165 0.20
4 
-0.016 0.071 0.092 
1988 1.040 20.197 0.090 0.082 0.950 0.045 0.163 0.20
2 
-0.020 0.086 0.055 
1989 1.116 17.018 0.078 0.069 0.991 0.052 0.113 0.13
1 
0.392 0.136 0.259 
1990 1.242 13.488 0.077 0.068 1.100 0.066 0.116 0.13
7 
0.004 0.085 0.133 
1991 1.272 20.830 0.069 0.063 1.153 0.044 0.083 0.09
4 
0.269 0.098 0.301 
1992 0.845 23.804 0.041 0.039 0.798 0.040 0.119 0.13
9 
0.368 0.051 0.299 
1993 0.925 22.153 0.040 0.038 0.890 0.043 0.000 0.00
0 
-0.127 0.092 0.111 
1994 0.958 16.833 0.041 0.040 0.920 0.057 0.101 0.11
6 
0.104 0.114 0.015 
1995 0.982 16.163 0.038 0.036 0.936 0.059 0.148 0.17
9 
0.352 0.171 0.015 
1996 1.124 15.569 0.040 0.037 1.029 0.059 0.354 0.57
6 
0.317 0.243 0.005 
1997 1.150 14.559 0.038 0.034 1.012 0.060 0.433 0.80
4 
0.471 0.214 0.017 
1998 1.392 13.376 0.034 0.027 1.110 0.060 0.506 1.11
5 
0.192 0.299 0.008 
1999 1.567 9.571 0.035 0.026 1.157 0.077 0.542 1.28
3 
0.089 0.146 0.008 
2000 1.799 13.133 0.040 0.027 1.230 0.052 0.556 1.35
8 
0.039 0.133 0.010 
2001 1.912 13.015 0.037 0.024 1.280 0.051 0.508 1.11
2 
0.120 0.106 0.037 
2002 1.971 12.936 0.038 0.027 1.388 0.054 0.533 1.23
5 
0.068 0.023 0.017 
2003 1.938 15.066 0.043 0.031 1.409 0.048 0.558 1.36
6 
0.226 0.066 0.006 
2004 2.039 16.613 0.045 0.034 1.544 0.046 0.603 1.6
8 
0.092 0.052 0.006 
2005 2.073 14.640 0.027 0.021 1.598 0.053 0.625 1.87
6 
0.127 0.108 0.006 
2006 2.061 19.408 0.053 0.042 1.614 0.040 0.670 2.32
2 
0.342 0.155 0.008 
2007 2.283 13.757 0.037 0.027 1.672 0.053 0.698 2.7
1 
0.240 0.168 0.014 
2008 1.992 14.207 0.061 0.050 1.632 0.058 0.659 2.22
1 
0.112 0.100 0.015 
2009 2.036 13.532 0.050 0.041 1.676 0.061 0.598 1.64
0 
-0.031 0.087 0.015 
2010 1.694 18.297 0.045 0.044 1.654 0.053 0.569 1.43
9 
0.060 -0.033 0.046 
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TABLE E-11  WINTHROP REALTY TRUST RATIOS 1970 -2010 
            YEAR FFOSH FFOMUL FFOPAY DIVPAY DIVPERSH DIVYLD DEBT LEV ASSETGR REVGR CASH 
1970       0.3961 0.7347 0.066 0.5227 1.1168     0.0178 
1971 1.2889 9.1161 0.5133 0.3505 0.88 0.0749 0.6262 1.7124 0.257908 0.338102 0.0286 
1972 1.4376 8.6949 0.5268 0.327 0.8923 0.0714 0.74 2.9764 0.534412 0.4442 0.0213 
1973 1.5863 6.5404 0.544 0.3206 0.935 0.0901 0.7543 3.2505 0.081917 0.270633 0.0308 
1974 1.5499 4.1939 0.512 0.3045 0.9218 0.1418 0.7589 3.3698 0.09566 0.10655 0.0426 
1975 1.7622 5.6037 0.4952 0.2687 0.9563 0.0968 0.7583 3.4661 0.01205 0.11051 0.0214 
1976 1.7247 7.0304 0.5019 0.2817 0.968 0.0798 0.7773 3.7687 0.058973 0.129287 0.0132 
1977 1.8427 6.9869 0.448 0.2687 1.1052 0.0858 0.7368 2.9496 0.102763 0.089572 0.0077 
1978 2.1822 4.9262 0.3902 0.2242 1.2542 0.1167 0.7522 3.2205 0.087071 0.200749 0.0039 
1979 2.2997 6.6856 0.3101 0.1794 1.33 0.0865 0.7169 2.7927 0.184019 0.281683 0.0529 
1980 3.0139 7.0093 0.2538 0.1279 1.5185 0.0719 0.7351 3.1668 0.187558 0.131823 0.1404 
1981 2.4462 6.1832 0.144 0.066 1.1202 0.0741 0.6879 2.5359 0.003154 0.230397 0.0023 
1982 2.7557 7.0762 0.1537 0.067 1.2011 0.0616 0.6856 2.8499 0.036381 0.083202 0.0133 
1983 6.0837 3.8217 0.3008 0.0706 1.427 0.0614 0.5631 2.3399 0.110555 0.03127 0.0029 
1984 2.1529 12.1928 0.0909 0.0673 1.5952 0.0608 0.5463 1.8801 0.155775 0.056929 0.1637 
1985 2.3099 11.4183 0.0954 0.0823 1.9911 0.0755 0.529 1.7571 -0.05257 -0.00232 0.0732 
1986 1.5927 15.6963 0.0625 0.057 1.4539 0.0582 0.6036 2.4333 0.206811 0.035117 0.2043 
1987 1.5964 11.3537 0.0614 0.0578 1.5035 0.083 0.5428 1.8753 -0.15879 0.018217 0.0338 
1988 
   
0.0652 1.5255 0.0836 0.5868 2.3121 0.016688 -0.00679 0.001 
1989 
   
0.0504 1.512 0.0923 0.5914 2.3025 -0.00882 0.048685 0.0005 
1990 
   
0.0525 1.0827 0.1468 0.6248 2.4598 0.012903 -0.00133 0.0172 
1991 1.1831 5.9165 0.0649 0.051 0.9304 0.1329 0.6274 2.4354 -0.00416 -0.02498 0.0354 
1992 1.2073 7.5579 0.0655 0.0391 0.72 0.0789 0.6065 2.0879 -0.06314 -0.00499 0.0028 
1993 1.1066 8.698 0.0791 0.0515 0.7196 0.0748 0.6538 2.4801 0.113638 -0.00306 0.0979 
1994 0.933 7.1005 0.1439 0.0614 0.3982 0.0601 0.6334 2.3149 -0.04429 0.026904 0.0079 
1995 0.957 7.3146 0.0689 0.0311 0.4313 0.0616 0.6445 2.5251 0.065951 0.037543 0.0085 
1996 0.9698 12.8891 0.2345 0.117 0.484 0.0387 0.5785 1.6707 0.098581 0.033609 0.0067 
1997 0.7506 21.6505 0.0953 0.0733 0.5769 0.0355 0.5896 1.8237 0.861442 1.877154 0.0206 
1998 
-
0.4388 -13.1052 0.0053 -0.0025 0.2062 0.0359 0.7487 3.9085 -0.04065 0.377772 0.0574 
1999 0.1859 25.5564 -0.0295 -0.0598 0.3767 0.0793 0.5563 1.5127 -0.41342 -0.62785 0.1253 
2000 
-
0.0252 -101.724 -0.0006 0.0015 0.0617 0.0241 0.6948 2.67 0.002483 -0.44305 0.0516 
2001 
-
0.0453 -51.9328 -0.0029 0.0038 0.0594 0.0253 
  
-0.59864 -0.53332 0.0254 
2002 
   
-0.0118 0.0594 0.0334 
  
-0.07456 -0.40426 0.0341 
2003 
   
-0.0113 0.0665 0.0308 
  
-0.14542 -0.10989 0.1208 
2004 
   
0.003 0.0665 0.0176 
  
0.974748 -0.64448 0.2847 
2005 
   
0.0107 0.3157 0.0556 0.5245 1.3476 1.254269 4.553565 0.0301 
2006 0.744 9.2065 0.0173 0.0088 0.3782 0.0552 0.5571 1.4662 0.302837 1.12697 0.1103 
2007 0.3741 14.1399 0.1508 0.1727 0.4286 0.081 0.5505 1.4064 -0.12467 -0.04468 0.0572 
2008 
-
3.6605 -2.9614 0.0537 -0.0191 1.3047 0.1204 0.5187 1.2079 -0.2245 -1.37682 0.1273 
2009 
-
3.4476 -3.15 0.0408 -0.0088 0.7453 0.0686 0.4827 1.0966 -0.14687 1.275343 0.1541 
2010 1.1977 10.6784 0.074 0.0358 0.5791 0.0453 0.4543 0.9372 0.2371 -1.93781 0.0883 
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TABLE F -1  DESCRIPTION OF RATIOS FOR SNL DATA 
  
 
  
RATIO DESCRIPTIONS CALCULATION 
FFOSH Funds from Operations (FFO) per 
share =FFO/Shares Outstanding 
  
 
  
AFFOSH Adjusted Funds from Operations per  =AFFO/Shares Outstanding 
  share; which takes FFO and subtracts   
  straight-line rents and normal expenses   
  capitalized by REITs to derive AFFO   
  
 
  
SNLFFOSH Funds from Operations (FFO) as 
defined by NAREIT guidelines and  =SNLFFO/Shares Outstanding 
  Calculated systematically by SNL 
   
FFOMUL Funds from Operations (FFO) Multiple =Price/FFO per share 
  
 
  
FFOPAY Funds from Operations (FFO) Payout =FFO per share/Net Income per share 
  
 
  
DIVSH Dividends per share =Annual Dividends/Shares Outstanding 
  
 
  
DIVYLD Dividend Yield =Annual Dividends per share/Price per share 
  
 
  
DIVPAY Dividend Payout =Annual Dividends per share/Net Income per share 
  
 
  
DEBT Debt Ratio =Total Debt/Total Assets 
  
 
  
LEV Leverage Ratio =Total Debt/Total Equity 
  
 
  
ASSETGR Growth in Total Assets =End of Year Total Assets - Beginning of Year Total Assets 
  
 
   /Beginning of Year Total Assets 
  
 
  
REVGR Growth in Total Revenue =End of Year Total Revenue - Beginning of Year Total Revenue 
  
 
   /Beginning of Year Total Revenue 
  
 
  
CASH Cash to Assets Ratio =Total Cash & ST Investments/Total Assets 
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TABLE F-2  SNL Mean Values for All Other Companies 
3 Companies Combined, Winthrop, Penn. REIT & Wash REIT 
              
ENTITY 
FFO 
SH 
AFFO 
SH 
SNL 
FFO 
FFO 
MUL 
FFO 
PAY 
DIV 
PAY 
DIV 
SH 
DIV 
YLD DEBT LEV 
ASSET 
GR 
REV 
GR CASH 
ALL 
COS 2.082 1.642 2.056 10.066 76.099 1.186 1.293 0.076 0.426 2.574 0.154 0.111 0.029 
3COS 1.664 1.823 1.677 7.734 73.400 1.186 1.214 0.071 0.486 1.499 0.196 0.242 0.032 
FUR 0.869 . 1.016 -0.323 63.234 0.944 0.562 0.081 0.495 1.493 0.092 0.265 0.060 
PEI 3.252 2.398 2.926 8.204 75.041 1.455 1.878 0.077 0.545 1.852 0.343 0.322 0.015 
WRE 1.925 1.124 1.751 14.040 81.693 1.160 1.189 0.054 0.436 1.117 0.176 0.132 0.018 
 
Table provides mean values for 13 select ratios for the 20-year period from 1990 – 2009. 
 
 
ALLCOS – All other REITs, not including Winthrop, Pennsylvania REIT, and Washington REIT 
3COS – The three companies of Winthrop, Pennsylvania REIT, and Washington REIT combined 
FUR – Ticker symbol for Winthrop Realty Trust 
PEI – Ticker symbol for Pennsylvania REIT 
WRE – Ticker symbol for Washington REIT 
 
Note:  Data is taken from SNL, provider of financial data. 
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Table F-3 SNL Detail Values for Penn. REIT, 
Wash. REIT & Winthrop 
  
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
FFOSH PEI 10 3.25200 .459101 2.650 3.900 
WRE 10 1.92500 .277218 1.370 2.310 
FUR 15 .86867 2.251669 -4.320 2.740 
AFFOSH PEI 10 2.39800 .179864 2.060 2.680 
WRE 8 1.12375 .534735 .270 1.710 
FUR 0 . . . . 
SNLFFOSH PEI 11 2.92555 .705291 1.720 3.828 
WRE 9 1.75111 .497831 .720 2.200 
FUR 13 1.01623 2.324403 -4.104 2.740 
DIVPAY PEI 18 1.45474 .795657 .375 3.852 
WRE 18 1.16035 .240209 .868 1.911 
FUR 18 .94354 2.018822 -1.384 8.150 
FFOPAY PEI 18 75.04056 14.073714 54.650 98.410 
WRE 18 81.69278 10.161675 66.840 95.830 
FUR 17 63.23412 25.779034 .000 112.690 
ASSETGR PEI 18 .34253 .703548 -.160 2.839 
WRE 19 .17572 .152545 -.127 .471 
FUR 19 .09204 .458001 -.599 1.272 
REVGR PEI 18 .32175 .689727 -.568 2.452 
WRE 17 .13203 .071942 .023 .299 
FUR 19 .26458 1.454852 -.636 6.094 
FFOMUL PEI 10 8.20369 3.642785 .000 12.264 
WRE 9 14.04014 2.596928 9.554 18.868 
FUR 7 -.32285 29.435627 -64.000 23.750 
DIVYLD PEI 18 .07747 .024175 .019 .129 
WRE 18 .05425 .009447 .041 .077 
FUR 18 .08125 .122626 .000 .531 
DEBT PEI 17 .54492 .188177 .152 .747 
WRE 19 .43609 .228187 .000 .698 
FUR 17 .49489 .188038 .000 .672 
CASHAT PEI 19 .0153 .01401 .00 .07 
WRE 19 .0178 .02888 .00 .13 
FUR 20 .0601 .06767 .00 .28 
LEV PEI 19 1.8515 1.01018 .19 4.05 
WRE 18 1.1174 .82815 .00 2.72 
FUR 19 1.4932 .83804 .43 2.77 
DIVSH PEI 19 1.8779 .42044 .47 2.28 
WRE 18 1.1886 .30878 .73 1.68 
FUR 20 .5624 .57930 .00 2.20 
Table provides mean values for 13 select ratios for the 20-year period from 1990 – 2009. 
 
FUR – Ticker symbol for Winthrop Realty Trust 
PEI – Ticker symbol for Pennsylvania REIT 
WRE – Ticker symbol for Washington REIT 
 
Note:  Data is taken from SNL, provider of financial data. 
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TABLE F-4 ANOVA BY ENTITY (SNL) 
  Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
FFOSH Between 
Groups 
35.518 4 8.879 4.433 0.003 
Within 
Groups 
122.198 61 2.003 
    
Total 157.716 65       
AFFOSH Between 
Groups 
7.605 3 2.535 13.912 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
8.018 44 0.182 
    
Total 15.623 47       
SNLFFOSH Between 
Groups 
23.043 4 5.761 3.017 0.025 
Within 
Groups 
116.463 61 1.909 
    
Total 139.505 65       
FFOPAY Between 
Groups 
3140.883 4 785.221 3.599 0.009 
Within 
Groups 
18327.513 84 218.185 
    
Total 21468.396 88       
FFOMUL Between 
Groups 
865.271 4 216.318 1.554 0.202 
Within 
Groups 
6543.099 47 139.215 
    
Total 7408.370 51       
DIVPAY Between 
Groups 
2.370 4 0.592 0.532 0.713 
Within 
Groups 
94.688 85 1.114 
    
Total 97.058 89       
DIVSH Between 
Groups 
16.998 4 4.249 28.147 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
13.889 92 0.151 
    
Total 30.887 96       
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TABLE F-4 ANOVA BY ENTITY (SNL) - CONT 
  Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
DIVYLD Between 
Groups 
0.008 4 0.002 0.560 0.692 
Within 
Groups 
0.307 85 0.004 
    
Total 0.315 89       
DEBT Between 
Groups 
0.168 4 0.042 1.467 0.219 
Within 
Groups 
2.522 88 0.029 
    
Total 2.691 92       
LEV Between 
Groups 
23.411 4 5.853 5.738 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
92.818 91 1.020 
    
Total 116.229 95       
ASSETGR Between 
Groups 
0.631 4 0.158 0.981 0.422 
Within 
Groups 
14.302 89 0.161 
    
Total 14.933 93       
REVGR Between 
Groups 
0.599 4 0.150 0.243 0.913 
Within 
Groups 
54.145 88 0.615 
    
Total 54.744 92       
CASH Between 
Groups 
0.025 4 0.006 4.863 0.001 
Within 
Groups 
0.119 93 0.001 
    
Total 0.144 97       
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TABLE F-5 ANOVA BY YEAR (SNL) 
  Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
FFOSH Between 
Groups 
73.822 16 4.614 2.695 0.004 
Within 
Groups 
83.893 49 1.712 
    
Total 157.716 65       
AFFOSH Between 
Groups 
8.323 17 0.490 2.012 0.046 
Within 
Groups 
7.301 30 0.243 
    
Total 15.623 47       
SNLFFOSH Between 
Groups 
64.705 17 3.806 2.442 0.008 
Within 
Groups 
74.801 48 1.558 
    
Total 139.505 65       
FFOPAY Between 
Groups 
7368.963 17 433.468 2.183 0.012 
Within 
Groups 
14099.433 71 198.584 
    
Total 21468.396 88       
FFOMUL Between 
Groups 
2956.330 14 211.166 1.755 0.086 
Within 
Groups 
4452.040 37 120.325 
    
Total 7408.370 51       
DIVPAY Between 
Groups 
43.262 17 2.545 3.406 0.000 
Within 
Groups 
53.796 72 0.747 
    
Total 97.058 89       
DIVSH Between 
Groups 
5.630 19 0.296 0.903 0.580 
Within 
Groups 
25.257 77 0.328 
    
Total 30.887 96       
DIVYLD Between 
Groups 
0.123 17 0.007 2.724 0.002 
Within 
Groups 
0.192 72 0.003 
    
Total 0.315 89       
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TABLE F-5 ANOVA BY YEAR (SNL) - CONT 
 
DEBT Between 
Groups 
1.060 19 0.056 2.498 0.003 
Within Groups 1.631 73 0.022 
    
Total 2.691 92       
LEV Between 
Groups 
43.992 19 2.315 2.436 0.003 
Within Groups 72.237 76 0.950 
    
Total 116.229 95       
ASSETGR Between 
Groups 
5.007 18 0.278 2.102 0.014 
Within Groups 9.926 75 0.132 
    
Total 14.933 93       
REVGR Between 
Groups 
18.221 19 0.959 1.917 0.025 
Within Groups 36.523 73 0.500 
    
Total 54.744 92       
CASH Between 
Groups 
0.038 19 0.002 1.494 0.111 
Within Groups 0.106 78 0.001 
    
Total 0.144 97       
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TABLE F-6  ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY (SNL) 
Tukey HSD 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
COMPANY 
(J) 
COMPANY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
FFOSH PEI WRE 1.327000 .632968 .235 -.45230 3.10630 
FUR 2.383333
*
 .577818 .001 .75906 4.00761 
3COS 1.588250 .570550 .054 -.01559 3.19209 
ALLCOS 1.169629 .577818 .267 -.45464 2.79390 
WRE PEI -1.327000 .632968 .235 -3.10630 .45230 
FUR 1.056333 .577818 .367 -.56794 2.68061 
3COS .261250 .570550 .991 -1.34259 1.86509 
ALLCOS -.157371 .577818 .999 -1.78164 1.46690 
FUR PEI -
2.383333
*
 
.577818 .001 -4.00761 -.75906 
WRE -1.056333 .577818 .367 -2.68061 .56794 
3COS -.795083 .508677 .526 -2.22500 .63483 
ALLCOS -1.213704 .516817 .144 -2.66650 .23909 
3COS PEI -1.588250 .570550 .054 -3.19209 .01559 
WRE -.261250 .570550 .991 -1.86509 1.34259 
FUR .795083 .508677 .526 -.63483 2.22500 
ALLCOS -.418621 .508677 .923 -1.84853 1.01129 
ALLCOS PEI -1.169629 .577818 .267 -2.79390 .45464 
WRE .157371 .577818 .999 -1.46690 1.78164 
FUR 1.213704 .516817 .144 -.23909 2.66650 
3COS .418621 .508677 .923 -1.01129 1.84853 
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TABLE F-6  ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY (SNL) 
Tukey HSD 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
COMPANY 
(J) 
COMPANY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
SNLFFOSH PEI WRE 1.174434 .621049 .333 -.57136 2.92023 
FUR 1.909315
*
 .566065 .011 .31808 3.50055 
3COS 1.248670 .541195 .157 -.27265 2.76999 
ALLCOS .869198 .534671 .487 -.63379 2.37218 
WRE PEI -
1.174434 
.621049 .333 -2.92023 .57136 
FUR .734880 .599166 .736 -.94940 2.41916 
3COS .074236 .575728 1.000 -1.54416 1.69263 
ALLCOS -.305237 .569599 .983 -1.90641 1.29593 
FUR PEI -
1.909315
*
 
.566065 .011 -3.50055 -.31808 
WRE -.734880 .599166 .736 -2.41916 .94940 
3COS -.660644 .515936 .704 -2.11096 .78967 
ALLCOS -
1.040117 
.509088 .258 -2.47119 .39095 
3COS PEI -
1.248670 
.541195 .157 -2.76999 .27265 
WRE -.074236 .575728 1.000 -1.69263 1.54416 
FUR .660644 .515936 .704 -.78967 2.11096 
ALLCOS -.379473 .481284 .933 -1.73238 .97344 
ALLCOS PEI -.869198 .534671 .487 -2.37218 .63379 
WRE .305237 .569599 .983 -1.29593 1.90641 
FUR 1.040117 .509088 .258 -.39095 2.47119 
3COS .379473 .481284 .933 -.97344 1.73238 
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TABLE F-6  ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY (SNL) 
Tukey HSD 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
COMPANY 
(J) 
COMPANY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
FFOPAY PEI WRE -6.652222 4.923692 .660 -
20.37907 
7.07462 
FUR 11.806438 4.995574 .136 -2.12081 25.73368 
3COS 1.641019 4.923692 .997 -
12.08582 
15.36786 
ALLCOS -1.058756 4.923692 1.000 -
14.78560 
12.66809 
WRE PEI 6.652222 4.923692 .660 -7.07462 20.37907 
FUR 18.458660
*
 4.995574 .004 4.53141 32.38591 
3COS 8.293241 4.923692 .449 -5.43360 22.02008 
ALLCOS 5.593466 4.923692 .787 -8.13338 19.32031 
FUR PEI -11.806438 4.995574 .136 -
25.73368 
2.12081 
WRE -
18.458660
*
 
4.995574 .004 -
32.38591 
-4.53141 
3COS -10.165419 4.995574 .259 -
24.09266 
3.76183 
ALLCOS -12.865194 4.995574 .084 -
26.79244 
1.06205 
3COS PEI -1.641019 4.923692 .997 -
15.36786 
12.08582 
WRE -8.293241 4.923692 .449 -
22.02008 
5.43360 
FUR 10.165419 4.995574 .259 -3.76183 24.09266 
ALLCOS -2.699775 4.923692 .982 -
16.42662 
11.02707 
ALLCOS PEI 1.058756 4.923692 1.000 -
12.66809 
14.78560 
WRE -5.593466 4.923692 .787 -
19.32031 
8.13338 
FUR 12.865194 4.995574 .084 -1.06205 26.79244 
3COS 2.699775 4.923692 .982 -
11.02707 
16.42662 
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TABLE F-6  ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY (SNL) 
Tukey HSD 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
COMPANY 
(J) 
COMPANY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
FFOMUL PEI WRE -5.836446 5.421237 .818 -
21.21372 
9.54083 
FUR 8.526543 5.814579 .589 -7.96644 25.01953 
3COS .469447 5.155326 1.000 -
14.15357 
15.09247 
ALLCOS -1.862761 4.816895 .995 -
15.52583 
11.80030 
WRE PEI 5.836446 5.421237 .818 -9.54083 21.21372 
FUR 14.362988 5.946105 .129 -2.50307 31.22904 
3COS 6.305892 5.303227 .758 -8.73665 21.34843 
ALLCOS 3.973684 4.974868 .930 -
10.13747 
18.08484 
FUR PEI -8.526543 5.814579 .589 -
25.01953 
7.96644 
WRE -14.362988 5.946105 .129 -
31.22904 
2.50307 
3COS -8.057096 5.704712 .623 -
24.23844 
8.12425 
ALLCOS -10.389304 5.400818 .319 -
25.70866 
4.93005 
3COS PEI -.469447 5.155326 1.000 -
15.09247 
14.15357 
WRE -6.305892 5.303227 .758 -
21.34843 
8.73665 
FUR 8.057096 5.704712 .623 -8.12425 24.23844 
ALLCOS -2.332208 4.683683 .987 -
15.61742 
10.95300 
ALLCOS PEI 1.862761 4.816895 .995 -
11.80030 
15.52583 
WRE -3.973684 4.974868 .930 -
18.08484 
10.13747 
FUR 10.389304 5.400818 .319 -4.93005 25.70866 
3COS 2.332208 4.683683 .987 -
10.95300 
15.61742 
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TABLE F-6  ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY (SNL) 
Tukey HSD 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
COMPANY 
(J) 
COMPANY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
DIVPAY PEI WRE .294389 .351816 .918 -.68619 1.27497 
FUR .511198 .351816 .595 -.46938 1.49178 
3COS .268529 .351816 .940 -.71205 1.24911 
ALLCOS .268952 .351816 .940 -.71163 1.24953 
WRE PEI -.294389 .351816 .918 -1.27497 .68619 
FUR .216809 .351816 .972 -.76377 1.19739 
3COS -.025861 .351816 1.000 -1.00644 .95472 
ALLCOS -.025437 .351816 1.000 -1.00602 .95514 
FUR PEI -.511198 .351816 .595 -1.49178 .46938 
WRE -.216809 .351816 .972 -1.19739 .76377 
3COS -.242669 .351816 .958 -1.22325 .73791 
ALLCOS -.242246 .351816 .958 -1.22283 .73834 
3COS PEI -.268529 .351816 .940 -1.24911 .71205 
WRE .025861 .351816 1.000 -.95472 1.00644 
FUR .242669 .351816 .958 -.73791 1.22325 
ALLCOS .000423 .351816 1.000 -.98016 .98101 
ALLCOS PEI -.268952 .351816 .940 -1.24953 .71163 
WRE .025437 .351816 1.000 -.95514 1.00602 
FUR .242246 .351816 .958 -.73834 1.22283 
3COS -.000423 .351816 1.000 -.98101 .98016 
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TABLE F-6  ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY (SNL) 
Tukey HSD 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
COMPANY 
(J) 
COMPANY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
DIVSH PEI WRE .68928
*
 .12780 .000 .3337 1.0449 
FUR 1.31554
*
 .12448 .000 .9692 1.6619 
3COS .66436
*
 .12448 .000 .3180 1.0107 
ALLCOS .58533
*
 .12448 .000 .2390 .9317 
WRE PEI -.68928
*
 .12780 .000 -1.0449 -.3337 
FUR .62626
*
 .12624 .000 .2750 .9775 
3COS -.02492 .12624 1.000 -.3762 .3263 
ALLCOS -.10395 .12624 .923 -.4552 .2473 
FUR PEI -1.31554
*
 .12448 .000 -1.6619 -.9692 
WRE -.62626
*
 .12624 .000 -.9775 -.2750 
3COS -.65118
*
 .12287 .000 -.9931 -.3093 
ALLCOS -.73021
*
 .12287 .000 -1.0721 -.3883 
3COS PEI -.66436
*
 .12448 .000 -1.0107 -.3180 
WRE .02492 .12624 1.000 -.3263 .3762 
FUR .65118
*
 .12287 .000 .3093 .9931 
ALLCOS -.07903 .12287 .967 -.4209 .2629 
ALLCOS PEI -.58533
*
 .12448 .000 -.9317 -.2390 
WRE .10395 .12624 .923 -.2473 .4552 
FUR .73021
*
 .12287 .000 .3883 1.0721 
3COS .07903 .12287 .967 -.2629 .4209 
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TABLE F-6  ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY (SNL) 
Tukey HSD 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
COMPANY 
(J) 
COMPANY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
DIVYLD PEI WRE .023218 .020023 .774 -.03259 .07903 
FUR -.003783 .020023 1.000 -.05959 .05202 
3COS .006474 .020023 .998 -.04933 .06228 
ALLCOS .001313 .020023 1.000 -.05450 .05712 
WRE PEI -.023218 .020023 .774 -.07903 .03259 
FUR -.027001 .020023 .662 -.08281 .02881 
3COS -.016744 .020023 .919 -.07255 .03906 
ALLCOS -.021905 .020023 .809 -.07771 .03390 
FUR PEI .003783 .020023 1.000 -.05202 .05959 
WRE .027001 .020023 .662 -.02881 .08281 
3COS .010257 .020023 .986 -.04555 .06607 
ALLCOS .005096 .020023 .999 -.05071 .06090 
3COS PEI -.006474 .020023 .998 -.06228 .04933 
WRE .016744 .020023 .919 -.03906 .07255 
FUR -.010257 .020023 .986 -.06607 .04555 
ALLCOS -.005161 .020023 .999 -.06097 .05065 
ALLCOS PEI -.001313 .020023 1.000 -.05712 .05450 
WRE .021905 .020023 .809 -.03390 .07771 
FUR -.005096 .020023 .999 -.06090 .05071 
3COS .005161 .020023 .999 -.05065 .06097 
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TABLE F-6  ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY (SNL) 
Tukey HSD 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
COMPANY 
(J) 
COMPANY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
DEBT PEI WRE .108831 .056523 .312 -.04859 .26625 
FUR .050031 .058071 .910 -.11171 .21177 
3COS .058793 .055851 .830 -.09676 .21435 
ALLCOS .118473 .055851 .220 -.03708 .27403 
WRE PEI -.108831 .056523 .312 -.26625 .04859 
FUR -.058800 .056523 .836 -.21622 .09862 
3COS -.050038 .054239 .887 -.20110 .10103 
ALLCOS .009642 .054239 1.000 -.14142 .16071 
FUR PEI -.050031 .058071 .910 -.21177 .11171 
WRE .058800 .056523 .836 -.09862 .21622 
3COS .008762 .055851 1.000 -.14679 .16432 
ALLCOS .068442 .055851 .737 -.08711 .22400 
3COS PEI -.058793 .055851 .830 -.21435 .09676 
WRE .050038 .054239 .887 -.10103 .20110 
FUR -.008762 .055851 1.000 -.16432 .14679 
ALLCOS .059680 .053539 .798 -.08943 .20879 
ALLCOS PEI -.118473 .055851 .220 -.27403 .03708 
WRE -.009642 .054239 1.000 -.16071 .14142 
FUR -.068442 .055851 .737 -.22400 .08711 
3COS -.059680 .053539 .798 -.20879 .08943 
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TABLE F-6  ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY (SNL) 
Tukey HSD 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
COMPANY 
(J) 
COMPANY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
LEV PEI WRE .73411 .33219 .185 -.1904 1.6587 
FUR .35837 .32767 .809 -.5536 1.2703 
3COS .35265 .32355 .811 -.5479 1.2532 
ALLCOS -.72260 .32355 .177 -1.6231 .1779 
WRE PEI -.73411 .33219 .185 -1.6587 .1904 
FUR -.37574 .33219 .790 -1.3003 .5488 
3COS -.38146 .32812 .773 -1.2947 .5318 
ALLCOS -1.45671
*
 .32812 .000 -2.3700 -.5435 
FUR PEI -.35837 .32767 .809 -1.2703 .5536 
WRE .37574 .33219 .790 -.5488 1.3003 
3COS -.00571 .32355 1.000 -.9062 .8948 
ALLCOS -1.08097
*
 .32355 .010 -1.9815 -.1805 
3COS PEI -.35265 .32355 .811 -1.2532 .5479 
WRE .38146 .32812 .773 -.5318 1.2947 
FUR .00571 .32355 1.000 -.8948 .9062 
ALLCOS -1.07526
*
 .31937 .010 -1.9641 -.1864 
ALLCOS PEI .72260 .32355 .177 -.1779 1.6231 
WRE 1.45671
*
 .32812 .000 .5435 2.3700 
FUR 1.08097
*
 .32355 .010 .1805 1.9815 
3COS 1.07526
*
 .31937 .010 .1864 1.9641 
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TABLE F-6  ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY (SNL) 
Tukey HSD 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
COMPANY 
(J) 
COMPANY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
ASSETGR PEI WRE .166808 .131856 .713 -.20034 .53396 
FUR .250481 .131856 .325 -.11667 .61763 
3COS .146525 .131856 .800 -.22063 .51368 
ALLCOS .188841 .131856 .609 -.17831 .55599 
WRE PEI -.166808 .131856 .713 -.53396 .20034 
FUR .083673 .130062 .967 -.27848 .44583 
3COS -.020283 .130062 1.000 -.38244 .34187 
ALLCOS .022033 .130062 1.000 -.34012 .38419 
FUR PEI -.250481 .131856 .325 -.61763 .11667 
WRE -.083673 .130062 .967 -.44583 .27848 
3COS -.103956 .130062 .930 -.46611 .25820 
ALLCOS -.061640 .130062 .990 -.42380 .30052 
3COS PEI -.146525 .131856 .800 -.51368 .22063 
WRE .020283 .130062 1.000 -.34187 .38244 
FUR .103956 .130062 .930 -.25820 .46611 
ALLCOS .042316 .130062 .998 -.31984 .40447 
ALLCOS PEI -.188841 .131856 .609 -.55599 .17831 
WRE -.022033 .130062 1.000 -.38419 .34012 
FUR .061640 .130062 .990 -.30052 .42380 
3COS -.042316 .130062 .998 -.40447 .31984 
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TABLE F-6  ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY (SNL) 
Tukey HSD 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
COMPANY 
(J) 
COMPANY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
REVGR PEI WRE .189725 .265284 .953 -.54913 .92858 
FUR .057171 .258003 .999 -.66141 .77575 
3COS .079457 .258003 .998 -.63912 .79803 
ALLCOS .210754 .254846 .922 -.49903 .92054 
WRE PEI -.189725 .265284 .953 -.92858 .54913 
FUR -.132554 .261871 .987 -.86190 .59679 
3COS -.110268 .261871 .993 -.83962 .61908 
ALLCOS .021029 .258761 1.000 -.69966 .74172 
FUR PEI -.057171 .258003 .999 -.77575 .66141 
WRE .132554 .261871 .987 -.59679 .86190 
3COS .022286 .254493 1.000 -.68651 .73109 
ALLCOS .153583 .251291 .973 -.54630 .85347 
3COS PEI -.079457 .258003 .998 -.79803 .63912 
WRE .110268 .261871 .993 -.61908 .83962 
FUR -.022286 .254493 1.000 -.73109 .68651 
ALLCOS .131297 .251291 .985 -.56859 .83118 
ALLCOS PEI -.210754 .254846 .922 -.92054 .49903 
WRE -.021029 .258761 1.000 -.74172 .69966 
FUR -.153583 .251291 .973 -.85347 .54630 
3COS -.131297 .251291 .985 -.83118 .56859 
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TABLE F-6  ANOVA POST HOC TESTING FOR ENTITY (SNL) 
Tukey HSD 
Dependent 
Variable 
(I) 
COMPANY 
(J) 
COMPANY 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
CASHAT PEI WRE -.00253 .01162 .999 -.0349 .0298 
FUR -.04477
*
 .01147 .002 -.0767 -.0128 
3COS -.01647 .01147 .606 -.0484 .0154 
ALLCOS -.01389 .01147 .746 -.0458 .0180 
WRE PEI .00253 .01162 .999 -.0298 .0349 
FUR -.04224
*
 .01147 .003 -.0742 -.0103 
3COS -.01395 .01147 .742 -.0459 .0180 
ALLCOS -.01136 .01147 .859 -.0433 .0206 
FUR PEI .04477
*
 .01147 .002 .0128 .0767 
WRE .04224
*
 .01147 .003 .0103 .0742 
3COS .02829 .01133 .100 -.0032 .0598 
ALLCOS .03088 .01133 .058 -.0006 .0624 
3COS PEI .01647 .01147 .606 -.0154 .0484 
WRE .01395 .01147 .742 -.0180 .0459 
FUR -.02829 .01133 .100 -.0598 .0032 
ALLCOS .00259 .01133 .999 -.0289 .0341 
ALLCOS PEI .01389 .01147 .746 -.0180 .0458 
WRE .01136 .01147 .859 -.0206 .0433 
FUR -.03088 .01133 .058 -.0624 .0006 
3COS -.00259 .01133 .999 -.0341 .0289 
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Table G -1 
3-month Treasury Bill Secondary Market Rate   
     Time Period Yr Rate   Time Period Yr Rate 
1960 2.87 
 
1985 7.47 
1961 2.35 
 
1986 5.97 
1962 2.77 
 
1987 5.78 
1963 3.16 
 
1988 6.67 
1964 3.55 
 
1989 8.11 
1965 3.95 
 
1990 7.5 
1966 4.86 
 
1991 5.38 
1967 4.29 
 
1992 3.43 
1968 5.34 
 
1993 3 
1969 6.67 
 
1994 4.25 
1970 6.39 
 
1995 5.49 
1971 4.33 
 
1996 5.01 
1972 4.06 
 
1997 5.06 
1973 7.04 
 
1998 4.78 
1974 7.85 
 
1999 4.64 
1975 5.79 
 
2000 5.82 
1976 4.98 
 
2001 3.4 
1977 5.26 
 
2002 1.61 
1978 7.18 
 
2003 1.01 
1979 10.05 
 
2004 1.37 
1980 11.39 
 
2005 3.15 
1981 14.04 
 
2006 4.73 
1982 10.6 
 
2007 4.36 
1983 8.62 
 
2008 1.37 
1984 9.54 
 
2009 0.15 
   
2010 0.14 
 
 
Information provided by the Federal Reserve.  Retrieved from 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/data.htm 
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Table G-2 
The Real Estate cycle in the U.S. 
 Peaks in   Interval     Peaks in             Depressions 
 Value    (years)       Const.   (years)                 (years) 
 1818           --            --             --           1819        -- 
 1836         18          1836          _           1837       18 
 1854         18          1856         20          1857      20 
 1872         18          1871         15          1873      16 
 1890         18          1892         21          1893      20 
 1907         17          1909         17          1918      25 
 1925         18          1925         16          1929      11 
 1973         48          1972         47          1973      44 
 1979           6          1978           6          1980        7 
 1989         10          1986           8          1990      10 
 2006         17          2006         20          2008!     18 
 Real-estate values and construction have peaked one to two years before a depression, 
 and have stayed at peak levels until the onset of the downturn. 
The historical evidence is consistent with the theory that speculative booms in real-estate 
 prices and construction act as an impetus for the downturn itself. 
   Prepared by Fred Foldvary, Economist, Santa Clara University 
 
 
 
Table G3 Comparison of Return on Assets & T- Bill Rates 
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YEAR PREIT WRIT FUR 
3M 
TBILL 
 1972 2.40% 7.18% 2.02% 4.06% C 
1973 2.58% 4.84% 2.00% 7.04% D 
1974 3.13% 5.83% 1.89% 7.85% 
 1975 2.87% 6.71% 2.20% 5.79% 
 1976 3.38% 7.95% 2.00% 4.98% 
 1977 3.07% 12.36% 2.17% 5.26% 
 1978 4.69% 7.64% 2.72% 7.18% C 
1979 4.33% 21.81% 3.05% 10.05% 
 1980 7.96% 8.30% 4.11% 11.39% D 
1981 8.48% 10.12% 5.85% 14.04% 
 1982 11.41% 11.34% 5.96% 10.60% 
 1983 6.53% 22.68% 6.06% 8.62% 
 1984 9.82% 13.43% 6.14% 9.54% 
 1985 10.27% 15.79% 6.62% 7.47% 
 1986 14.43% 12.93% 5.78% 5.97% C 
1987 15.72% 13.48% 7.01% 5.78% 
 1988 15.61% 15.13% 6.20% 6.67% 
 1989 15.97% 13.39% 8.02% 8.11% 
 1990 14.71% 15.07% 5.45% 7.50% D 
1991 17.94% 13.54% 4.83% 5.38% 
 1992 13.10% 11.00% 5.21% 3.43% 
 1993 12.98% 14.35% 3.55% 3.00% 
 1994 14.52% 12.93% 1.72% 4.25% 
 1995 6.19% 10.80% 3.46% 5.49% 
 1996 6.21% 8.78% 0.94% 5.01% 
 1997 6.18% 6.43% 0.96% 5.06% 
 1998 4.81% 7.35% -10.62% 4.78% 
 1999 3.79% 7.28% -1.37% 4.64% 
 2000 5.59% 7.14% 8.70% 5.82% 
 2001 3.28% 7.40% 8.34% 3.40% 
 2002 3.36% 6.86% -2.93% 1.61% 
 2003 7.30% 4.84% -4.02% 1.01% 
 2004 1.97% 4.50% 7.74% 1.37% 
 2005 1.91% 6.80% 4.52% 3.15% 
 2006 0.89% 2.52% 5.04% 4.73% C 
2007 0.71% 3.26% 0.33% 4.36% 
 2008 -0.30% 1.56% -11.79% 1.37% D 
2009 -2.56% 1.99% -17.13% 0.15% 
 2010 -1.69% 1.73% 2.65% 0.14% 
       C - CONSTRUCTION PEAK  
D - DEPRESSION 
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Exhibit H–1 from 1985 Prospectus 
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Exhibit H-2 from 1989 Prospectus 
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Exhibit H-3 from 1989 Prospectus 
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Exhibit H-4 from1997 Prospectus 
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Exhibit H-5 from 1997 Prospectus 1 
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Exhibit H-6 
 
 
WASHINGTON REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST 
YEAR NI/ SH DIVIDEND PROPERTIES ASSETS REVENUE 
2003 44.9 1.47 61 928.09 143.1 
2004 45.6 1.55 67 1012.39 162.6 
2006 38.7 1.64 82 1531.26 208.7 
2007 61.9 1.68 88 1898.33 255.7 
2010 37.4 1.73 85 2111.39 298.0 
 
 
Selected years from 2003 to 2010 reveal fluctuations in Net Income per share, while dividends 
per share steadily increased from $1.47 per share in 2003 to $1.73 per share in 2010.  Assets 
and revenues showed steady growth from 2003 to 2010. 
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Exhibit I – 1 
PENNSYLVANIA REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST 
SELECTED YEARS FROM 1972 TO 2003 
NET INCOME PER SHARE, DIVIDEND, ASSETS & REVENUE 
YEAR NI/SH DIVIDEND ASSETS REVENUE NOTES   
 1972 1.5 1.1 12.141 9.5 
 
  
 1992 8.7 11.2 53.095 20.5 
 
  
 1998 23.2 25.0 137.082 67.7 MERGED WITH RUBIN 
 2002 1.5 33.2 703.660 133.8 
 
  
 2003 9.6 41.6 1,023.630 190.6 MERGEDWITH CROWN 
 
        From 1972 to 2003, Net Income per share fluctuated, while dividends showed marked 
increases over the period.  Both Assets and Revenues increased, with dramatic increases in 
Assets and Revenues after the merger with Rubin Organization in 1998 and the merger with 
Crown in 2003. 
 
Exhibit I - 2 
PENNSYLVANIA REAL ESTATE 
INVESTMENT TRUST  
2007 TO 2009 
 NET INCOME PER SHARE/  
BY QUARTER 
YEAR QUARTER NI PER SH 
 2007 1ST 5.7 
 2008 1ST -2.1 
 2009 1ST -11.0 
 2008 2ND -3.8 
 2009 2ND -4.0 
 
    From the years 2007 to 2009, PREIT’s net income per share on a quarterly basis reflected 
losses after 2007 with the onset of the financial crisis in 2008.  The above table shows the year 
and quarter with its respective Net Income or Net Loss per share. 
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Appendix J - U. S. Senator Johnny Isakson’s Statement concerning 
Congressional Resolution on REIT Industry: 
 
Mr. ISAKSON:  Mr. President, in just a moment, I will ask the body for 
unanimous consent to adopt S. Res. 60. Before I do, I wish to talk about the 
significance of this agreement we have come to on this important resolution.  
Fifty years ago last September, President Eisenhower signed into law legislation 
that established real estate investment trusts, or REITs, as an investment 
opportunity for all investors. Prior to 1960, access to the highly desirable 
investment returns of commercial real estate assets was limited to institutions 
and wealthy individuals that had the financial wealth to make direct real estate 
investments. By creating REITs, Congress recognized that small investors 
should be afforded the same opportunity to invest in portfolios of large-scale 
commercial properties and achieve the same investment benefits--
diversification, liquidity, performance, transparency--as those able to make 
direct investments in real estate.  
 
Some of my colleagues may not be familiar with each REIT property in their 
States, but they should be aware that these properties are making a significant 
contribution to the economic vitality of their State and our Nation. REITs are 
companies dedicated to the ownership and development of income producing 
real estate, such as apartments, regional malls, shopping centers, office 
buildings, self storage facilities and industrial warehouses. They operate under 
an intricate set of tax rules that require them to, among other things, meet 
specific tests regarding the composition of their gross income and assets, in 
order to stay in business. For example, Federal tax law requires that 95 percent 
of a REIT's annual gross income must be from specified sources such as 
dividends, interests and rents, and 75 percent of the gross income must be from 
real estate related sources. Similarly, at the end of each calendar quarter, 75 
percent of a REIT's assets must consist of specified “real estate” assets. 
Consequently, REITs must derive a majority of their gross income from 
commercial real estate. And, the REIT rules require that at least 90 percent of a 
REIT's total income must be returned to the company's shareholders in the form 
of dividends. 
 
While REITs have played a major role in the U.S. economy since 1960, their 
mark in the investing world has primarily been achieved since passage of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, a time period many refer to as the "Modern REIT 
Era." This law removed most of the tax-sheltering capability of real estate and 
emphasized income producing transactions, allowing REITs to operate and 
manage real estate as well as own it. I am pleased that over the years, Congress 
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has adopted legislation to perfect the REIT method of investing in real estate. 
Among many proposals, these include the REIT Simplification Act of 1997, the 
REIT Modernization Act of 1999, the REIT Improvement Act of 2004, and the 
REIT Investment Diversification and Empowerment Act passed in 2008.  
 
REIT executives are hard-working business men and women who are singularly 
focused on bringing increased value to their shareholders. According to the 
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, NAREIT, which is also 
celebrating its golden anniversary, these executives have proven to be 
successful in this objective, especially in the past two years in the wake of the 
financial downturn. Indeed, the vision of Congress has come to fruition: the 
equity market capitalization of REITs at the end of 2010 was $389 billion, up 
from only $1.5 billion at the end of 1971, and listed REITs distributed $13.5 
billion to shareholders in 2009.  
I am pleased to be joined by my colleague, Senator MIKULSKI, who is a 
cosponsor of this legislation, and I am pleased that my home state of Georgia is 
headquarters to several REIT companies that are engaged in the daily business 
of creating wealth and employment for many investors across the country and 
my constituents. These companies include Cousins Properties Incorporated, 
Gables Residential Trust, Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Incorporated, Post 
Properties, Incorporated, and Wells Real Estate Investment Trust. In total, there 
are more than 1400 REIT properties located in Georgia, with an estimated 
historical cost in the billions of dollars. 
 
Commercial real estate represents more than 6 percent of this country's gross 
domestic product and is a key generator of jobs and other economic activities. 
Today, because of the foresight that Congress had 5 decades ago, anyone can 
purchase shares of real estate operating companies, and do so in a manner that 
meets their investment needs by focusing on a particular sector in the 
commercial real estate world and a specific region of the country. That is the 
beauty of the REIT method of investing, whose influence has now spread 
abroad to more than 2 dozen countries that have adopted a similar model 
encouraging real estate investment.  
 
I again congratulate the REIT industry on this momentous occasion of their 50 
years of leadership in the real estate investing market. REITs have fulfilled 
Congress' vision by making investments in large scale, capital intensive 
commercial real estate available to all investors. I thank my colleagues for 
supporting this resolution, and I look forward to continuing to work with them 
on issues of importance to REIT investors (Isakson, 2010). 
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VITA 
 
Barbara Sumrall White, CPA, CBA, CGMA, PhD(c)_____________ 
179 Laurelwood Drive, Pike Road, AL 36064 • Ph: 334-320-9235 • Email: 
bwhite@huntingdon.edu, bswhite@go.olemiss.edu 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
August 2005  Huntingdon College, Montgomery, Alabama. 
To Present  
Assistant Professor - Accounting.  Responsible for teaching various 
accounting courses, while also advising students interested in pursuing a 
career in accounting and business administration majors, as needed.  In 
addition, assist in the development and growth of the accounting 
program at Huntingdon College.  Serve as a liaison with the business 
community in an effort to establish relationships with the college for 
both the program and the students.  Work with students and businesses 
to secure internships for those interested.  Assist students in developing 
an understanding of accounting practices and issues and how they apply 
in the overall business environment, while gaining an appreciation for 
the liberal arts.  Strive to incorporate real life examples (based on 
personal working experiences) in the classroom, so as to show the 
relevance and applicability of the material to their future working 
experiences.   Install in students their social responsibility.     
 
January 2009  University of Mississippi, Oxford, Mississippi. 
To December 2010 
   Graduate Assistant/Instructor of Accounting.  Responsible for teaching 
introductory accounting courses and assisting students in learning the 
concepts, as  part of a graduate assistantship while conducting PhD 
studies in Accounting. 
 
August 1997  Huntingdon College, Montgomery, Alabama. 
To August 2005  
   Adjunct Accounting Instructor.  Responsible for teaching various 
accounting, audit and finance courses as requested by management.  In  
addition, work to assist students in developing an understanding of 
 accounting issues and how they relate to the overall business 
 environment.   
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 July 1986  Colonial Companies (The Colonial Company and Colonial 
To December 2008 BancGroup), Montgomery, Alabama  
       
   Contract Tax Advisor, The Colonial Company, September 2005 to 
December 2008.   
Perform contract tax and advising services on an as-needed basis. 
    
Corporate Tax Manager, The Colonial Company, January 1997 to  
   August 2005. 
Responsible for the timely payment and administration of all taxes 
related to the various entities and owner himself, including income 
taxes, property taxes, sales and use taxes, franchise taxes, etc.  Prepared 
tax returns and tax filings to ensure compliance with federal and state 
agencies and reviewed tax assessments with appropriate company 
personnel for reasonable valuations.  Where necessary, participated in 
the protest of valuations in an effort to keep taxes at a justifiable and 
reasonable level.  In addition, prepared periodic financial statements for 
the owner and his family and helped coordinate financial issues related 
to personal net worth and legal obligations.  Updated on a monthly basis, 
the owner’s stock accounts and net worth position and periodically 
provided him with an evaluation of his Brokers’ performance.   
 
Merger/Acquisition Coordinator and Budget Director, Colonial 
BancGroup, January 1995 to January 1997.   
Responsible for the implementation and coordination of the merger and 
acquisition process for the corporation, including establishment of a 
Merger/Acquisition manual.   Involved in the due diligence process by 
both being an initial contact for the institution to be acquired and also by 
providing assistance to other bank personnel in 
obtaining/distributing/reviewing information.  After agreement to 
purchase was signed, was responsible for coordination of the statewide 
conversion process.  Position also evolved into coordinating the yearly 
budget process for the corporation and implementing new budget 
software. 
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Corporate Financial Analyst, The Colonial Company, March 1990 to 
December 1994.   
Responsible for the preparation and presentation of the monthly 
financial reports to The Colonial Company Board.  Prepared annually 
the Current Value Financial Statement of The Consolidated Colonial 
Company and Subsidiaries, which assigned market values to the various 
companies’ assets.  Prepared annual personal financial statements for the 
companies’ owners.  Coordinated the budgeting process for all the 
companies.  Conducted financial analysis and work flow reviews of 
companies and/or projects as requested by management.  Established the 
strategic planning process and package for all the companies and 
coordinated the meetings. 
 
Accounting Manager, Colonial BancGroup, February 1998 to February 
1990.   
Responsible for the preparation and review of monthly financial 
statements for the holding company and subsidiaries.  Assisted in the 
preparation of the Annual Report, Comptroller’s (Call) Report and other 
quarterly filings.  Where either no or inadequate procedures existed, was 
responsible for designing and 
implementing methodology to control transactions within the accounting 
department and affected areas.  Established a system for collecting 
FASB 91 data, and performed follow-up to ensure compliance.  
Participated in projects as requested by management, including 
statewide accounting consolidation.  
 
Special Projects Audit Manager, Colonial BancGroup, July 1986 to July 
1988.  
Performed pre-acquisition reviews of proposed mergers while designing 
audit programs to identify and report any contingencies.  Supervised 
and/or provided consultant work to branch locations on request of 
management.  Participated with outside auditors on audits of holding 
company books.  Responsible for updating the Audit Manual as new 
policies and procedures were issued by management.  On a limited basis, 
performed application reviews and assisted audit staff in the timely 
completion of their audits. 
 
 August 1991 Auburn University at Montgomery, Montgomery, Alabama 
 To May 1992 
   Adjunct Accounting Instructor.    Responsible for teaching either section 
 of the Principles of Accounting course on a quarterly basis as requested. 
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June 1983 Deposit Guaranty National Bank, Jackson, Mississippi 
 To June 1986 
   Information Systems Auditor/Financial Auditor.  Provided audit support 
to both internal and external auditors and federal examiners, conducted 
audits and system reviews of computerized information systems, and 
participated in the evaluation of security and controls at the Information 
Center.  Wrote or revised audit  programs and audit reports for the areas 
audited and  participated in special projects as requested by 
management.  Supervised and performed financial audits of bank 
branches and departmental operations, and assisted external auditors in 
the conduct of their audits. 
 
EDUCATION  University of Mississippi  
   Completed  coursework and passed comprehensive exams in the PhD in 
Accounting program.  Have successfully proposed Dissertation with 
expected completion by Summer 2012. 
 
San Francisco State University 
   Coursework in Calculus completed August 2008 as prerequisite to PhD 
 program. 
 
Huizenga School of Business & Entrepreneurship, Nova Southeastern 
University 
Additional Accounting coursework completed September 2005. 
 
Keller Graduate School of Management, Devry University 
Additional Accounting coursework completed June 2005. 
 
Auburn University at Montgomery 
   M.B.A. conferred August 1990.  GPA 3.9. 
 
   University of Alabama at Birmingham 
   Additional Accounting coursework completed May 1988. 
 
   Millsaps College, Jackson, Mississippi. 
   B.B.A. in Accounting conferred May 1983. 
   Cum Laude Graduate.  Dean’s List.  GPA 3.6. 
   Concentration in Computer Studies. 
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Ongoing Continuing Professional Education (CPE) courses taken with 
such institutions as the Alabama Society of CPAs and Mississippi 
Society of CPAs.  CPE courses, at a rate of 40 hours per year, have been 
taken since 1984.   
 
CERTIFICATIONS/PUBLICATIONS 
   Certified Public Accountant (CPA). 
   Certified Bank Auditor (CBA). 
   Chartered Global Management Accountant (CGMA). 
Authored the book, Family-Career Choices:  A Women’s Perspective, 
published 1997.  Performed signings, discussions, and seminars in 
connection with this book’s promotion and distribution. 
   Co-Authored paper, “Ethical Prompts and Their Effects on the 
Individual’s Evaluation of Acceptable Business Practices:  
Consideration for CPAs,” presented at the American Accounting 
Association’s 2010 Southeast Region Meeting held in April 2010 and 
the Annual Meeting’s Ethics Symposium in August 2010.  Paper 
 published in Research on Professional Responsibility and 
 Ethics in Accounting’s April 2012 issue. 
Co-Authored paper, “An Empirical Examination of Non-GAAP 
Disclosures by Real Estate Investment Trusts Before and During a 
Period of Crisis,” accepted for presentation at the American Accounting 
Association’s Annual Meeting in Washington D. C. in August 2012. 
Co-Authored paper, “The Implementation of SFAS 91:  A Financial 
Accounting Pronouncement with Cost Accounting Implications,” 
published in Journal of  Bank Auditing and Accounting’s Spring 1991 
issue. 
Authored paper, “Dr. John Massey:  Farm Boy, Confederate Soldier, and 
Renowned Educator - Financial Documentation as an Indicator of his 
Life’s Work,” presented at the American Accounting Association’s 
Southeast Regional Meeting held in April 2011.  
 
ACTVITIES/AWARDS  
Awards specific to professional growth/development: 
   Recipient of the Alabama Society of Certified Public Accountants’ 2009 
 Public Service Award. 
Selected by the University of Mississippi’s Patterson School of 
Accountancy as their Doctoral Student Representative for the American 
Accounting Association 2010 Deloitte Doctoral Consortium.   
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Awards/Activities specific to position at Huntingdon College: 
Recipient of the Mary Mildred Sullivan Award (“Presented to those 
persons who by their general conduct and their relations with others 
indicate that they possess to a marked degree a spirit of helpfulness and 
an awareness of the beauty and value of the intangible elements of life.”) 
Recipient of The Julia Lightfoot Sellers Award, which is given to one 
Faculty member each year as voted on by the junior/senior class of  
Huntingdon College “who in their judgment has done much this year 
toward inspiring them to mobility of purpose and integrity of character, 
and rekindling within  them a deeper desire for learning.” 
Faculty Advisor, Huntingdon College Accounting Club (Club was 
awarded the Jimmy Baker Spirit Award and Margaret Hicks Shadoin 
Community Service Award for being the most involved campus 
organization and performing the most hours of community service.) 
Faculty Advisor/Director, Huntingdon College Founder’s Day Run, 
which is a fundraiser for The Leukemia & Lymphoma Society 
Faculty Adviser/Participant in Savefirst Initiative of Impact Alabama, 
which provides free tax services to low income individuals. 
Faculty Advisor, Huntingdon College Running Club 
 
Other Awards/Activities: 
Member, American Accounting Association 
Member, Academy of Accounting Historians 
Member, Alabama Society of Certified Public Accountants 
   Member, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
   Member, Montgomery Chapter of CPAs 
   Member, Alpha Eta Sigma, Accounting Honorary Society 
Board Treasurer/Director, Consumer Credit Counseling Center of 
Alabama 
Race Director, Woodland Wallahatchie 10k, 5k and 1 Mile Run/Walk, 
which is a fundraiser for the Leukemia & Lymphoma Society 
   Mentor/Team Captain, Team-N-Training Program with the Leukemia & 
    Lymphoma Society 
Member, 50 States Marathon Club & Marathon Maniacs Club 
   Member, Auburn Opelika Running and Track Association 
Member, Woodland United Methodist Church 
   Member, Humane Society of United States 
     
INTERESTS  Marathon runner, having completed 53 marathons to date.  Completed 
the goal to run a marathon in all 50 states and the District of Columbia in 
June 2011.  Pursuing goal to run a marathon on all 7 continents.  
